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Abstract
This thesis examines share price performance of firms after mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) in some major EU M&A markets. In particular, they are the UK, French and 
German M&A markets. The thesis performs a full empirical survey covering not only 
both the short and long run share price performance, but also both domestic and cross- 
border acquisitions. In addition, the thesis pays attention to the long run performance 
of the acquirers of private target firms.
Based on a sample in the three selected M&A markets over the period 1992-2003, the 
thesis shows that, in the short run, target firm shareholders receive on average positive 
excess returns while acquirers receive on average zero or slightly positive excess 
returns. This is in line with other studies in this area. In addition, amongst other 
things, UK target firm shareholders receive substantially higher excess returns than 
continental-EU target firm shareholders.
In the case of the UK sample, there is some evidence that in the long run domestic 
acquirers on average experience negative buy-and-hold-abnormal-retums and cross- 
border acquirers are likely to experience insignificant buy-and-hold-abnormal-retums. 
When I gather all types of UK acquirers together, the evidence shows that overall 
acquisitions by UK acquirers yield negative profits in the long run. The thesis also 
shows that UK overlapping acquirers outperform UK non-overlapping acquirers in 
certain circumstances.
On the other hand, the results of the French sample in general suggest no under- or 
over- performance in the long run. In Germany, there is some evidence for 
underperformance in the long run.
The thesis reveals that, in the long run, UK acquirers of cross-border M&As 
experience higher share price performance than those of domestic M&As. Other 
factors, such as means of payment, tender offer, market-to-book-value, leverage ratio, 
and market value are found to be important determinants for the short and/or the long 
run share price performance.
Overall, this thesis performs a comprehensive empirical study. to examine the 
profitability of firms after M&As and explore the determinants of the profitability.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
Section 1.1 Objectives and Importance of the Study
This study aims to consider a comprehensive empirical examination of the 
profitability of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) following an event study approach. 
The profitability of M&A activity as well as some other relevant issues has generated 
a wide interest and debate over the past 30 years. Various approaches have been 
adopted by earlier researchers such as case studies (or surveys of executives), 
accounting studies examining financial statements and event studies examining 
abnormal returns to shareholders. Among these approaches, the event study approach 
has the unique advantages of being theoretically well-grounded and providing a direct 
measure of value created for investors.
Earlier event studies have extensively studied short run abnormal returns for target 
and bidding firms. In general they report positive and statistically significant 
abnormal returns for target firms. The results for bidding firms are quite mixed. Some 
frequently cited studies, such as Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Franks and Harris 
(1989), conclude that acquiring firms generally experience zero or slightly positive 
abnormal returns in several days surrounding the announcement time, whereas some 
other studies, such as Healy, Palepu and Ruback (1992), claim negative abnormal 
returns for acquiring firms over the event time.
While the announcement period returns are important sources of information, the 
possibility exists that the market does not always accurately predict the future 
performance of M&As. Based on the announcement period returns, we may still ask if 
bidding firms’ shareholders do experience wealth gains (or losses) over longer periods 
(e.g. up to 5 years). Put differently, the short run abnormal returns may only provide 
an incomplete image of acquiring firms’ shareholder wealth effects. Therefore, it is 
important to examine the long run share price performance of M&As together with 
the short run performance.
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Despite the importance of examining the long run share price performance, however, 
there is a relative lack of long run event studies which is in sharp contrast with a large 
number of existing short run studies. Also, consequently, only a few earlier studies 
(e.g. Franks and Harris, 1989; Gregory, 1997) have examined both the short and the 
long run share price performance of M&As. In addition, recently researchers (e.g. 
Fama and French, 1992, 1993; Barber and Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999; Mitchell 
and Stafford, 2000) have raised serious questions on earlier studies employing 
conventional event-study methodologies for detecting the long run share price 
performance. As a result, some earlier long run event studies of M&As may be flawed 
for various methodological reasons (discussed later in this dissertation). Hence, for all 
the reasons above, this study undertakes an event study focusing on the long run, 
while also examining the short run, shareholder wealth effects of M&As and utilising 
methodologies that are robust to these recent criticisms.
Earlier event studies of M&A activity have also focused more on domestic M&A 
markets, and relatively rarely has an earlier event study examined both domestic and 
cross-border M&As in both the short and the long run. However, there are important 
theoretical reasons for examining the wealth effects of both domestic M&As and 
cross-border M&As. Roll (1986) argues that bidding companies tend to over-pay for 
targets because managers are affected by ‘hubris’. Overseas companies are more 
difficult to value than domestic firms due to greater information asymmetry (e.g. due 
to different accounting standards, difficulties of access foreign information) and as a 
result, cross-border bidders may be linked with greater ‘hubris’ than domestic ones. In 
this case, we may see higher target gains and lower bidder gains in cross-border 
M&As than in domestic M&As.1 In contrast, as argued by Sudarsanam (1995, p. 269), 
there is a group of other factors indicating that cross-border bidders may, in fact, turn 
out to be outperformers compared with domestic bidders. This group of opinions 
claims that cross-border M&As may be more influenced by synergy-related factors 
such as escaping a small home market, extending markets served, achieving 
economies of scale and responding to overseas clients’ needs. These factors provide 
an argument for expecting higher shareholder wealth effects in cross-border than in
1 There are some other arguments that suggest lower bidder gains in cross-border than in 
domestic M&As. See Section 2.3.2.2 of Chapter 2 (Literature Review) for more discussion of 
this issue.
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domestic M&As. For all the reasons above, it is important to examine the 
performance of these different types of M&As. This study does so by bringing cross- 
border and domestic M&As together and makes comparisons between them in one 
study.
Earlier event studies of M&A activity have also been limited to some extent in terms 
of concentrating mainly on the US and UK markets and/or M&As in a single country. 
Conn and Connell (1990) suggest that regulations that facilitate the flow of 
information regarding M&As can encourage competitive bids. As a result, higher 
premiums for targets may exist in the better regulated UK and US markets. La Porta 
et al. (2000) claims that a positive relationship exists between the quality of 
shareholder protection and share valuations assessed by investors. La Porta et al. 
(2000) suggests that shareholder protection is higher in English common law 
countries (such as the UK and US) than in civil law countries (such as France and 
Germany). Therefore, target firms in the UK and US markets may, on average, 
receive higher premiums than those in other markets. In addition, the UK and US 
markets have higher liquidity than other markets. A higher liquidity allows savers to 
sell their shares more easily if they desire, therefore making shares relatively more 
attractive investments. Many profitable investments require a long-term commitment 
of capital, but investors might not want to tie up their savings for such long periods. 
All the considerations above suggest that target firms in the UK and US markets may 
experience higher wealth effects than those in other markets (such as the French and 
German markets). Hence, an investigation of M&As for multi-countries may be 
important and may yield interesting results at least for target firms. This study does so 
by examining EU M&A markets. In particular, it focuses on the UK market but also 
brings two Continental-EU M&A markets (specifically, the French and German 
markets) into one study. These are the most active M&A markets in Continental-EU 
and they have better data availability than other Continental-EU countries. This also 
contributes to the literature of the profitability of M&As because rarely has an earlier 
event study examined, in particular, the long run share price performance of the 
French and German M&A markets.
Finally, there is a distinctive lack of event studies, especially long run event studies, 
that have examined recent data. Prior long-run event studies have only investigated
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the period up to Year 1994 (e.g. Gregory and McCorriston, 2005). Therefore, this 
study focuses on the most recent period for the UK, France and Germany, specifically, 
from 1992 to 2003. The next section will introduce the background of M&A activities 
for this period and we can see that there are some significant movements of M&A 
activities during this period.
Section 1.2 M&A Activities
As noted in Section 1.1, this study investigates the shareholder wealth effects of the 
major EU M&As (the UK, France and Germany) for the period 1992-2003. In the 
1990s, due to the introduction of the single currency in the European Union, the 
deregulation and promotion of an integrated single market in Europe (and as a result 
the decreased cost of performing European corporate acquisitions), the technological 
progress in some industries and the development of financial instruments and markets, 
the value of M&A activity in Europe rose significantly. In terms of the total value, the 
largest M&A wave in history could be observed spanning approximately the years 
1992-2000. The start of the rise in M&A activity in Europe seems to be from the end 
of the year 1992. In 1993 the total dollar value paid for target firms doubled after four 
consecutive years of decline in M&A activity. An even steeper rise was observed in 
1996 with European M&A activity accounting for 37% of the worldwide value of 
M&A deals. In the following years, the total value of M&A deals in Europe rose 
further to about 550.9 (S billion) in 1997, 869.2 (S billion) in 1998, 1,559.9 ($ billion) 
in 1999, and 1,483.9 (S billion) in 2000. The year 1999 was remarkable for the 
European M&A market as it was almost as large as the US market. Afterwards 
(approximately from 2001), Europe experienced a reduction in M&A activity.
More detailed information is available on the UK M&A market. Together with the 
M&A trend in Europe, the level of UK M&A activity similarly appeared to accelerate 
in the 1990s (see Figure 1.1 below). In the UK, after a M&A wave during the period 
1986-1989, another wave was observed from around 1995. This M&A wave has 
involved some very large takeover bids and the total value of M&As has reached a
2 Data source of paragraph: a M&A report by Thomson Financial Securities Data report, and 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004).
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new high. The value of the UK M&As in 1994 was 28,646 (£ million) whereas in 
1995 it was 57,384 (£ million). In 1998, the value of UK M&A deals jumped to 
116,855 (£ million), in 1999 the UK M&A wave gained even more strength with a 
value of 198,216 (£ million), and by the end of 2000 it reached a peak value of 
352,819 (£ million). After year 2000, the value of UK M&A deals decreased sharply 
and by the end of 2003 it was only 48,744 (£ million).
We can observe this trend in Panel A of Figure 1.1.3 On the other hand, Panel B of 
Figure 1.1 shows the quarterly number of M&As from 1992 to 2003. By comparing 
Panel A and Panel B we can see that, from around 1995, both the number and value of 
M&A deals with a UK company involved rose steadily. The number of M&As peaked 
in Year 2000 Quarter 1 and the value of M&As peaked in Year 2000 Quarter 2. After 
this period, UK M&A activity decreased especially in terms of total value.
Also, cross-border M&As contribute to an important part of the UK M&A activities 
in terms of both number and total value. In Figure 2, Panel A shows that 67% of the 
deal values (deflated by the FTSE ALL Share index) in the period 1992-2003 are 
from cross-border M&As for the UK market. Also, in Panel B we can see more than 
half the number of M&A cases are cross-border ones. Furthermore, outward UK 
cross-border M&As have higher total value (as well as more total bid numbers) than 
inward ones. According to UNCTAD (2000), by 2000 the UK was the largest 
acquiring country worldwide, accounting for 31% of the total value of all cross-border 
acquisitions.
In short, the period, 1992-2003, examined by this study represents some significant 
movements in M&A activities from a historical point of view. The next section will 
briefly introduce the major findings for this period as well as the structure of the study.
3 The deal values in Figure 1.1 are quarterly data and deflated using the FTSE ALL Share 
index.
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Figure 1.1
The Value and Number of Domestic and Cross-border M&As in the UK M&A Market, 1992-2003
Panel A: Value of Domestic and Cross-border M&As
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Note: The values of M&As are deflated using the FTSE ALL Share index. 
Data Source: UK Office for National Statistics
Figure 1.2
The Value and Number of Domestic and Cross-border M&As (in percentage) in the UK M&A Market, 1992-2003
Panel A: Value (in percentage) of Domestic and 
Cross-border M&As
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Note: The values of M&As are deflated using the FTSE ALL Share index. 
Data Source: UK Office for National Statistics
7
Section 1.3 Major Findings and the Structure of the Study
Some major findings of this study are concluded as follows. First, Section 1.1 has 
raised the question: how was the long run share price performance of M&As, in 
comparison with their short run performance, for the period examined in this study? 
The results of this study show that, in the short run, shareholders of both domestic and 
cross-border target firms enjoy wealth gains for all three countries. This is in line with 
most other studies in this area (e.g. Franks and Harris, 1989). On the other hand, in 
general, shareholders of bidding firms experience insignificant average abnormal 
returns although there is some evidence that UK acquirers’ shareholders may 
experience small positive wealth effects in the short run.
However, in the long horizon, the results show that there is strong evidence that UK 
domestic bidders of listed targets under-perform relative to a control firm (or a control 
portfolio) model. Some evidence of negative long-run share price performance can 
also be found for UK domestic bidders of private targets but this depends on the 
methodology used. UK cross-border acquirers, in general, experience insignificant 
abnormal returns in the long run. Nevertheless, by gathering all types of UK acquirers 
together, negative average abnormal returns are found in the long run in the UK. This 
supports the view of some earlier studies such as Gregory (1997) but is in contrast 
with some other studies such as Higson and Elliot (1998). These earlier studies will be 
discussed in Chapter 2 (Literature Review). On the other hand, there is some evidence 
for share price underperformance in the long horizon for the German sample, 
depending on methodology used. Results for the French sample mainly suggest no 
under- or over- share price performance in the long run.
On balance, I find that some types of acquirers under-perform in the long run. This 
raises a question on the wealth-creation feature of M&As measured in the short run. It 
also raises a question as to whether these types of M&As should be approved in the 
first place. From a shareholder (and a broader public policy) point of view, the results 
suggest that investors need to be more cautious in supporting these types of M&As.
Second, Section 1.1 has also raised two more questions: one is whether cross-border 
M&As experience different profitability compared with domestic M&As for the
8
period examined? Another is whether UK M&As on average experienced different 
profitability compared with French and German M&As at least for target firms? On 
the first question, this study reveals that, in the short run, UK targets in cross-border 
M&As experience higher share price performance than those in domestic M&As. 
However, UK bidders in cross-border M&As do not under-perform UK domestic 
bidders. In the long run, there is evidence that UK cross-border bidders have better 
share price performance than UK domestic bidders. These results suggest that some 
synergy-related factors (such as escaping small home markets and responding to 
overseas clients) are important to UK cross-border bidders in the long run. On the 
second question, this study finds a ‘market effect’ does exist. The available evidence 
suggests that target firms in the UK market on average gain considerably higher 
abnormal returns than those in the French and German markets. This is consistent 
with the view discussed in Section 1.1. On the other hand, no ‘market effect’ is 
observed in bidding firms between the UK market and the French and German 
markets.
Third, this study further attempts to explore the possible determinants to explain the 
variations in the share price performance of UK M&As for the period examined. A 
number of factors have been discovered that have explanatory power for short- and/or 
long- run post-acquisition share price performance. For example, this study suggests 
that Jensen (1986)’s ‘free cash flow’ hypothesis4 is not a major factor in the UK 
M&A market by examining the impacts of cash offer and dividend yield on M&A 
profitability. This study shows that the post-acquisition share price performance has a 
positively relationship with cash offers and a negative relationship with dividend yield. 
This is in contrast with Jensen (1986)’s predictions. As one more example, this study 
also suggests that acquirers’ experience of handling M&As may have a positive 
impact on bidding firm shareholder wealth effects, as reflected by the better 
performance of an overlapping5 sample than a non-overlapping one. More findings, 
including the importance of tender offer, market value, market-to-book-value, the
4 Jensen (1986) predicts that firms with larger free cash flow are more likely to undertake 
M&As than pay out cash to shareholders because of a conflict of interest between managers 
and shareholders. He also argues that low or negative profitability is often associated with 
these kinds of M&As.
5 ‘Overlapping’ means bidders have multiple M&As within the relevant periods.
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total debt / common equity ratio and some other factors are also obtained and their 
implications are discussed in Chapters 4-6.
The rest of the study is organised as follows:
In chapter 2, I survey more than 100 earlier studies using the event study approach 
and present a review of the existing literature. Chapter 2 discusses the motives of 
mergers and acquisitions, reviews existing studies on both short and long run 
shareholder wealth effects, and further summarises existing evidence on the possible 
determinants of share price performance. Some hypotheses are generated which are 
tested in later chapters.
In chapter 3, I discuss various methods used for both short and long run tests of 
abnormal returns. Besides the presentation of the methodologies, chapter 3 identifies 
the potential problems that exist in event studies for both the short and the long run as 
well as discussing the advantages and limitations of each methodology discussed.
In chapter 4, I present the share price performance for the short run for up to one 
month surrounding the announcement of an M&A for the UK, French and German 
samples in turn. The market model, the multi-factor market model and the control 
firm model were employed although since all gave similar results, only results based 
on the market model are reported. Some other relevant issues, such as comparing 
cross-border M&As and domestic M&As and comparing the UK market and the 
French and German markets, are also discussed.
In chapter 5 ,1 present the share price performance for acquirers for up to 5 years after 
the announcement of a M&A for the UK, France and German markets. Efforts are 
made to ensure that the results are robust to some recent criticisms of commonly used 
event study methodologies. Various methods are employed including the control firm 
model, the control portfolio model, the Fama-French three-factor model with the 
calendar time approach, the control portfolio model with the calendar time approach, 
and the control firm model adjusted for industry. Additionally, skewness-adjusted t- 
statistics (where applicable) are calculated to avoid test statistic misspecifications. On 
the other hand, the original samples are subdivided into non-overlapping sub-samples
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and overlapping sub-samples. In particular, the calendar time approach is employed 
for overlapping sub-samples as this provides a way of avoiding sample contamination 
and statistical biases in this kind of study.
In chapter 6, I examine the possible determinants of share price performance 
following the announcement of M&As. This chapter examines a number of factors 
and discusses the possible implications of the results. The factors include 
domestic/cross-border acquisitions, cash/equity payment methods, tender/non-tender 
offers, acquiring private/publicly-listed target firms, dividend yield, market-to-book- 
value, the total debt to common equity ratio, market value, and industry effects. Their 
impact is examined for up to five years following a M&A announcement and a 
number of significant effects are observed.
In Chapter 7, a conclusion is made for this study. It brings all the major results of this 
study together and discusses their implications. Chapter 7 also identifies the 
contributions and discusses the wider significance of the results in this study.
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Chapter 2 Literature Review
Section 2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews studies on the profitability of M&As as well as other relevant 
issues. About 100 studies are surveyed in this chapter including the most cited 
research over several decades, and some most recent and notable work.
Research generally offers four approaches to measure merger and acquisition 
profitability. They are: the accounting approach examining reported financial 
performance, surveys of executives, case studies focusing on one transaction in order 
to explore insights in more detail, and event studies. I concentrate on event studies in 
this thesis. A distinctive advantage of the event study methodology is that it provides 
a direct measure of value created for investors.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: 1) to examine the major hypotheses of 
M&A motives (Section 2.2); 2) to review the existing empirical results on the 
profitability of M&As in the short run, both for domestic and cross-border M&As 
(Section 2.3); 3) to review the existing empirical results on the profitability of M&As 
for bidders in the long run (Section 2.4); 4) to examine the links between the motives 
and M&A profitability in relation to bid characteristics (e.g. means of payment) 
(Section 2.5). Finally, a conclusion (Section 2.6) is made for Chapter 2.
Section 2.2 Motives for M&As
This section discusses the possible motives for M&As. Mainly three hypothesis of 
motives for M&As have been advanced in the literature: the synergy motive, the 
agency motive, and the ‘hubris’ motive.
2.2.1 Synergies
The synergy motive assumes that managers of targets and acquirers maximize 
shareholder wealth and would engage in takeover activity only if acquisitions result in
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gains to both sets of shareholders. As a result, ‘synergies’ are created and M&As are 
beneficial to shareholders. A number of forms of synergy may be distinguished as 
follows.
First, synergy gains could occur through the realization of economies of scale and 
scope. Datta and Puia (1995, p. 340) state that synergies are ‘created’ through M&As: 
‘...for both cross-border and domestic acquisitions, operating synergies in 
acquisitions can take the form of economies of scale and scope (in areas such as 
R&D, marketing and production) resulting in a firm being able to secure a cost 
advantage over its competitors’. This form of synergy gain is often involved in 
horizontal (acquiring firms with similar production lines) and vertical (acquiring firms 
at different stages of an industry) M&As. For horizontal M&As, extra synergy gains 
may be achieved through the familiarity the acquiring firm has in the acquired firm 
industry; for vertical M&As, extra synergy gains may be achieved through more 
efficient co-ordination of the different levels of an industry.
Second, value creation may be realized through the replacement of less efficient 
management of the acquired firms (e.g. Manne, 1965). M&As may improve the 
efficiency of the combined firms’ operations by letting superior managers shift 
control of an acquired firm’s assets from a relatively inefficient management to the 
superior managers of the acquiring firms. Both the range and depth of the 
management skills and abilities could be improved and transferred to the acquired 
firms. This type of M&A is often hostile in its bid characteristics.
Some studies agree that ‘synergies’ occur through replacing the management of the 
acquired firm, but stress different perspectives. For example, Brealey and Myers 
(1991, p. 283 ) stress that in some cases synergies are ‘saved’ by getting rid of 
inefficient management and operation rather than ‘created’ by better management 
skills: ‘...there are always firms with unexplored opportunities to cut costs and 
increase sales and earnings. Such firms are natural candidates for acquisition by other 
firms with better management. ...in some cases ‘better management’ may simply 
mean the determination to force painful cuts or realignment of the company’s 
operations.’
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Third, synergy gains may also be realized for financial reasons. If the cash flow 
streams of the two firms are not perfectly correlated, corporate failure probabilities 
may be lowered through M&A. Although the co-insurance motive above benefits 
debtholders at the expense of shareholders (Higgins and Schall, 1975), this effect can 
be offset by increasing gearing after the M&A, and the result will be increased tax 
savings on interest payments (Galai and Masulis, 1976).
Finally, synergy gains may be achieved by acquiring under-valued target firms. This 
‘under-valuation’ hypothesis often uses the ‘q’ ratio as a proxy, where the ‘q’ ratio is 
the ratio of market value to replacement cost of a company’s assets. For example, if 
the ‘q’ ratio of a target is 0.6 and the premium paid by a bidder over the target’s 
market value is 50%, the resulting purchase price is 0.6 times 1.5 which equals 0.9. 
Since the outcome ‘0.9’ would still be 10% below the current replacement cost of the 
assets acquired, this acquisition may imply a ‘good buy’. Empirically, however, there 
are difficulties of accurately valuing a ‘q’ ratio (e.g. Gonzalez et al. 1998).
In summary, the ‘synergies’ motive assumes that M&As maximize shareholders’ 
wealth. The sources of synergies may be due to operating synergies through 
economies of scale and scope, replacement of less efficient management, financial 
reasons, and seeking under-valued targets.
2.2.2 Agency Problems
Managers might have substantial power while in office. The problem of managerial 
power and discretion when ownership and management are separated has been 
analyzed as an ‘agency problem’. Managers may engage in maximizing their own 
benefits rather than shareholders’. They also may fail to distribute excess cash to 
shareholders and instead prefer a less desirable M&A. These ‘agency-related’ issues 
provide another dimension motivating M&As.
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Maximizing Managers ’ Own Interests
When a firm makes an acquisition, its managers might consider both their personal 
benefits from the investment and the consequences for the market value of the firm. 
Assuming that managers have enough independence from their shareholders, they 
may aim to maximize their own utility rather other maximize shareholders’ wealth. 
As a result, this will reduce the profitability of the M&A against the shareholders’ 
interests. This hypothesis is directly contrasting to the ‘synergies’ hypothesis. A 
number of hypotheses on how managers may want to maximize their own utility may 
be distinguished as follows.
Williamson (1964) suggests that managers may seek to maximize a utility function 
subject to reported profit exceeding some minimum acceptable level, which is a 
function of staff employed, emoluments of the managers and ‘discretionary’ profits. 
On the first term, the managers have a preference for increased staff as a means of 
increasing their power, salary and status. The emoluments refer to the portion of 
management compensation obtained directly in the form of expense accounts, large 
office, etc. The ‘discretionary’ profits are profits above the minimum performance 
constraint which are used as discretionary expenditure by the managers. Such 
expenditures, in particular, might be used for M&As which do not maximise 
shareholder wealth.
Marris (1964) suggests that the interests of the managers lead the firm to maximize as 
utility function which is a function of long-term growth subject to a constraint on their 
job security. Long term growth is seen as a proxy for income, power and prestige and 
the job security constraint is imposed by the desire not to be a M&A target. When the 
market value of a firm falls sufficiently, a M&A attack may occur and the managers’ 
job security is threatened. Marris (1964)’ model was the first to hypothesize that 
managers were constrained by the threat of M&As and could imply that M&As might 
actually be used to avoid any threat of other M&As.
There are some other hypotheses on why managers might prefer to maximize their 
own utility. For example, Amihud and Lev (1981) argue that managers hold highly 
undiversified portfolios which are overwhelmingly invested in their own firms, hence
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M&As are motivated in order to diversify managers’ personal portfolios. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989) argue that the greater complexity of larger firms may increase the 
firm’s dependence on management and hence, managers’ status and power in the firm 
is strengthened. Hence, managers will again love an incentive to undertake excess 
M7As.
All hypotheses above assume that shareholders* wealth is not a priority in the 
consideration of undertaking M&As. M&As may be motivated by empire building 
(for increasing status, power, salary, etc.), risk diversification of managers’ portfolios, 
and the defensive motive of avoiding becoming a M&A target. When managers and 
shareholders conflicts are severe, M&As may be associated with low- or non- 
profitable projects. In short, the ‘maximizing top managers’ own interests’ hypothesis 
implies that M&As are value-destroying for bidders and possibly for the combined 
firms as well.
In contrast with the views above, Mueller (1972)’s life-cycle theory suggest that 
M&As are one way to reduce manager/shareholder conflict by avoiding the slowdown 
in growth that product maturity brings. He hypothesizes the existence of ‘young’ 
firms that have ‘taken off* into a process of fast, accelerating growth (in terms of time 
since some event, e.g. a technological or commercial breakthrough) and which are 
associated with good profitability. At the ‘young’ stage the interests of managers and 
shareholders converge to maximum feasible growth. Later, as the exceptional 
circumstances fade, the optimum growth rate for shareholders gradually declines and 
may finally become negative. During this phase, conflict between managerial and 
stockholder interests emerges, and it is presumed that the managerial interests prevail. 
This hypothesis does not necessarily predict that the fastest growing firms are the 
ones for which the managerial/stockholder conflict is most severe. In contrast, the 
most extreme managerial/stockholder conflict may arise for firms that are hardly 
growing at all and have only modest opportunities for profit. In his model, M&As of 
moving into growth industries are one way to avoid slowdown in growth that product 
maturity brings and are not necessarily value-decreasing.
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Free Cash Flow Hypothesis
Jensen (1986, 1988) suggests that M&As in general generate a special type of agency 
problem in firms that have substantial free cash flow. Free cash flow is cash flow in 
excess of that required to fund all projects that have positive net present values when 
discounted at the relevant cost of capital (Jensen, 1986, p. 323). Such free cash flow is 
generally available to profitable firms in mature industries with few growth prospects 
(e.g. the tobacco industry). Managers of those firms have the option to increase the 
dividend payout or, alternatively, could reduce the size of free cash flow to finance 
diversifying acquisitions. When the organization generates substantial free cash flow, 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers over payout policies will be 
especially severe. Acquisitions may be used as one way for managers to spend cash 
instead of paying it out to shareholders. As a result some firms are more likely to 
make acquisitions when they have generated larger free cash flows. M&As of this 
type are often associated with low-benefit or even value-destroying projects. Jensen’s 
free cash theory, therefore, implies that M&As motivated by free cash flow are more 
likely to destroy, than to create, value.
Similar to the ‘maximizing managers’ own benefits’ hypothesis, the ‘free cash flow’ 
hypothesis also assumes that managers may not undertake M&As in an optimal way 
from the shareholders’ perspective. ‘For shareholders the (free cash flow) problem is 
how to motivate managers to disgorge the excess cash rather than investing it at below 
the cost of capital or wasting it on organisational inefficiencies’ (Jensen, 1988, p. 29).
2.2.3 ‘Hubris’ Hypothesis
In M&A markets, the bidding firm identifies a potential target firm and a ‘valuation’ 
of the equity of the target is undertaken. The ‘valuation’ itself can be considered a 
random variable whose mean is the target firm’s current market price. When the 
random variable exceeds its mean, a M&A offer is made and otherwise there is no 
offer. Now there is a possibility that no potential synergies exist but some bidding 
firms believe that such gains exist. As a result, offers are observed only when the 
valuation is too high. The M&A premium in such a case is a mistake by the bidding
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firm and most importantly, the observed error is always in the same direction. 
Corresponding errors in the opposite direction are not made public. This is the 
extreme version of the ‘hubris’ hypothesis raised by Roll (1986).
The ‘hubris’ hypothesis suggests (Roll, 1986, p. 212): ‘decision makers in acquiring 
firms pay too much for their targets due to ‘hubris’, which means they over-estimate 
their ability and/or make mistakes in evaluating potential targets. ...the ‘hubris’ 
hypothesis implies: (1) the combined value of the target and bidding firms could be 
zero or negative; (2) the value of the bidding firm should decrease; (3) the value of the 
target should increase’.
The extreme version of the ‘hubris’ hypothesis predicts that there are no synergistic 
gains from M&As and the entire premium paid to the target firm is a transfer from the 
acquirer. Roll (1986, p. 200) describes the ‘hubris’ hypothesis in its extreme version 
as consistent with strong form market efficiency: ‘financial markets are assumed to be 
efficient in that asset prices reflect all information about individual firms. Product and 
labour markets are assumed efficient in the sense that (a) no industrial reorganization 
can bring gains in aggregate output at the same cost or reductions in aggregate costs 
with the same output and (b) management talent is employed in its best alternative 
use’.
Heaton (2002) attempted to establish a mechanism to link managerial overconfidence, 
free cash flow and M&A activities together. Heaton (2002, p. 33) assumes that 
managers are generally too optimistic, where ‘optimistic’ is defined to mean they 
‘systematically overestimate the probability of good firm performance and 
underestimate the probability of bad firm performance’. First, managerial optimism 
leads managers to believe that capital markets undervalue their firm’s securities. 
Therefore, managerial optimism leads to a preference for internal funds to finance 
M&A activities. Second, optimistic managers overvalue their own corporate projects 
and may wish to invest in (in fact) unprofitable M&A projects even when they are 
loyal to shareholders. As a result, the Heaton (2002) framework suggests that: 1) 
M&As may be motivated by excessive managerial optimism when managers have 
enough internal funds at their disposal; 2) M&As’ profitability is affected by 
excessive managerial optimism because managers may overpay or misjudge their own
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ability according to Roll (1986); 3) such managers may prefer to finance M&As by 
excess cash flow without invoking the ‘agency* problems proposed by Jensen (1986).
Heaton (2002), in comparison with Roll (1986), makes the explicit assumption that 
individuals do not always make rational decisions under uncertainty. In addition, 
Heaton (2002) provides an alternative motive for cash-financed M&As without 
invoking Jensen (1986).1
In short, the ‘hubris’ related hypotheses suggest that M&As may not be value-creating 
because managers either over-estimate targets’ true value (and overpay) and/or are too 
optimistic of their own ability. Bidding firms infected by ‘hubris’ simply pay too 
much for their targets.
2.2.4 Conclusion
This section has (mainly) discussed three motives for M&As: synergy gains, agency 
problems, and ‘hubris’. The major difference between the ‘synergy’ and ‘agency’ 
motives is: the former assumes managers are motivated by shareholders’ interests and 
the latter suggests managers prefer to maximize their own utility at the expense of the 
shareholders of the firm. On the other hand, the ‘hubris’ hypothesis simply suggests 
that bidding firm managers make mistakes in evaluating target firms. The ‘synergy’ 
hypotheses predict positive gains for both targets and bidders of M&As, whereas the 
‘agency’ and ‘hubris’ hypotheses are often associated with negative wealth effects for 
bidder shareholders in M&As. In real life, multiple motives may be at work in any 
given M&A decision. For example, agency costs (or ‘hubris’ costs) may exist in 
conjunction with higher efficiency (e.g. Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000). This may 
increase the difficulties of empirical research of identifying motives for M&As.
1 The effects o f  cash offer on shareholder wealth effects are examined in more detail in 
Section 2.5.1.
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Section 2.3 Profitability of M&As: Short Run Studies
Numerous studies estimate the profitability of M&A activity on stock performance of 
bidder and target firms around the time of announcement of M&As. Section 2.3 
surveys those studies and examines insights about market-based excess returns to 
target shareholders, bidder shareholders, and the combined profitability of M&A 
activities respectively. Section 2.3 is organized as follows: excess returns for targets 
and bidders in domestic M&As; returns to bidders and targets combined; followed by 
a further discussion of excess returns for targets and bidders in cross-border M&As. I 
put the wealth effects of bidders and targets combined before the discussion of cross- 
border M&As because earlier studies on the combined wealth effects have been 
limited to domestic M&As.
2.3.1 Profitability of Domestic M&As
2.3.1.1 Excess Returns to Target Firms 
Prior surveys
Several earlier survey studies (e.g. Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Jarrell, Brickley & 
Netter, 1988; Jensen, 1988; and Datta and Pinches, 1992) in general conclude that 
target firm shareholders enjoy abnormal returns that are positive and statistically 
significant. For example, Jensen and Ruback (1983) survey 13 studies of pre-1980 
data and suggest that target shareholders receive average abnormal returns around 
16% for mergers and around 30% for tender offers2. Jarrell, Brickley & Netter (1988) 
agree that gains for target shareholders range from 19% to 35%, depending on the 
periods and bid types.
2 Tender offers are public offers (by a person or a group o f  individuals) to existing  
shareholders to buy a specific number o f  shares in the company at a particular price and date. 
See Section 2.5.3 for more discussion o f  tender offers.
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Survey o f the thesis
The survey of the thesis is summarized in Table A2.1 in the appendix3.
It is not easy to directly compare results across all studies reported in this table 
because the benchmark used, sample periods, trading markets, event windows and 
mode of bids are different from each other. However, in general, average abnormal 
returns to target shareholders are uniformly positive and statistically significant, 
despite variations in time periods, type of deals (mergers or tender offers), observation 
periods, etc. This conclusion holds up for the UK market, the US market and 
European markets.
For the UK market 8 studies are presented in Table A2.1. All 8 studies are consistent 
in the sense that targets enjoy positive and statistically significant abnormal returns 
from M&As. For example, Firth (1980) finds that CAR(-1M, OM)4 is 35.0% 
(statistically significant at the 1% level) for UK targets in the period 1969-1975; and 
Tse and Soufani (2001) find that CAR for the event month is 30.5% (statistically 
significant at the 1% level) in the 1990-1993 period. CARs reported in other studies 
range from 8.9% to about 32.0%, depending on the length of event window examined, 
methodologies used, and sample periods, etc.
In total 12 studies for the US market are presented in the table. Three have studied 
tender offers. Two tender offer studies report CARs around the 30% level around the 
announcement date. In comparison, Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989) report a higher 
CAR of 40.3% over the ±5D period for tender offers. All results are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Other US studies in the table also uniformly report 
positive and statistically significant CARs for targets. The highest CAR (45.6%,
3 The selection o f  the studies is based on three principles: 1) they were frequently referred to 
in earlier studies, 2) they are selected in an attempt to cover as many tim e periods as possible, 
3) they are selected in an attempt to cover as many methodologies as possible. For example, 
the 8 studies selected for the UK cover time periods from 1955 to 2000 and a number o f  
m ethodologies were used by these studies, including the market m odel, the CAPM, and the 
size-adjusted benchmark. These principles are also applicable to other sections on M &A  
profitability reviews.
4 ‘0M ’ is ‘the month o f  bid announcement’ and ‘-1M ’ is ‘one month before bid announcement 
month’. Similarly, ‘0 D ’ is the day o f  bid announcement and ‘-1D ’ is ‘one day before bid 
announcement day’.
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statistically significant at the 1% level) reported in the table is that from Healy, Palepu 
and Ruback (1992) who examine major deals during 1979-1984. As another example, 
Maquiera, Megginson and Nail (1998) examine 92 stock-for-stock mergers in the 
period 1963-1996. The CARs over the period (-60D, +60D) are high and range from 
38.0% to 41.7% (both statistically significant at the 1% level), depending on the sub­
sample used. Other studies report CARs ranging from about 6.2% to 28.0%, with 
most of them statistically significant at the 1% level.
Two studies in the table examine target profitability for European M&As. Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) examine targets in large deals in the 1993-2000 period. They 
find that CARs for targets of domestic M&As range from 10.2% to 22.9% (depending 
on the event window used) and are statistically significant. Similarly, Campa and 
Hernando (2002) find that CARs are positive and statistically significant for targets of 
domestic M&As in the period 1998-2000, ranging from 3.5% to 9.3% (depending on 
the event window used). All results are significant at the 5% level.
What do those results suggest?
The survey above generates some insights into shareholder’ wealth effects for the 
target side:
First, the studies presented in Table A2.1 generally show positive and sometimes 
large abnormal returns to target firms. This is in line with prior survey studies for the 
1980s. In short, it suggests that the M&A transaction delivers a premium return to 
target firm shareholders. Therefore, the first hypothesis developed is the wealth (for 
targets o f  domestic M&As) hypothesis: domestic M&As deliver premiums for 
shareholders of target firms.
Second, by observing and comparing target gains, it is shown that targets of different 
markets may enjoy substantially different wealth gains. Few studies have directly 
compared target gains between the UK and US domestic-M&A markets. In the table, 
however, Draper and Paudyal (1999) find that CAR (-1D, +1D) is 8.9% (statistically 
significant at the 5% level) for 581 UK targets in the 1988-1996 period. Also based on 
a large sample size and the same event window, Mulherin and Boone (2000) find
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CAR (-1D, +1D) is 21.2% (statistically significant at the 1% level) for 376 US targets 
in the period 1990-1999. Hie two time periods studied above are overlapping and the 
difference in target gains is a substantial 12.3%.
A more recent study by Goergen and Renneboog (2004) provide us with a direct 
comparison of targets gains between the UK and (the rest of) European markets. Over 
the (-1D, 0D) event window, the average CAR for the UK sample is 12.3% and 
statistically significant at the 1% level5, while the average CAR for the (rest of) 
European sample is 5.9% and statistically significant at the 1% level6. The difference 
is 6.4% and statistically significant at the 1% level. The sample firms are restricted to 
firms with large MVs. Although sample target firms are mixed with targets in both 
domestic and cross-border M&As, the results still indicate that target gains may be 
significantly different depending on locations.
The evidence above suggests higher target gains in the US than in the UK, and higher 
target gains in the UK than in the rest of the Europe. Conn and Connell (1990) 
suggest that regulations that facilitate the flow of information regarding M&As can 
encourage competitive bids. Hence, returns to target firms in better regulated markets 
should be more than those observed in other markets. La Porta et al. (2000) suggest 
that a target country’s corporate governance system (e.g. the English common law, 
the French civil law and the German civil law) may have impacts on shareholder 
wealth effects. They claim that a positive relationship exists between the quality of 
shareholder protection and share valuations assessed by investors. Therefore, target 
firms in the market with higher shareholder protection may on average receive higher 
premiums. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) further suggest that the market effect is 
the combined result of a high degree of disclosure in the UK, a liquid and well- 
developed equity market and a higher degree of shareholder protection (see also La 
Porta et al., 2000). Therefore, the second hypothesis developed is the market effect 
(for targets o f domestic M&As) hypothesis: domestic targets in the UK market
n
experience higher CARs than those in the French/German markets in the short run . I
will further test if the hypothesis holds up for targets in cross-border M&As, because
5 The whole sample size is 70, 14 are targets in cross-border M &As.
6 The whole sample size is 66, 35 are targets in cross-border M &As.
7 This dissertation focuses on three markets: the UK, France and Germany.
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the conditions suggested by Goergen and Renneboog (2004) and Conn and Connell 
(1990) also hold for cross-border targets.
2.3.1.2 Excess Returns to Bidding Firms 
Prior surveys
There are a number of prior survey studies for M&As of the 1980s and earlier as 
noted in Section 2.3.1.1. Jensen and Ruback (1983), based on an analysis of 16 
studies, conclude that average excess returns to bidders in successful mergers are 
zero, and in successful hostile offers are 4%. They therefore conclude that bidding 
firm shareholders do not lose in corporate takeovers (Jensen and Ruback, 1983, p. 5). 
Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) conclude that in the 1980s corporate takeovers 
generated negative but statistically insignificant wealth effects to bidders (Jarrell et 
al., 1988, p. 53). Datta and Pinches (1992) conclude that bidders earn very small 
excess returns. They therefore summarize (Datta et al., 1992, p. 13) that ‘... on 
average, shareholders of bidding or acquiring firms do not realize significant returns 
from mergers and acquisitions.’
As a result, some studies would prefer to use the notion: ‘the evidence is evenly 
distributed between studies that report negative excess returns and those that report 
zero and slightly positive excess returns.’
Survey o f  the thesis
The current survey of 24 studies is summarized in Table A2.2.
Table 2.1 below may be helpful to check the 24 studies in Table A2.2 conveniently. 
Studies 6, 7 and 8 have examined tender offers. The significance level is not 
available for Study 11.
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Table 2.1 Distribution of CARs in Table A2.2
Studies reporting 
insignificant CAR
Studies reporting significant 
CAR
N/A
10% 5% 1%
Positive CARs 3,7
10, 13,18, 22 ,23(main 
results), 24
21 9 4,6, 
8,19
Negative CARs 2, 14,
17(main
results)
15 11
Depending on other 
factors
Depending on event window length or sample 
period
Depending on 
feature of 
bids
Mainly negative CAR 
(either statistically 
significant or 
insignificant)
Mainly positive CAR 
(either statistically 
significant or 
insignificant)
1,5 12, 20 16
Although it may be not easy to compare these studies directly (because the benchmark 
used, sample periods, trading markets, event windows, sample sizes and mode of bids 
are different), Table 2.1 shows that a large number of studies report insignificant
CARs. The rest of the studies are distributed between ‘positive and statistically
significant* and ‘negative and statistically significant’ with no apparent tilt if I 
exclude the three tender offer studies (Studies 6, 7 and 8).8 Therefore, Table A2.2 
(and Table 2.1) are basically consistent with prior survey studies. The abnormal 
returns for bidders could be one of the three possibilities with no apparent clustering: 
positive, negative or zero.
There are 8 studies for the UK market, 15 studies for the US market and 3 studies for 
other regions in Table A2.2. For the UK market, all studies report small CARs 
ranging from 1.1% to 1.3% (in absolute values). Among them, Franks and Harris 
(1989), Tse and Soufani (2001), and Chatteijee and Kuenzi (2001) find positive and 
statistically significant CARs. Franks and Harris (1989) report CARs of 1% 
(statistically significant at the 1% level) for the event month; Chatteijee and Kuenzi 
(2001) report CARs of 1% (statistically significant at the 10% level) for the event day.
8 Tender offers tend to show better performance for acquirers than mergers. Further
discussion is available in Section 2.5.3.
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In addition, Tse and Soufani (2001) find that UK bidders in large and friendly deals in 
the 1990-1993 period experience positive CARs of 4.9% over the (-1M, 0) event 
window which is statistically significant at the 5% level.
Some studies find negative and statistically significant CARs for the UK market. 
Sudarsanam et al. (1996) find that, in the 1980-1990 period, UK bidders experienced 
significant losses (at the 1% level) of -1.3% on the event announcement day. Draper 
and Paudyal (1999) examine bidding firms listed on the LSE in the period 1988-1996. 
They show that in a short event window of (-1D, +1D), bidders receive negative and 
statistically significant CARs of -1.1%. However, in a relatively large event window 
of (-5D, +5D), bidders’ CARs are negative but statistically insignificant. Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) study 52 UK large deals in the period 1993-2000 and find very 
similar results to Draper and Paudyal (1999).
15 studies examine the US market. Table 2.2 below may be helpful to check the 15 
studies on the US market in Table A2.2. Studies 6, 7 and 8 examined tender offers. 
The significance level is not available for Study 11.
Table 2.2 Distribution of CARs in Table A2.2 for the US market
Studies report 
insignificant CAR
Studies report 
significant CAR
N/A
10% 5% 1%
Positive CARs 3,7, 10,13,18,22 4, 6,8
Negative CARs 2,14 11
Depending on other 
factors
Depending on event window length or sample 
period
Depending 
on feature 
of bids
Negative CAR (either 
statistically significant 
or insignificant)
Positive CAR (either 
statistically significant 
or insignificant)
12 5,16
In Table 2.2, six studies report insignificant results. Three studies show positive 
CARs which are statistically significant at the 1% level (two of them are tender offer 
studies). Two studies show negative and statistically significant CARs. In addition,
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results of a number of studies are conditional on features of bids (e.g. how M&As are 
financed). Similar to the UK results, the picture of bidders’ abnormal returns for the 
US market appears to be well distributed around insignificant CARs.
Two tender offer studies in Table A2.2 show positive and statistically significant 
CARs. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) find that in a (-5D, +5D) event window, CARs 
for US tender offer bidders in the period 1963-1984 are on average 1.0% (statistically 
significant at the 1% level). Jarrell and Poulson (1989) also have similar findings.
A number of non-tender-offer studies also report statistically significant abnormal 
returns. Asquith et al. (1983) find positive and statistically significant average 
abnormal returns. The average CAR over the (-20D, 0) window for the US market in 
the period 1963-1979 is 3.5% (significant at the 1% level). In contrast, two studies, 
Dodd (1980), and Healy et al. (1992), find negative and statistically significant CARs 
although the amounts involved are very small.
Additionally, Loderer and Martin (1990) find CARs for US bidders kept decreasing 
over the period 1966-1984. In the period 1966-1968, US bidders received positive and 
statistically significant average CARs of 1.7% over the (-5D, 0) event window. The 
average CARs over the (-5D, 0) event window decreased to 0.6% but were still 
statistically significant in the period 1968-1980. They further decreased to -0.1% in 
the period 1981-1984 and became statistically insignificant.
Turning to other markets, Studies 19, 23 and 24 in Table A2.2 examine the European 
and Canadian markets. Eckbo and Thorbum (2000) study domestic acquisitions in 
Canada in the period 1964-1983. The average abnormal return for the event month is 
1.3% and statistically significant at the 1% level. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) 
study European bidders in large deals in the period 1993-2000 and Campa and 
Hernando (2002) study European bidders in the period 1998-2000. Both studies find 
insignificant CARs for bidders, irrespective of the event window used (except in one 
case as shown in Table A2.2).
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What do those results suggest?
The available evidence seems to confirm that ‘the evidence for bidders is evenly 
distributed between studies that report negative excess returns and those that report 
zero and slightly positive excess returns’. If the abnormal returns for bidders are 
statistically significant (either positive or negative), the magnitude generally remains 
quite small. Therefore, a test can be performed on whether M&As actually deliver 
premiums to shareholders of bidding firms, which is the third hypothesis to be tested: 
the wealth (for bidders o f  domestic M&As) hypothesis.
The evidence surveyed above suggests that most of the M&A gains are enjoyed by 
targets alone. A number of hypotheses attempt to explain the distribution of takeover 
gains between targets and bidders in the short run. The managerial hypotheses as I 
have discussed earlier, argue that bidder gains are lowered by agency costs. The 
‘hubris’ hypotheses, e.g. Roll (1986), argue that bidders may overpay for targets 
because they overestimate the targets’ true value due to managers’ misjudgement, 
hence bidder gains are reduced. Some ‘hubris’-related hypotheses also suggest that 
excessively optimistic managers may misjudge their own ability, therefore M&As are 
often associated with projects that managers in fact are unable to handle. In this case, 
M&As may turn out to be bad news for bidder shareholders.
Finally, among the studies surveyed above, only Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find 
weak evidence (statistically significant at the 10% level) that UK bidders (domestic 
plus cross-border bidders) experience higher CARs, by an average 0.64%, than the 
continental European bidders in the short run. Therefore, the ‘market effect’ fo r 
targets (targets in the continental EU markets on average may receive lower premiums 
than those in the UK and US markets) is not apparent for bidders.
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2.3.1.3 Returns to Bidders and Targets Combined
Prior surveys
At first I present two prior survey studies of M&As in the 1980s. Jensen (1988, p. 23) 
suggests: ‘takeovers do not waste credit or resources. Indeed, they generate 
substantial gains: historically, 8 percent of the total value of both companies. Those 
value gains represent gains to economic efficiency, not redistribution between various 
parties.’ Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) also argue that there is virtually no 
empirical evidence that gains to target firm shareholders are due to losses from other 
shareholders. They, therefore, conclude that the gains to shareholders must be real 
economic gains via the efficient rearrangement of resources. Thus, based mainly on 
US data, both Jensen (1988) and Jarrell et al. (1988) suggest real and substantial 
combined economic gains from M&As.
Survey o f  the thesis
Table A2.3 reports the findings of 15 studies on this issue. Most of them focus on 
domestic acquisitions.9 Among the 15 studies, six studies report positive and 
statistically significant total wealth gains, ranging from 1.4% to 10.8%. Although 
several studies do not report statistic significance levels, most of them still show 
positive total wealth effects.
Six studies report the percentage of positive wealth effects for the combined firms. 
Most of the studies (4 out of the 6 studies) in the table show that more than 50% of 
the M&As in the samples have positive total wealth effects.
Two studies, by Firth (1979, 1980), report a small negative total wealth effects. Both 
studies examine the UK market in the pre-1975 period. On the other hand, four 
studies report insignificant total wealth effects.
9 Campa and Hernando (2002) examine the combined wealth effects for European cross- 
border M &As in the period 1998-2000. Small positive total returns are found for two event 
windows. Significance levels are not available.
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One study reports results for several event windows. Draper and Paudyal (1999) study 
the UK market from 1988 to 1996. The total wealth gains for 394 LSE listed firms 
peak at 10.8% over the (-20D, +20D) event window in their study. Across all event 
windows, they consistently find positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level) 
combined wealth effects.
One study reports results of different time periods. Andrade et al. (2001) examined 
the US market from 1973 to 1998. They show that the values of the total wealth gains 
are largest for the period 1980-1989. In that period the average total wealth gain is 
2.6% over the event window (-1D, +1D), which is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. Throughout all periods in Andrade et al. (2001), no negative total gain was 
found.
In conclusion, corporate M&As largely report positive combined returns. This 
suggests that, on average, M&As do not destroy value for the combined firms in the 
short run, irrespective of the selection of markets or event windows. This is in line 
with Jensen (1988) and Jarrell et al. (1988).
Conclusion
This section discussed four issues: 1) the hypothesis that M&As deliver premiums to 
targets in domestic offers; 2) the hypothesis that domestic M&As have neutral wealth 
effects on the bidder shareholder side. A number of theories have made attempts to 
explain why M&A gains may be distributed in this way. Some possible explanations 
are that agency-costs or hubris-costs offset the gains to bidders in M&As; 3) the 
hypothesis that bid premiums may have a ‘market effect’ as suggested by Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) and Conn and Connell (1990). Also the available evidence 
suggests that the market effect is mainly present on the target side. Namely, in the 
case of this study, target firms in the UK may on average receive higher premiums 
than those in the French and German markets. There are relatively few studies that 
have tested the ‘market effect’, therefore a study comparing shareholder wealth 
effects between the UK.and France/Germany may provide more evidence on this 
issue; 4) in the short run targets gain substantially and bidders (on average) do not
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loss. As a result, the wealth effects for the combined firms are generally positive, 
which suggests that collectively M&As are more likely to be value-creating in the 
short run.
2.3.2 Wealth Effects of Cross-border M&As
The motives as well as sources of gains may be different between domestic and cross- 
border M&As. For example, Sudarsanam (1995, p. 269) suggest that there are 
additional motives (and synergy gains) for cross-border M&As, such as to escape a 
small home market, to extend markets served and to respond to overseas clients. In 
contrast, e.g. Seth, Song and Pettit (2000) argue that ‘hubris’ may be more relevant in 
cross-border than domestic M&As because there is greater information asymmetry 
between foreign bidders and domestic targets than between domestic bidders and 
targets. Section 2.3.2.1 surveys the wealth effects of cross-border M&As for both 
targets and bidders. To extend the issue, Section 2.3.2.2 compares wealth effects 
between domestic and cross-border M&As, in order to examine whether they are 
different and the possible reasons why they may be different.
2.3.2.1 Wealth Effects o f  Cross-border M&As
Survey o f  the Thesis
A list of earlier studies is summarized in Table A2.4 and Table A2.5. Table A2.4 
focuses on the wealth effects for targets, and Table A2.5 focuses on the wealth effects 
for bidders.
At first, Table A.2.4 surveys seven studies focusing on the target side. In general the 
evidence suggests that cross-border M&As deliver premiums to targets.
Four of the seven studies focus on the US market. Conn and Connell (1990) report an 
average CAR of 39.9% over the period (-12M, 0) for 24 US target firms (acquired by 
UK bidding firms) in the period 1971-1980. Similarly, Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), 
Kang (1993), and Cheng and Chan (1995) all find positive CARs for cross-border
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targets listed in the US markets. A few studies in Table A2A  have examined the 
cross-border target wealth effects for the UK market. Irrespective of different time 
periods, these studies in general report positive and statistically significant CARs. For 
example, Conn and Connell (1990) analyze the abnormal returns of 22 UK targets 
(acquired by US bidding firms) in the period 1971-1980. Over a twelve-month period, 
the cumulative returns for the UK targets amounted to 18.2%, in comparison to 39.9% 
for the US targets in their study. This also suggests that the ‘market effect’ discussed 
in Section 2.3.1.1 may be present for targets in cross-border M&As. As another study 
for the UK market, Danbolt (2004) finds, during the (0M, +1M) period, the average 
abnormal return amounts to 22.0% for target shareholders in cross-border M&As in 
the period 1986-1991, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Turning to 
European markets, Goergen and Renneboog (2004) examine European firms with 
deal values larger than USD lOOmillion. They find positive CARs for European 
targets (significant at the 1% level) over the (-1D, 0) and (-40D, 0) event windows, 
ranging from 11.3% to 19.8%. One more study for European markets, Campa and 
Hernando (2002) examine European (including UK) M&As in the period 1998-2000. 
In their study targets of cross-border M&As receive an average CAR of 4.7% 
(statistically significant at the 5% level) for the event window (-7D, +7D) and of 8.7% 
(statistically significant at the 5% level) for the event window (-30D, +30D).
Secondly, Table A.2.5 surveys 11 studies focusing on the bidder side. The available 
evidence in Table A2.5 seems to suggest that in general cross-border M&As only 
have a small or insignificant impact on the wealth effects of bidding firms as in the 
domestic case.
For the US market, two studies report positive and statistically significant CARs. For 
example, Markides and Ittner (1994) report positive and statistically significant CARs 
of 0.5% for US bidders over the (-2D, 3D) event windows in the period 1975-1988. In 
contrast, Datta and Puia (1995) report negative and statistically significant (at the 10% 
level for most of the cases) CARs. They examine 112 large cross-border acquisitions 
by US acquiring firms in the period 1978-1990. The average CARs over the (-1D, 0), 
(-15D, +15D) and (-30D, +30D) periods are -0.4%, -1.4% and -2.5% in turn. Other 
studies (e.g. Servaes and Zenner, 1994; Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Cakici, Hessel and 
Tandon, 1996; and Echbo and Thorbum, 2000) report insignificant CARs in the short
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run for US bidding firms engaging in cross-border acquisitions. Turning to the UK 
market, only Goergen and Renneboog (2004) report that, over the event window (-1D, 
0), the average CAR is 6.3% which is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
sample firms are UK bidders in very large cross-border deals in the 1993-2000 period. 
Other cross-border studies that have examined the UK market report insignificant 
event period CARs. Finally turning to European markets, Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) examine European firms with deal values larger than USD lOOmillion. They 
report the average CAR(-1D, 0) is 2.4%, which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Corhay and Rad (2000) study international acquisitions and shareholder wealth 
effects using a Netherlands sample. They tested 16 different event windows, two of 
them (as shown in Table A2.5) generate positive and statistically significant (at the 
5% level) CARs for Dutch acquiring firms. Other studies (e.g. Campa and Hernando, 
2002) report that the event period CARs are insignificant.
2.3.2.2 Cross-border vs Domestic
This section makes comparison of wealth effects between domestic and cross-border 
M&As, examining whether they are different and the possible reasons why they may 
be different.
Survey o f  the thesis
For the target side: Harris and Ravenscaft (1991) examine cross-border and domestic 
acquisitions in the US stock market in the period 1970-1987. They show that target 
wealth gains are significantly higher in cross-border takeovers (39.77%) than in 
domestic takeovers (26.33%). Furthermore, the gap between domestic and cross- 
border target gains persists after controlling for means of payment and the effects of 
multiple bids. Similarly, Danbolt (2004) examines UK cross-border and domestic 
targets in the period 1986-1991. He finds that targets of cross-border acquisitions 
receive higher gains of 4.05% and 10.07% than targets of domestic ones in the event 
windows of (0, +1M) and (-2M, +1M) in turn. Both are statistically significant. 
Hence, both studies suggest that targets of cross-border M&As experience greater 
gains than those of domestic ones. However, in a European M&A study, Campa and
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Hernando (2002) find that target gains in cross-border M&As are not statistically 
different from those in domestic ones.
For the bidder side: Campa and Hernando (2002) find that in the period 1998-2000, in 
Europe bidders of cross-border M&As generally under-perform those of domestic 
M&As. The gap of the average CARs between cross-border and domestic M&As are 
-1.38% over the (-1D, +5D) event window and -3.51% over the (-30D, +30D) event 
window. Both are statistically significant.
What do those results suggest?
Both Harris and Ravenscaft (1991) and Danbolt (2001) suggest that in a stock market 
there is a cross-border effect for targets of M&As. Namely, cross-border targets gain 
significantly more than domestic targets during the months (days) surrounding the 
bid. On the other hand, Danbolt (1995), and Campa and Hernando (2002) suggest that 
such a cross-border effect may also be present for bidders of M&As but in an opposite 
direction. Namely, cross-border bidders gain significantly less than domestic bidders 
for the event period. Therefore the fourth hypothesis developed is the cross-border 
effect hypothesis', in a market, in the short run cross-border targets gain significantly 
more than domestic targets while cross-border bidders gain significantly less than 
domestic bidders.
Some studies (e.g. Harris and Ravenscaft, 1991; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; and 
Danbolt, 2004) attempt to explain why such a cross-border effect may exist. A 
number of explanations may be distinguished as follows:
First, bid characteristics may partly have explanatory power. For example, Danbolt 
(2004, p. 96) suggests that ‘...a significantly higher proportion of cross-border than 
domestic acquisitions are cash offers’. If investors respond less favourably to cash 
than to equity offers, the cross-border effect may be attributable to such a payment 
effect. However, the available evidence is mixed. Danbolt (2004), based on UK data, 
reports that the ‘cross-border effect’ for targets is insignificant after controlling for 
means of payment. In contrast, Harris and Ravenscaft (1991), based on US data,
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report that the ‘cross-border effect* for targets persists after controlling for means of 
payment.
Second, ‘hubris’ factors. Roll (1986) argues that bidding companies tend to over-pay 
because bidding companies’ managers are affected by ‘hubris’. Seth, Song and Pettit 
(2000) argue that ‘hubris’ may be more relevant in cross-border than domestic M&As 
because there is greater information asymmetry between foreign bidders and domestic 
targets than between domestic bidders and targets. If overseas companies are more 
difficult to value than domestic firms (e.g. due to different accounting standards and 
culture differences), the size of overpayment may be larger in cross-border than in 
domestic acquisitions.
Third, some studies (e.g. Megginson, Morgan and Nail, 2004) also argue that cultural 
differences in cross-border M&As may make acquisition integration a difficult, time 
consuming and expensive process, therefore poorer share price performance may be 
expected from cross-border bidders than domestic ones.
Finally, managerial factors. As with domestic acquisitions, cross-border acquisitions 
may not be driven by shareholder wealth maximisation objectives, but may also be a 
result of agency conflict. Cross-border acquisitions may be more advantageous to 
managers than domestic ones if managers are pursuing power and status through 
empire building, or increase the company’s global reach at the cost of paying higher 
premiums. Hence cross-border acquisitions may also be motivated by managerial 
factors. As a result, agency costs may be higher for cross-border bidders.
All the hypotheses above suggest that bidders in cross-border M&As may on average 
underperform those in domestic ones. However, as indicated by Sudarsanam (1995), 
there are a group of factors that point in the opposite direction. This group of factors 
claim that cross-border acquisitions may be more influenced by synergy-related 
factors such as escaping small home market, extending markets served, achieving 
economies of scale, replacing inefficient management of a foreign firm, and 
responding to overseas clients’ needs. This group of factors provides an argument for 
expecting higher shareholders’ wealth effects in cross-border than in domestic M&As.
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Section 2.4 Long Run Post-acquisition Event Studies
In this section I focus on the long run post-acquisition share price performance for 
bidders. The investigation into the long term event window is of interest because 
some of the evidence suggests that the long run post-acquisition performance is 
different from the short run one. Also, some evidence in long run event studies is not 
consistent with the efficient markets theory. I divide the review of bidder post-merger 
performance in the long term event window into two sections. In the first section I 
present a survey of the studies that have examined an event window no longer than 
one year after the announcement date. This enables me to compare the profitability of 
M&As more continuously with the short run event studies discussed above. In the 
second section I discuss the previous studies of longer term event studies, typically 
over an event window (0, +5 Y).
2.4.1 Post-acquisition Share Price Performance within the One-year Horizon
Conn and Connell (1990) argue that ‘the CARs in a longer window (e.g. 6 to 12 
months) after announcement are also of interest since this period represents, on 
average, the market’s assessment of the merger following the actual merger’. For this 
reason, I concentrate on event studies that have examined an event window consisting 
of the (+2M, +12M) period. The eleven studies reviewed in this section are 
summarized in Table A2.6.
In Table A2.6, four studies report negative and statistically significant abnormal 
returns to acquirers in longer event windows within the one year horizon. They are: 
Asquith (1983), Malatesta (1983), Franks and Harris (1989), and Gregory (1997). For 
example, Gregory (1997) studied UK domestic M&As for the period 1984-1992. He 
found an average CAR of -9.2% (statistically significant at the 1% level) over the 
one-year post-acquisition event window. He used six different models in his study 
which all report similar results within one year relative to the announcement time. A 
number of studies, however, only find insignificant abnormal returns. For example, 
Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) show that at the end of the first year after 
M&As, US bidders experience insignificant abnormal returns. As one more example,
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recently, Gregory and McCorriston (2005) also show insignificant abnormal returns at 
the end of the first year after M&As for UK cross-border bidders in the period 1985- 
1994. On the other hand, Conn and Connell (1990) employ six different benchmarks 
to assess the post-acquisition performance of US and UK cross-border bidders in 
1971-1980. The results in their study are sensitive to the benchmark used. The 
abnormal returns over a one-year post-acquisition event range from -10% to 10%, 
which can be either significantly positive or significantly negative.
Five studies in Table A2.6 report the percentages of positive abnormal returns for 
bidders in their samples. All five studies report less than half of sample bidders 
experience positive abnormal returns over approximately the one-year horizon 
relative to the announcement date.
Overall, the evidence suggests that the post-acquisition share price performance 
within the one year horizon is more likely to be negative or zero than to be positive 
for bidders.
2.4.2 Long Run Post-acquisition (up to 5 Years) Share Price Performance
Some recent evidence suggests big apparent abnormal returns spread over several 
years following well-publicised events like mergers and acquisitions. For example, 
Franks and Harris (1989), and Agrawal et al. (1992) both find negative and 
statistically significant abnormal returns over the long horizon. Franks and Harris 
(1989) study the 2-year long-term post-merger performance of UK acquiring firms. 
They find that bidder post-merger performance is negative (statistically significant at 
the 1% level), cumulating to about -12.6%. These losses are more than enough to 
offset the small positive wealth effects for bidders in the short horizon. Agrawal, Jaffe 
and Mandelker (1992) study the US market in the period 1955-1987. They find the 
CARs (for acquirers in mergers) are negative and statistically significant for holding 
periods up to five years (also for two, three and four years). For the five-year period, 
the CAR is -10.3% and statistically significant at the 5% level. In addition, the 
percentage of positive abnormal returns over the five-year period is 44.0%, which is
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significantly lower than 50 at the 1% level. The median value of abnormal return over 
the five-year time period is -7.5%.
These results pose a challenge to the efficient markets hypothesis. The evidence of 
market inefficiency has created an entirely new area of research examining long- 
horizon stock-price performance following an event. This is in sharp contrast to the 
boom in short window event studies and studies of economic consequences (Kathari, 
2001, p. 107). For example, a long-horizon event study tests whether one-to-five-year 
returns following an event are systematically non-zero for a sample of firms. These 
studies assume that the market can overreact or under-react to new information and 
that it can take a long time to correct the mis-valuation because of continued 
apparently inefficient behaviour and frictions in the market. The source of under­
reaction and overreaction is human judgement or behavioural biases in information 
processing.
However, although recent studies pose a challenge to the efficient markets hypothesis, 
the long horizon event studies suffer from problems such as: risk mis-estimation (e.g. 
an ‘imperfect’ asset pricing model), data problems, test statistic mis-specification and 
the lack of a theory of market inefficiency as the null hypothesis. Risk mis-estimation 
can arise because sensitivity to a risk factor is measured incorrectly or because a 
relevant risk factor is omitted from the model of expected returns. Data problems can 
arise from survivorship biases. In detail, it is not uncommon to observe 50% or more 
of the initial sample of firms failing to survive the long horizon examined in the study 
(Kothari, 2001, p. 189). Especially when both stock-price and financial accounting 
data are required, data survivor and data-mining biases can be very serious in the 
long-horizon event studies. Test statistic mis-specification can arise from the long- 
horizon returns of cross-correlated sample firms (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000). In 
addition, the long-horizon return data are highly skewed to the right, which poses 
problems in using statistical tests that assume normality (Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
Chapter 3 (Methodology) will discuss these issues in more detail.
Therefore in recent years, studies of long-horizon post-acquisition performance are 
accompanied by discussions of methodology in order to eliminate some of the 
problems noted above. I discuss the methodology in Chapter 3. In the rest of this
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section I concentrate on the earlier findings on the long run share price performance 
for bidding firms. Table A2.7 is a summary table of the existing evidence.
Loughran and Vijh (1997) study 788 mergers in the period 1970-1989 for the US 
market. Their study measures abnormal returns as the difference between the five- 
year holding period returns of sample stocks and matching stocks (chosen to control 
for size and market-to-book-value). The sample firms show an average buy-and-hold 
return of 81.2% compared to 97.1% for their matched firms. The difference is -15.9% 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. However, they find positive and 
statistically significant mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns for tender offers.
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) examine 3,169 mergers and 348 tender offers completed 
in the period 1980-1991. Acquirers are traded on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. 
They report negative and statistically significant abnormal returns over 36 months 
following mergers. The average ‘bias adjusted CAR’10 across all mergers is -4.04% 
and significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the average ‘bias adjusted CAR’ 
for tender offers following takeovers of public targets is a positive 8.85% and 
statistically significant at the 10% level.
Gregory (1997), and Gregory and McCorriston (2005) have studied the long-horizon 
share price performance of UK acquiring firms. Gregory (1997) tests six benchmarks, 
including the CAPM, the ‘control for size’ approach and the Fama-French three-factor 
model. All models show negative and statistically significant CARs for the 24 months 
following the completion of M&As, ranging from -11.82% to -18.01%.
Gregory and McCorriston (2005) study UK cross-border acquirers who have acquired 
US firms in the period 1985-1994. They find the average long run share price 
performance of those UK acquirers over the 5-year horizon after the announcement 
date is a negative -27.1% and statistically significant at the 1% level. However, they 
also report that UK acquirers acquiring EU firms in the same period only receive 
insignificant post-acquisition abnormal returns.
10 Abnormal returns are adjusted using the bootstrapping approach.
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In contrast, a number of studies find insignificant abnormal returns over the long 
horizon event window. For example, Franks, Harris and Titman (1991), Loderer and 
Martin (1992) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000). All three studies have examined the 
US acquisition market. Another example, Higson and Elliott (1998) have studied UK 
bidders in the period 1970-1990. In their study the 24-month post-acquisition share 
price performance is -1.1% and insignificant. However, the post-acquisition abnormal 
return over the 36-month period becomes positive but still insignificant.
In summary, some previous studies report insignificant long run share price abnormal 
performance, whereas some other previous studies report that acquirer shareholders 
suffer negative shareholder wealth effects over the long run post-acquisition period. 
The existing evidence is mixed but there is more evidence of shareholder wealth 
losses in the long run than evidence of insignificant long run share price abnormal 
performance. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis developed is the long run wealth 
hypothesis (for bidders)\ in the long run, on average, there are negative wealth effects 
for bidding firms’ shareholders. The shareholder wealth losses in the long run not 
only raise questions to the approval of M&As, but to market efficiency as well.
Section 2.5 Relationship between M&A Profitability and Bid Characteristics
This section discusses the links between M&A motives and profitability in relation to 
bid characteristics.
2.5.1 Means of Payment
Jensen (1986) suggests that M&As financed by free cash flows are often costly 
because of a conflict between managers and shareholders. Managers want to retain 
free cash flows and invest them in projects that increase managerial benefits like 
compensation or power and reputation. As a result, managers of firms with excess 
cash flows have a tendency to waste these cash flows on unprofitable investments.
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Therefore cash offers are associated with more negative wealth effects on bidding 
firms’ shareholders compared with equity offers.
Harford (1999) finds support for the view that cash offers may be motivated by the 
agency problem of Jensen (1986). Harford (1999), based on pre-1994 US data, reports 
that: 1) cash rich firms are more likely to make acquisitions; 2) cash-rich firms are 
more likely to pick up targets that do not attract interest from other acquirers; 3) cash- 
rich firms are more likely to make diversifying acquisitions; 4) acquisitions by cash- 
rich firms are value-decreasing. Overall, the evidence of Harford (1999) supports the 
agency costs of free cash flow explanation for acquisitions by cash-rich firms. A 
similar result can be found in Lang, Stultz and Walking (1991), in which they report 
an increase in free cash flow is associated with a decrease in bidders’11 gains from 
M&As.
Alternatively, Heaton (2002) argues (as discussed in Section 2.2.3) that excessive 
managerial optimism leads managers to believe that capital markets undervalue their 
firm’s securities. Therefore, managerial optimism leads to a preference for internal 
funds to finance M&A activities. At the same time, optimistic managers tend to 
overvalue their own corporate projects (e.g. Roll, 1986) and may invest in 
unprofitable projects even when they are loyal to shareholders. The Heaton (2002) 
framework suggests that cash offers are motivated by excessive optimism, which 
simultaneously leads to hubris-affected projects. As a result, cash offers are often 
associated with negative wealth effects for bidders.
Therefore, when the agency problem of Jensen (1986) or manager optimism (Roll, 
1986; Heaton, 2002) is the link between making cash offers and M&A profitability, 
the sixth hypothesis developed is the cash offer hypothesis: M&As financed by cash 
have worse wealth effects for bidders.
Table A2.8 summarizes ten studies that have examined the impact of choices of 
payment on M&A profitability. Among the ten studies, Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) support the cash offer hypothesis above. Goergen and Renneboog (2004)
11 Bidders without good investment opportunities. Lang, Stultz and W alking also suggest that 
for cash-rich bidders with good investment opportunities, M & As do not destroy value.
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examine European M&As with very large deal values. They find that the average 
CAR (-2D, +2D) is 2.6% for bidders with equity offers while it is only 0.9% for 
bidders with cash offers. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.
Some studies in Table A2.8 do not support the cash offer hypothesis above. Travlos 
(1987), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Peterson and Peterson (1991), Draper (1999) and 
Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) all find that stock-based deals are associated with 
negative and statistically significant returns at deal announcement for acquirers, 
which is not the case for bidders with cash offers. Peterson and Peterson (1991), and 
Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) further show that bidder abnormal returns in cash- 
financed acquisitions are statistically significantly higher than those in equity- 
financed ones. If the impact of cash offer turns out to be positive rather than the ‘cash 
offer’ hypothesis above, one possible explanation is Myers and Majluf (1984)’s 
asymmetric information model. Myers and Majluf (1984) assume that: 1) the 
acquiring firm’s management possesses information about the intrinsic value of the 
firm which is not reflected in the pre-acquisition share price; and 2) managers are 
loyal to existing shareholders. Therefore, managers will favour a cash offer if they 
believe that their firm is undervalued, whereas they will favour a stock offer if they 
believe their stocks are overvalued. Consequently, a cash offer serves as good news to 
investors because it signals that the bidder is undervalued. In Myers and Majluf 
(1984)’s approach, free cash flow is beneficial.
2.5.2 Effects of Bidder Size and ‘Relative Size’12
The ‘maximizing top managers’ own interests’ motives suggest that managers may 
sacrifice shareholders’ interests to pursue their own interests. As a firm becomes 
bigger, the power of the agents may also get bigger, which makes monitoring agents 
more difficult and costly. Hence, M&As with large bidders may be associated with 
greater manager/shareholder conflicts and greater agency costs. On the other hand, 
bigger firms may have less focus on the acquired targets. If these are the case, bigger 
firms may be linked to worse share price performance after M&As. As an example,
12 For convenience I define ‘relative size’ as ‘bidder market value /  target market value’.
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Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004, p. 1) based on US data from 1980 to 2001, 
report that ‘the announcement return for acquiring-firm shareholders is roughly two 
percentage points higher for small acquirers irrespective of the form of financing and 
whether the acquired firm is public or private. The size effect is robust to firm and 
deal characteristics, and it is not reversed over time’. Therefore, the seventh 
hypothesis developed is the bidder size hypothesis: there is a size effect in M&As that 
bigger bidders are associated with lower average abnormal returns.
However, a bigger bidder could also have more bargaining power in the acquisition 
process, more flexibility in financing the acquisition deal, and more 
adaptability/experience in absorbing target firms (e.g. Peterson and Peterson, 1991). 
These factors may have positive wealth effects on bidder shareholders in M&As and 
provide an argument contrasting to the bidder size hypothesis raised above.
Additionally, in some studies ‘relative size’ rather than ‘size’ is tested. For example, 
Franks and Harris (1989), and Eckbo and Thorbum (2000) both use a sample where 
targets are on average about one eighth the size of bidders. The bigger the relative 
size, the more likely that mangers of the bidder have less focus on the target. Danbolt 
(2004) also argues that large bidding companies can afford to be comparatively more 
generous with small targets, thus paying a higher premium to small than to larger 
target companies. Nine studies are summarized in Table A2.9 that have investigated 
the ‘relative size’ effects on excess returns. Four studies, Asquith, Bruner, and 
Mullins (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Loderer and Martin (1990), and Eckbo 
and Thorbum (2000), support the views above that the bigger the difference in size 
between bidder and target, the less benefit the bidder may experience. In contrast, 
Markides and Ittner (1994)’s finding points in the opposite direction. Other studies 
suggest that relative size have no effects on shareholders wealth after M&As.
2.5.3 Effects of Tender Offers
Mergers are often friendly negotiated between the top management of bidder and 
target firms. Tender offers are structured as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal, directly to 
the target firm shareholders. Quite often, tender offers are unfriendly. Several studies
43
report larger announcement returns to bidders in tender offers, as compared with 
friendly negotiated transactions. The sources of gains in tender offers are not fully 
clear, but the value-creation feature of a tender offer is consistent with the view that 
acquiring firms can replace the inefficient management of target firms and realize a 
capital gain by improving operating performance. The bidder uncovers value-creating 
insights about the target firm and seeks to avoid giving value up in a negotiation with 
the target firm. Therefore, the eighth hypothesis developed is the tender offer 
hypothesis', bidders in tender offers experience higher average abnormal returns than 
those in negotiated offers.
Jensen and Ruback (1983) in their study show that after tender offers, bidders earn 
statistically significant and positive abnormal returns, while after mergers, bidding 
firms systematically under-perform. There are a number of other empirical studies 
that show positive and statistically significant abnormal returns to bidders in tender 
offers. For example, Lang, Stultz and Walking (1989), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), 
Gregory (1997), Loughran and Vijh (1997), and Rau and Vermaelen (1998).
2.5.4 Overreaction Hypothesis and Effects of MTBV
The overreaction hypothesis assumes that investors make systematic mistakes when 
they react to information. It can arise from investors’ tendency to form beliefs about 
future performance by extrapolating from recent past performance. On seeing a stock 
that has experienced a string of good news or a period of growth, investors may 
wrongly believe that growth will continue, which pushes the stock’s price higher than 
is justified by the news. Thus, the market over-reacts to the observed tendencies from 
the past achievement of the firm. In the long run, the price reverses when investors 
realize mistakes were made. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998, pp. 307-314) state 
that: ‘...recent empirical research in finance has identified two families of pervasive 
regularities: under-reaction (to news such as earnings announcements) and over­
reaction (to a series of good or bad news). ...the overreaction evidence shows that 
over longer horizons of perhaps 3-5 years, security prices overreact to consistent 
patterns of news pointing in  the same direction. That is, securities that have had a long 
record of good news tend to become overpriced and have low average returns
44
afterwards. Put differently, securities with strings of good performance, however 
measured, receive extremely high valuations, and these valuations, on average, return 
to the mean. ...similarly, stocks with a consistent record of bad news become 
undervalued and (investors) subsequently earn superior returns’.
Stocks with very high market valuations relative to their book values (glamour stocks) 
tend to be stocks of companies with extremely high earnings growth over the previous 
several years, whereas stocks with low market valuations to their book values (value 
stocks) tend to be the opposite. If the overreaction hypothesis is the case, the market 
may over-react to the past performance of acquirers at the time of the bid 
announcement. Acquirers with a high MTBV (glamour stocks) tend to have a high 
share price reflecting a recent high growth in earnings, and vice versa. After a period 
of time the market corrects the previous over-reaction based of past performance, 
shareholders of acquirers with a high MTBV at the announcement time will 
experience low average returns afterwards, and shareholders of acquirers with a low 
MTBV (value stocks) at the announcement time will subsequently earn superior 
returns (Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Therefore, there are two hypotheses 
developed. The ninth hypothesis developed is the short run MTBV effect hypothesis: 
Shareholders of high MTBV acquirers experience better share price performance than 
low MTBV acquirers at the announcement time; and the tenth hypothesis developed is 
the long run MTBV effect hypothesis: in the long run, shareholders of high MTBV 
acquirers experience poorer share price performance than low MTBV acquirers.
Few studies have investigated the differential performance of bidders based on their 
MTBVs. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) examine a sample of 987 US takeovers during 
the period 1980 to 1991. Their results show that glamour acquirers in a merger 
experience average gains of -5.6%, -5.4% and 0.1% during the first, second and third 
years respectively after completion (statistically significant at the 1%, 1% and 10% 
level in turn). In contrast, value acquirers experience wealth gains of 5.6%, -1.1% and 
5.4% during the first, second and third years after completion (statistically significant 
at the 1%, 10% and 1% level in turn). Over the entire 36 months, glamour acquirers 
earn abnormal returns of -10.8% but value acquirers earn 9.9% (both statistically 
significant at the 1% level). Rau and Vermaelen (1998)’s results are consistent with 
the long run MTBV effect hypothesis above.
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As another study, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) examine a sample of 519 UK 
acquirers during the period 1983 to 1995. They report that at the bid announcement 
(-1D, +1D) period glamour acquirers experience abnormal returns in the range of -2% 
to -1.8% 13 (statistically significant at the 1% level), while the returns are -1% to 0.9% 
(generally statistically significant at the 5% level) for value acquirers. The difference 
is statistically significant at the 10% level. This finding is contrary to the short run 
MTBV hypothesis which argues that the market favours glamour acquirers with high 
MTBV at the time of the bid announcement. During the period (+2D, +40D) they find 
that average abnormal returns are not statistically significantly different between 
glamour and value acquirers. During the event window (+4ID, +750D), they report 
that glamour acquirers experience average (buy-and-hold) abnormal returns in the 
range of -26.0% to -16.0% (statistically significant at the 1% level), while value 
acquirers experience in the range of -16.0% to -3.0% (statistically significant at the 
1% level). The difference is statistically significant for most of the cases with value 
acquirers outperforming glamour ones. The findings based on the post-acquisition 
event window (+4ID, +750D) are consistent with the long run MTBV effect 
hypothesis.
Section 2.6 Conclusion
In summary, Chapter 2 has reviewed earlier event studies on the profitability of 
M&As as well as other relevant issues as follows.
This chapter examined the motives for M&As (e.g. synergies, agency problems and 
hubris). The ‘synergies’ factor drives the outcome of M&As towards positive gains, 
while the other two factors reduce the shareholder wealth benefits for bidders. 
Multiple motives may be at work in any given M&A decision, therefore the actual 
wealth effects of M&As may depends on which motive prevails.
13 Depending on the benchmark used.
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The chapter examined the announcement period wealth effects of M&A activity, both 
for domestic and cross-border M&As. The available evidence suggests that target firm 
shareholders enjoy abnormal returns that are generally positive and statistically 
significant, while studies of excess returns to bidding firm shareholders are (in 
general) evenly distributed between negative excess returns and those that report zero 
and slightly positive excess returns. As a result, previous studies tend to report, on 
balance, positive total gains for the combined firms. Two hypotheses were developed 
here:
1. M&As deliver premiums to target firm shareholders in the short run.
2. M&As have either a small or insignificant wealth effects for bidder firm 
shareholders.
This chapter compared earlier evidence on the UK and US and Continental EU M&A 
markets. Due to the greater competitiveness of M&A activities in the UK, a more 
liquid and developed equity market and a higher degree of shareholder protection in 
the UK than in the Continental EU markets, target shareholders in the UK on average 
are expected to receive higher premiums than target shareholders in Continental EU. 
The earlier studies on this issue have been limited. The developed hypothesis states 
that:
3. M&As have a market effect for target shareholders. Target shareholders in the 
UK market receive higher premiums than those in the France/Germany 
markets.
This chapter makes distinction between domestic and cross-border M&As. Cross- 
border M&As may have different profitability from domestic ones because: 1) they 
may be more affected by ‘hubris’ due to greater information asymmetry; and 2) 
culture differences in cross-border M&As may make acquisition integration a more 
difficult, time-consuming and expensive process. For these reasons, the developed 
cross-border effect hypothesis was developed:
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4. M&As have a cross-border effect. In a stock market, in the short run cross- 
border target shareholders experience higher average CARs than domestic 
target shareholders, while cross-border bidder shareholders gain less than 
domestic ones.
This chapter also examined the long-term post-acquisition share price performance for 
acquirers. Some evidence seems to suggest that acquirer shareholders on average 
experience negative post-acquisition drift in share price returns. This not only raises 
questions to the possible short-run wealth gains of M&As, but on market efficiency as 
well. The developed long run wealth effect hypothesis is described as:
5. In the long run, on balance there are negative wealth effects for bidding firms’ 
shareholders.
Finally, this chapter examined some links between M&A motives and profitability in 
relation to bid characteristics (e.g. means of payment). A number of hypotheses were 
developed.
6. Cash offers are associated with lower bidder gains. One possible explanation 
is the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders, according to 
Jensen (1986)’s free cash flow hypothesis.
7. A size effect exists. Bigger bidders are associated with lower gains compared 
with smaller ones. One possible reason is managers of bigger bidders often 
have higher power and status, which makes it more difficult and costly to 
monitor them. The associated greater agency costs may lower the synergy 
gains for bidder shareholders.
8. Bidders in tender offers experience higher average abnormal returns than those 
in negotiated offers. This is consistent with the view that the bidder uncovers 
value-creating insights in relation to target firms and avoids giving up value in 
a negotiation.
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9. Shareholders of high MTBV acquirers experience better share price 
performance than low MTBV acquirers in the short run. After a period of 
time, in the long run, shareholders of high MTBV acquirers experience poorer 
share price performance than low MTBV acquirers. One possible reason is 
‘market overreaction’ as I have discussed in Section 2.5.4.
The hypotheses listed above are tested and presented in Chapters 4-6. The next 
chapter, Chapter 3, is the discussion of methodology to be used.
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Appendix: Chapter 2
Table A2.1: Excess returns to target firms in domestic M&As
Study CAR Event Window Sample Period Number o f target 
firms
Target Market Percentage of 
Positive Returns
Methodology
Firth (1979) 22.0%n/a Event Month 1972-1974 224 UK 99.0% The market model
32.0% N/A (-1M, 0M) N/A
Firth (1980) 28.1%*** Event Month 1969-1975 434 UK 99% The market model
35.0% *** (-1M, 0M) 98%
Asquith (1983) 6.2% *** (-1D, OM) 1962-1976 211 US 84.0% The mean return model
Asquith et al. 
(1983)
16.8% *** (-20D, OD) 1963-1979 54 US N/A The mean return model
Bradley, Desai and 
Kim(1988)
31.8%*** (-5D,+5D) 1963-1984 236 US (tender offers) 95% The market model
Lang, Stulz and 
Walking (1989)
40.3% *** (-5D, +5D) 1968-86 87 US (tender offers) N/A The market model
Jarell and Poulsen 
(1989)
29.0%*** (-20D, +10D) 1963-1986 526 US (tender offers) N/A The Scholes-Williams 
methodology
Franks and Harris 
(1989)
23.3%*** Event month 1955-1985 1814 UK 87.0% The simplified market 
model (a=0 p=l)29.7%*** (-4M, +1M) 85%
Franks, Harris, 
Titman (1991)
28.0% *** (-5D, +5D) 1975-1984 399 US N/A Multi-factor model
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Healy, Palepu and 
Ruback(1992)
45.6%*** (-5D, +5D) 1979-1984 50 (Very large 
deals only)
US N/A The market model
Sudarsanam, Holl 
and Salami (1996)
14.0%*** Event day 1980-1990 429 UK N/A The Dimson(1979) 
adjusted market model
Maquieria, 
Megginson and 
Nail (1998)
41.7%*** (-60D, +60D) 1963-1996 47
(conglomerate)
US (Stock-for- 
stock mergers)
61.8%; The market model
38.0% *** 55
(non­
conglomerate)
83.0%
Draper and Paudyal 
(1999)
14.9% ** (-20D, +20D) 1988-1996 581 UK N/A The market model
12.9% ** (-10D, +10D)
11.3%** (-5D, +5D)
9.6% ** (-3D, +3D)
8.9% ** (-1D, +1D)
Mulherin and 
Boone (2000)
21.2%*** (-1D, +1D) 1990-1999 376 US N/A The market model
Eckbo and 
Thorbum (2000)
7. 5% * (-40D, 0D) 1964-1983 345 Canada N/A The CAPM
Tse and Soufani 
(2001)
30.5%*** Event month 1990-1993 40 UK (large, 
friendly deals)
N/A Not reported
19.9%*** 1994-1996
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Andrade et al. 16.0%** (-1D, +1D) 1973-1979 3688 (total firms) US N/A Not reported
(2001) 16.0%** 1980-1989
15.9%** 1990-1998
16.0%** 1973-1998
24.8%** (-20D, 0D) 1973-1979
23.9%** 1980-1989
23.3%** 1990-1998
23.8%** 1973-1998
Goergen and 10.2% *** (-1D, 0D) 1993-2000 118 (Very large Europe N/A The CAPM
Renneboog (2004) 12.7% *** (-2D, +2D) deals only) (including UK)
22.7%*** (-40D, OD)
22.9%*** (-60D, +60D)
12.9%*** (-1D, OD) 56 (Very large UK only
15.7%*** (-2D, +2D) deals only)
27.0%*** (-40D, OD)
27.8%*** (-60D, +60D)
Danbolt (2001) 17.8%*** (OM, +1M) 1986-1991 474 UK N/A Size adjusted 
benchmark
20.2%*** (-2M, +1M)
Agrawal and Jaffe 20.4%*** Event Month 1926-1996 1987 US N/A The size and market-to-
(2002) 24.5%*** (-1M, OM) 2003 book-value adjusted
25.8%*** (-2M, OM) 1009 approach
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Campa and 3.5% ** (-1D, +5D) 1998-2000 288 Europe 59.2% The CAPM
Hernando (2002) 6.3% ** (-7D, +7D) (including UK) 59.9%
9.3% ** (-30D, +30D) 63.7%
*** ** * denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. N/A denotes information not available. # denotes significant but the significance level not available. 
Other results are insignificant.
Y denotes Yearly; M denotes Monthly; D denotes Daily.
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Table A2.2: Excess returns to bidding firms in domestic M&As
No.
Study CAR Event Window Sample Period Number of 
bidder firms
Bidder Market Percentage of 
Positive Returns
Methodology
1 Firth (1979) -2.4% (non- 
equity);N/A
Event Month 1972-1974 224 UK 21.0% The market model
-3% (equity 
offer);N/A
20.0%
2 Dodd (1980) -1.1%** (-1D, 0D) 1970-1977 151 US N/A The market model
3 Asquith (1983) 0.2% (-1D, 0D) 1962-1976 196 US 57.7% The mean return 
model
4 Asquith et al. 
(1983)
3.5% *** (-20D, 0D) 1963-1979 214 US 60.0% The mean return 
model
5 Travlos (1987) 0.2%
(cash offer)
(-1D, 0D) 1972-1981 167 US N/A The market model
-1.5%*** 
(equity offer)
6 Bradley, Desai and 
Kim(1988)
1.0%*** (-5D,+5D) 1963-1984 236 US (tender 
offers)
47.0% The market model
7 Lang, Stulz and 
Walking (1989)
0% (-5D, +5D) 1968-86 87 US (tender 
offers)
N/A The market model
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8 Jarrell and Poulsen 
(1989)
0.9%*** (-5D, +5D) 1963-1986 526 US (tender 
offers)
N/A The Scholes-
Williams
methodology
9 Franks and Harris 
(1989)
1%** Event month 1955-1985 1058 UK 49.0% The simplified 
market model (a=0 
P=l)
10 Lahey and Conn 
(1990)
-2.5% Event month 1960-1979 91 (major 
mergers)
US N/A The market model
11 Morck et al. (1990) -0.7%n/a (-1D, +1D) 1975-1987 326 US 41.4% Industry-adjusted
performance
12 Loderer and Martin 
(1990)
1.7% * (-5D, 0D) 1966-1968 970 US N/A The market model
0.6%* 1968-1980 3401
-0.1% 1981-1984 801
13 Franks, Harris, 
Titman (1991)
-1.0% (-5D, +5D) 1975-1984 399 US N/A Multi-factor model
14 Healy, Palepu and 
Ruback(1992)
-2.2%** (-5D, +5D) 1979-1984 50 (Very large 
deals only)
US N/A The market model
15 Sudarsanam, Holl 
and Salami (1996)
-1.3% *** Event day 1980-1990 429 UK N/A The Dimson(1979) 
adjusted market 
model
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16 Maquieria, 
Megginson and 
Nail (1998)
-4.8% (-60D, +60D) 1963-1996 47
(conglomerate)
US (Stock-for- 
stock mergers)
36.2% The market model
6.1%*** 55
(non­
conglomerate)
61.8%
17 Draper and Paudyal 
(1999)
-1.1%** (-1D, +1D) 1988-1996 394 UK N/A The market model
-1.0% (-5D, +5D)
18 Mulherin and 
Boone (2000)
-0.4% (-1D, +1D) 1990-1999 281 US N/A The market model
19 Eckbo & Thorbum 
(2000)
(for TSE listed 
firms)
1.3%*** Event month 1964-1983 1261 Canada Ranging from 
50.0% to 59.4%; 
depending on 
benchmark and 
time period
The CAPM
20 Tse and Soufani 
(2001)
1.7% Event month 1990-1993 40 (large deals) UK (large, 
friendly deals)
N/A Not reported
4.9% ** (-1M, 0M)
1.4% Event month 1994-1996
1.8% (-1M, 0M)
21 Chatterjee and 
Kuenzi (2001)
1.0%; * (-1D, 0M) 1991,1995 & 
1999
362 UK N/A The mean return 
model
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22 Andrade et al. 
(2001)
-0.3% (-1D, +1D) 1973-1979 3688 US N/A Not reported
-0.4% 1980-1989
-1.0% 1990-1998
-0.7% 1973-1998
-4.5% (-20D, 0D) 1973-1979
-3.1% 1980-1989
-3.9% 1990-1998
-3.8% 1973-1998
23 Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004)
-0.5% (-1D, 0D) 1993-2000 86 (Large deals 
only)
Europe
(including UK)
N/A The CAPM
-0.1% (-2D, +2D)
-1.3%*** (-1D, 0D) 52 (Large deals 
only)
UK & Ireland 
only
-0.6% (-2D, +2D)
24 Campa and 
Hernando (2002)
0.5% (-7D, +7D) 1998-2000 288 Europe
(including UK)
50.0% The CAPM
1.4% (-30D, +30D)
***,**,* denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. N/A denotes information not available. # denotes significant but the significance level not available. 
Other results are insignificant.
Y denotes Yearly; M denotes Monthly; D denotes Daily.
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Table A2.3: Wealth effects of bidders and targets combined
Study Total Wealth Gains 
(abnormal gains in 
value and/or in 
percentage)
Event
Window
Percentage of 
positive pairs
Sample
Period
Number o f  
acquisitions
Sample Market Notes
Halpem (1973) $27.35M (-140D, OD) N/A 1950-1965 77 US
Firth (1979) -£9.1 M N/A (-1M, +1M) 46.9% 1972-1974 224 UK
Firth (1980) -£36.6M N/A (-1M, OD) 48.4% 1969-1975 434 UK
Bradley et al. (1982) $17M (-20D, +5D) N/A 1962-1980 162 US Tender offers only
Bradley et al. (1983) $33.9M (-20D, +5D) N/A 1963-1980 161 US Tender offers only
Malatesta (1983) $32.4M# (-20D, +20D) N/A 1969-1974 30 US Larger deals only
Bradley et al. (1988) $117MM/7.4% ** (-5D, +5D) 75.0% 1963-1984 236 US Tender offers only
Franks and Harris (1989) £2.37M N/A Event month 68.0% 1955-1985 1841 (targets) UK
1058 (bidders)
Franks et al. (1991) 3.9%* (-5D, +5D) N/A 1975-1984 399 US
Healy et al. (1992) 9.1%** (-5D, +5D) N/A 1979-1984 50 US Very large deals only
Draper and Paudyal (1999) 10.8%** (-20D, +20D) N/A 1988-1996 394 UK
8.6%** (-10D, +10D)
7.2%** (-5D, +5D)
6.0%** (-3D, +3D)
5.2%** (-1D, +1D)
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Mulherin and Boone (2000) 3.6% (-1D, +1D) N/A 1990-1999 281 US
Andrade et al. (2001) 1.5% (-1D, +1D) N/A 1973-1979 3688 US
2.6%** 1980-1989
1.4%** 1990-1998
1.8%** 1973-1998 '
0.1% (-20D, 0D) 1973-1979
3.2% 1980-1989
1.6% 1990-1998
1.9% 1973-1998
Goergen
and Renneboog (2004)
4.0% W/A Event day 58.0% 1993-2000 68 Europe very large deals only
Campa and Hernando 1.0% N'A (-7D, +7D) 56.1% 1998-2000 231 Europe
(2002) 0.8% N/A (-30D, +30D) 50.0%
***, **, * denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. N/A denotes information not available. # denotes significant but the significance level not available. 
Other results are insignificant.
Y denotes Yearly; M denotes Monthly; D denotes Daily.
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Table A2.4: Excess returns to target firms in cross-border M&As 1
Study CAR for acquired firms Event Window Sample Period Number of target firms Target Market / Bidder Market Methodology
Conn and Connell (1990) 18.2%** (-12M, 0M) 1971-1980 22 U K /U S The market model
39.9%** 24 U S/U K
Harris and Ravenscraft (1991) 39.8% *** (-3D, +1D) 1970-1987 159 US / Various The market model
Kang (1993) 7.0%*** (-1D, +1D) 1975-1988 102 US / Japan The market model
13.7%*** (-20D, +20D)
9.4%*** (-1D, +1D) Japan / US
12.4%*** (-2D, +2D)
Chen and Chan (1995) 29.6%*** (-4D, +1D) 1985-1990 70 US / Various The market model
21.8%*** (-1D, +1D)
Danbolt (2001) 22.0%*** (0M, +1M) 1986-1991 106 UK / Various The market model
31.0%*** (-2M, +1M)
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Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004)
11.3%*** (-1D, 0D) 1993-2000 49 (large deals only) Within Europe (including 
UK)
The CAPM
19.8%*** (-40D, 0D)
15.3%*** (-1D, 0D) 14 (large deals only) UK (+Ireland) / Europe (non- 
UK)31.2%*** (-40D, 0D)
Campa and Hernando (2002) 4.7%** (-7D, +7D) 1998-2000 288 Within Europe (including 
UK)
The CAPM
8.7%** (-30D, +30D)
1 Information of percentage of positive CAR is largely unavailable.
***, **, * denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. N/A denotes information not available. # denotes significant but the significance level not available. 
Other results are insignificant.
Y denotes Yearly; M denotes Monthly; D denotes Daily.
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<s
Table A2.5: Excess returns to bidding firms in cross-border M&As
Study CAR for 
acquiring firms
Event Window Sample Period Number of bidder 
firms
Target Market / 
Bidder Market
Methodology
Conn and Connell 
(1990)
-2.5% (-12M, 0M) 1971-1980 35 UK /U S The market model
-5.9%* (-12M, +1M)
-7.9% (-12M, 0M) 38 U S/U K
-7.3% (-12M, +1M)
Markides and Ittner 
(1994)
0.1% (-5D, +5D) 1975-1988 276 Various / US The market model
0.5%*** (-2D, 3D)
Cakici et al. (1996) 2.0%*** (-10D, +10D) 1983-1992 195
112
US / Various The market model
-0.3% Various / US
Doukas (1995) 0.4%** 
(Tobin’ Q>1)
(-1D, 0D) 1975-1989 234 Various / US The market model
-0.2%
(Tobin’ Q <1)
Servaes and Zenner 
(1994)
0.1% (0 ,+ lD ) 1979-1988 123 US / Various The market model
Doukas and Travlos 
(1988)
0.1% Event day 1975-1983 202 Various / US The market model
0.5% (-10D,+10D)
63
Eckbo and Thorbum 
(2000)
-0.2% Event Month 1964-1983 390 Canada / US The market model
Datta and Puia (1995) -0.4%* (-1D, 0D) 1978-1990 112 Various / US 
(large deals only)
The market model
-0.8% (-10D, +10D)
-1.4%* (-15D, +15D)
-2.5%** (-30D, +30D)
Corhay and Rad (2000) 1.1%** (-5D, 0D) 1990-1996 84 European / Dutch The market model
-1.1% (-40D, +40D)
-0.5% (-5D, 0D) 17 US/Dutch
4.8%** (-40D, +40D)
Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004)
2.4%*** (-1D, 0D) 1993-2000 56 Within Europe 
(including UK)
(large deals only)
The CAPM
1.5% (-40D, 0D)
6.3%*** (-1D, 0D) 14 Europe (Non-UK) / 
UK (+Ireland) (large 
deals only)
4.9% (-40D, 0D)
Campa and Hernando 
(2002)
-0.8% (-7D, +7D) 1998-2000 288 Within EU (including 
UK)
The CAPM
-2.1% (-30D, +30D)
2 Information of percentage of positive CAR is largely unavailable.
*** ** * denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. N/A denotes information not available. # denotes significant but the significance level not available. 
Other results are insignificant.
Y denotes Yearly; M denotes Monthly; D denotes Daily.
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Table A2.6: Post-acquisition share price performance within the one-year horizon
Study Abnormal returns over 
the post-acquisition 
event window
Post-acquisition event 
window
Sample Description 
(number o f bidders /  
sample period / bidder 
home country)
Percentage of Positive 
CARs
Methodology
Firth (1979) -5.6% (Cash offers)N/A 
-11.2%(equity offers)
N/A
(0M, +12M) 2 24 / 1972-1974/UK 39.0%
37.0%
The market model
Asquith (1983) -7.2%** (0M, +240D) 196/1962-1976/U S N/A The mean return model
Malatesta (1983) -7.6%** (0M, +12M) 256/1969-1974/U S N/A The market model
Dodds and Quek 
(1985)
7.1% N/A (0M, +10M) 7 0 / 1974-1976/U S 43.0% The market model
Franks and Harris 
(1989)
-4.8%*** (0M, +12M) 1058/ 1955-1985/U K N/A The market model
Conn and Connell 
(1990)
Evenly distributed 
between positive and 
negative CAR, ranging 
from -0.1 to 0.1 
(depending on which 
benchmark to use)
(0M, +12M) 35 US Firms & 38 UK 
Firms/ 1971-1980
N/A The market model; 
(6 different 
benchmarks)
Agrawal, Jaffe and 
Mandelker (1992)
-1.5% (+1M, +12M) 765/ 1955-1987/U S 46.5% The Dimson and Marsh 
(1986) model
Gregory (1997) -9.2%*** (0M, +12M) 452/ 1984-1992/U K 35.6% The CAPM
Higson and Elliott 
(1998)
-0.7% (+1M, +12M) 830/ 1975-1990 /U K 47.3% The size matched 
benchmark
Eckbo and Thorbum 
(2000)
-0.6% (+1M, +12M) 1261 / 1964-1983 / 
Canada
N/A The market model
Gregory and 
McCorriston (2005)
0.7% (0M, +12M) 365/ 1985-1994/U K
(cross-border
acquisitions)
N/A The size and market-to- 
book-value adjusted 
approach
***, **, * denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. N/A denotes information not available. # denotes significant but the significance level not available. 
Other results are insignificant.
Y denotes Yearly; M denotes Monthly; D denotes Daily.
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Table A2.7: Long term post-acquisition share price performance
Study Abnormal returns over 
long horizon post­
acquisition event 
window
Month relative to the 
announcement month
Sample Description 
(Number o f bidders / 
sample period / bidder 
market)
Percentage of Positive 
Returns
Methodology
Dodds and Quek 
(1985)
-6.8% N/A +60 Months 7 0 / 1974-1976 /U S N/A The market model
Franks and Harris 
(1989)
-12.6%*** +24 Months 1058/ 1955-1985/U K N/A The market model
Franks, Harris and 
Titman (1991)
-11% +36 Months 399/ 1975-1984/U S 49.0% Eight-portfolio
benchmark
Loderer and Martin 
(1992)
-0.8% 
for mergers
+60 Months 304 (mergers) and 155 
(tender offers) / 1965- 
8 6 /U S
N/A The size and market-to- 
book-value adjusted 
approach-1%
for tender offers
Agrawal, Jaffe and 
Mandelker (1992)
-10.3% ** 
for mergers
+60 Months 937 (mergers) and 227 
(tender offers) / 1955- 
1987/U S
44.0% for mergers The Dimson and Marsh 
(1986) model
+2.2%
for tender offers
percentage for tender 
offers not available
Gregory (1997) -11.8%*** +24 Months 452/1984-1992/U K 52.0% The size adjusted 
approach
Loughran and Vijh 
(1997)
-15.9% *** 
for mergers
+60 Months 788 (mergers) and 135 
(tender offers) / 1970- 
1989/U S
N/A The size and market-to- 
book-value adjusted 
approach
+43% ** 
for tender offers
Higson and Elliott 
(1998)
-1.1% +24 Months 776 (for 24 months 
window) and 722 (for 
36 months window) / 
1975-1990/U K
42.7% The size matched 
benchmark
+0.8% +36 Months 43.0%
Rau and Vermaelen 
(1998)
-4.0% *** 
for mergers
+36 Months 3169 (mergers) and 
316 (tender offers) / 
1980-1991/US
N/A The size and market-to- 
book-value adjusted 
approach+8.9% * 
for tender offers
Gregory and 
McCorriston (2000)
-14.3% *** +36 Months 365 / 1985-1994 / UK 
(cross-border)
48.0% The CAPM
Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000)
-1% +36 Months 2068/1961- 1993/U S N/A The (equal weighted) 
size and market-to- 
book-value adjusted 
approach
Gregory and -27.09% *** +60 Months 197 / 1985-1994 / UK N/A
McCorriston (2005) (for acquisitions into 
the US market)
(cross-border)
10.20% 97 / 1985-1994 / UK N/A
(for acquisitions into (cross-border)
the continental-EU
markets)
The size and market-to- 
book-value adjusted 
approach
***, **, * denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. N/A denotes information not available. # denotes significant but the significance level not available. 
Other results are insignificant.
Y denotes Yearly; M denotes Monthly; D denotes Daily.
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Table A2.8: Effects of means of payment on the profitability of bidding firms
Study Market / Time period
CAR (target) CAR (bidder)
Significance level of the 
difference between two 
types of offers Event Window
Cash offers Equity offers Cash offers Equity
offers
Target side Bidder side
Studies that show better bidder performance after cash offers
Travlos (1987) US / 1972-81 N/A 0.245 -1.47%
***
N/A (-1D, 0D)
Franks, Harris and Mayer 
(1988)
U S / 1955-84 25.4%
***
11.1%
***
2%*** -0.9%
***
*** *** Event Month
Peterson and Peterson 
(1991)
U S / 1980-86 9.6%
* *
4.6%
**
0.2% -0.9%
**
** ** (-1D, 0D)
Loughran and Vijh (1997) U S / 1970-89 N/A -4.9% -25%
***
N/A (0M, +60M)
Draper and Paudyal 
(1999)
U K / 1988-96 8.9%** 3.3%** -0.1% -0.3%
4c He
N/A (-1D, +1D)
Studies that show better bidder performance after equity offers
Eckbo and Thorbum 
(2000)
Canada / 1964-83 N/A 3.1% 3.0%
#
N/A (0M, +12M)
Goergen and Renneboog 
(2002)
Europe /1993-2000 (large 
deals only)
13.6%*** 11.4%*** 0.9%
*
2.6%
* * ♦
* * * *** (-2D, +2D)
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-Continued
Studies that show bidder performance not affected by choice of payments
Franks, Harris and Mayer 
(1988)
UK / 1955-85 30.2%
***
15.2% 0.7% -1.1% *** Insignificant Event Month
Cornett and De (1991) US / 1982-86 
(interstate bank mergers)
13.6%
***
9.8%
***
0.9%
***
-0.9%
***
N/A Insignificant (-1D, 0D)
Davidson and Cheng 
(1997)
U S / 1981-97 Page 477: ‘Once control for the relative size ol 
unrelated to target firm abnormal returns’. 
After controlling other variables (e.g. tender ol 
= -0.890. (Page 476)
'payment and other variables, we find the method o f payment to be 
'fer dummy), the coefficient o f ‘cash-offer dummy’ = -1.0058, with t
***,*♦,* denotes significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. N/A denotes information not available. # denotes significant but the significance level not available. 
Other results are insignificant.
Y denotes Yearly; M denotes Monthly; D denotes Daily.
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Table A2.9: Effects o f ‘relative size’3 on bidder shareholder wealth effects
Study Effect o f ‘Relative Size’ Number o f firms 
(targets/bidders)
Sample Period / Bidder 
Market
Methodology (to assess excess 
returns)
Asquith et al. (1983) C 54 /170 1963- 1979/U S The mean return model
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989) C 526/462  
(Tender offers)
1963-1986/U S The Scholes-Williams 
methodology
Franks & Harris (1989) B 1050/1984 1955- 1985/U K The market model
Loderer and Martin (1990) C 5172 1966-1984/U S The market model
Franks, Harris & Titman (1991) B 399/399 1975-1984/U S Various benchmarks
Peterson and Peterson (1991) B 130/130 1980-1986/U S The market model
Markides and Ittner (1994) A 276/276 1975- 1988/U S The market model
Eckbo and Thorbum (2000) C 345 / 1226 1964- 1998/Canada The CAPM
Campa and Hernando (2002) B 288 / 288 1998 -  2000 / European The CAPM
Notes:
A denotes positive relationship between ‘relative size’ and bidder abnormal returns 
B denotes ‘relative size’ has no significant effect on post-takeover returns for bidders 
C denotes negative relationship between ‘relative size’ and bidder abnormal returns
3 ‘Relative size’ is defined as ‘bidder market value / target market value’.
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Chapter 3 Methodology
This thesis examines the profitability of M&As based on the event study approach. 
Event studies examine the abnormal returns to shareholders in a period surrounding 
the announcement of a transaction. Another general approach to measure profitability 
is accounting studies where returns are estimated from reported financial statements. 
In comparison with the accounting study approach, the event study approach provides 
a direct measure of value created for investors.
Section 3.1 Introduction to Event Studies
Event study methodology has been widely used to measure the impact of an economic 
event on the value of firms. Fama et al. (1969) introduced the methodology that is 
essentially similar to what is in use today. A number of studies have reviewed the 
conventional procedure of event study. For example, Firth (1980), Conn (1985) and 
Mackinlay (1997). In this thesis I not only employ the conventional event study 
procedure introduced by these prior studies but also make use of the most recent 
developments in event studies as well as asset pricing methodology.
The initial task of conducting an event study is to define the event of interest and 
identify the period over which the security prices of the firms involved in this event 
will be examined. It is customary to define the event window to be larger than the 
specific period of interest. This permits examination of periods surrounding the event. 
The periods prior to and after the event period may also be of interest.
Then it is necessary to determine the selection criteria for the inclusion of a given firm 
in the study. The most problematic part in performing an event study is the appraisal 
of the event’s impact. It requires a measure of the ‘normal’ return, which is at the core 
of an event study. The assessment of the ‘normal’ return is based on the application of 
a certain pricing model (e.g. the basic market model in past has been the dominant 
technology in the field). Given the selection of sample firms, the estimation window 
needs to be defined (for some asset pricing models). In the mean time, there are some
73
important considerations such as determining the techniques for aggregating the 
individual firm’s abnormal returns. The abnormal return (ARjt) is the actual ex post 
return of the security (R jT) over the event window minus the ‘normal’ return of the 
firm over the event window:
A R i, =  R i, - E (R it | X t)  
where E (R j, | X t)  is the expected ‘normal’ return given the conditioning information X  
for time period t. To keep the notation simple, I “normalize” the time so period 0 is 
the time of the event for asset i —and then I repeat this for every asset. To control for 
information leakage and possible slow price adjustment, the abnormal return is often 
calculated for some time before and after the event. I take the appraisal of abnormal 
return as the most problematic part of an event study because the abnormal returns 
may be sensitive to model selection, the chosen event window and the chosen 
estimation window.
The description above outlines the event study approach. The rest of this chapter is 
organized as 5 parts: the structure of event studies, models of ‘normal’ returns, 
models of ‘normal’ returns for long-run studies, further issues in testing abnormal 
returns, and a summary of the models to be used.
Section 3.2 Structure of Conventional Event Studies
To assess the ‘normal returns’, one needs to define the estimation windows (L), event 
window (x), and determine the techniques for cumulating the individual firm 
abnormal returns. In Section 3.2,1 discuss these issues in detail.
The figure below provides a graphical illustration for the time periods used in the 
event study method (taking the basic market model as an example):
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Figure 3.1 Estimation and Event Windows (for the market modelV
Time=0
TpLpre Tj tl t2 T 2 T 2+LpoS,
Estimation window  
(Lpre)
Event window  
0 0
Post-estimation window  
(Lpost)
First of all I discuss the determination of estimation window using the basic market 
model as an example. The basic market is Ru = (Xj + piRmt + £it with E(ejt)=0 and 
VAR(£jt) =  o 2(Sj),2 thus the sample abnormal return is
A R it =  R it - at  - J3t R,mt
(3.1)
Under the null hypothesis, conditional on the market-model returns over the event 
window, the abnormal returns will be jointly normally distributed with a zero 
conditional mean and conditional variance a 2(ARjt) where (e.g. Mackinlay, 1997, pp. 
20-21):
a2(ARit) = o2(ei) + - L  [1+ ]
pre a,
(3.2)
where
Lpre is the length of the estimation window;
A  A
Um is the average of Rmt in the estimation window Lpre and <rm is its variance.
One component of Equation 3.2 is the disturbance variance a  (Sj) and a second
A  A
component is additional variance due to sampling error in a  \ and fi \ . As L pre
1 Lpre and LpoSt denote the length o f  the estimation window; T and t both denote the point o f  
time; ti , Tj< 0 and t2 , T2 >  0; tj >  Ti and t2<  T2; t2 -  ti +1= x. See Conn (1985), and Coutts, 
M ills  and Roberts (1997) for similar figures.
2 See equation (3.6) for further discussion.
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becomes large, the second component approaches zero. The variance of the abnormal 
return, a 2(ARjt), then will become a 2(ej) which is independent through time. Thus, in 
practice the estimation window, Lpre , usually is chosen to be large enough (e.g. 5 
years in Franks and Harris, 1989) to make it reasonable to assume that the 
contribution of the second component to the variance of the abnormal return is 
effectively zero.
The event window, x, is often calculated for some time before and after the event in 
order to control for information leakage (market anticipation) and the possible slow 
price adjustment. For example, Firth (1979) finds that the market begins to anticipate 
a merger one month prior to the announcement. It is common that a period like (-5D, 
+5D), (-10D, +10D) or (-2M, +1M) is chosen as the event window. In this thesis, 
several alternative periods are used.
The abnormal return observations must be aggregated in order to draw overall 
inferences for the event period of interest. One popular method is to use cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs). Briefly, for any interval in the event window the 
mathematical formula of the mean CAR (cumulated over time) is:
CAR (ti, t2) = 2 ]AR,
/= /,
(3.3)
  1 N
Where ARt = — ^  ARit (where i denotes the rth firm and N denotes the number of 
firms)
In event studies over a longer horizon, an alternative method for drawing overall 
inferences is the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR). The BHAR is specified as:
BHARk- f t ( l  + *») '  f t P + *(*»)]
<=1 M
(3.4)
where
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Rit = return for security i at time t
E(Rjt) = the expected return for security i at time t
BH A R jT = the t  period buy-and-hold abnormal return for security i
Beginning with a long-term event study by Ritter (1991), the most popular estimator 
of long-term abnormal performance is the mean BAHR. Barber and Lyon (1997) 
argue that the mean BHAR is appropriate because it precisely measures investor 
experience in the long horizon. However, both Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Fama
(1998) argue that there is no compelling reason to use BHARs. First, if a matched- 
portfolio, like the market index, is used, biases can arise from severe skewness of 
multi-year abnormal returns. Second, BHARs can give false impressions of the 
speed of price adjustment to an event.4 Therefo re both CARs and BHARs have 
advantages and disadvantages, but in the long run event studies it is now common to 
see that BHARs are used.
Section 3.3 Models of ‘Normal* Returns
The most commonly used approaches in this area are the market model and the 
CAPM. Recently, the market model has increasingly been replaced by a multi-factor 
model introduced by Fama and French (1992, 1993). Yet another approach is to 
construct a normal return as the actual return on assets which are very similar to the 
asset with the event. Normally this approach chooses to match the event-asset with a 
non-event-asset that is similar in MV and/or MTBV,5 inspired by the finding (Fama 
and French, 1992,1993) that average returns are well explained by the combination of 
MV and MTBV. I discuss the asset pricing models used in this thesis based on a 
market index first. In Section 3.3.1 and Section 3.3.2 the market model and the 
CAPM are presented in turn. Then in Section 3.3.3,1 discuss the models which are in 
relation to the MV and MTBV factors. In particular, they are the Fama-French three-
3 For example, it is common to observe a sample firm with an annual return in excess o f  
100%, but uncommon to observe a sample firm with an annual return in excess o f  100%.
4 For example, suppose returns for the first year after the event are 20% for event firms and 
zero for benchmark firms, so the first-year abnormal return is 20%. Suppose over the next 
four years both event and benchmark firms have a 100% buy-and-hold return. Although there 
is no abnormal return after the first year, the BHAR after five years grows to 40%.
5 MV = Market Value; M TBV = Market-to-book-value.
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factor model and the MV/MTBV-matched models. In the thesis, both the market 
model and the MV/MTBV- matched model are used for the short run study (Chapter 
4). However, without modification and/or improvements many of these models are 
not appropriate to measure abnormal performance in the long horizon. I leave these 
discussion of the modification/improvements to Section 3.4 and Section 3.5.
3.3.1 Market Model
3.3.1.1 Market Model
The basic market model was developed by Markowitz (1952) and Sharpe (1963). 
Recently a number of studies have reviewed the basic market model methodology 
(and other relevant issues). For example, Patell (1976), Conn (1985) and Mackinlay 
(1997). At first, I discuss the procedure introduced by these prior studies. The market 
model was the most used model in short run event studies of M&As. For this reason, I 
also use this model in my short run share price performance study (Chapter 4).
The market model typically assumes the return on a risky asset is statistically related 
to the return on a market index (e.g. the FTSE all share index or the S&P 500). The 
market model is specified as:
Rit ~  OCj +  PiRmt"*" ^it
(3.5)
where
Rit = the return on security i at time t, where return reflects both dividends and capital 
gains/losses, i.e.
Rit = In , where Djt is cash dividend paid per share of firm i at time t.
Pi,t -  1
a* = constant intercept
Rmt = the return on the market portfolio at time /, where return includes both 
dividends and capital gains/loss, i.e.
Pm tRmt = In [----- :—] , where Pmt is adjusted with dividends and capital gains/losses.
Pm,t-  1
78
pi = beta coefficient
sjt = residual error, namely difference between actual return and predicted return on 
security i at time t
3.3.1.2 Advantages and Variations of the Market Model
Perhaps the simplest model in assessing ‘normal’ returns is the constant-mean-retum 
model.6 Although Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) find that the constant-mean-retum 
model sometimes yields similar results to those of more sophisticated models, the 
following equations show that the market model can lead to more precise inferences 
than the constant-mean-retum model. The variance of the abnormal return for the 
market model is:
A  A
c] = V ar[R it - a  - p  R mt]
=  V ar[R jt] - p  2[RmJ 
=  (1  •  R ? ) V ar[R jt]
(3.6)
where R , is the R of the market-model regression for security i.
For the constant-mean-retum model
aJ = Var[Rit-m] = Var[Rit]
(3.7)
where pi is the mean return for asset i.
Since R,2 lies between zero and one, the variance of the abnormal return using the
market model will be less than or equal to the abnormal return variance using the 
constant-mean-retum model. Thus the application of the market model will be a better
6 This model assumes the expected return is constant and equal to the mean return o f  a pre­
merger period.
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approach than that of the constant-mean-retum model. For this reason, I do not use the 
constant-mean-retum model for the current study.
Equation 3.6 suggests that in principle further increases in R2 could be achieved by 
using a multi-factor model. One occasionally tested multi-factor model is the 
international market index model. Yang, Wangsley and Lane (1985) find that a two- 
factor market model (derived by adding a world index) outperforms a single 
domestic-index model for the US market. They find that portfolios of firms with a 
high degree of multi-nationality have a relatively high coefficient relating to the 
international index. A two-factor market model states that:
Rit — OCj +  PidRdt*^ PiwE-wt £it
(3.8)
where
oij, pid and piw are regression parameters respectively and 
Rit = rate of return on asset i at time t 
Rdt= rate of return on the domestic market index at time t 
Rwt = rate of return on the world market index at time t 
Sjt = residual error
However, Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) argue that (p. 163) ‘...in practice, 
however, the gains in R2 from adding additional factors are usually small’. Both Conn 
and Connell (1990), and Kiymaz and Mukheijee (2001) find no significant differences 
between CARs in the domestic model and in the international model. Thus both 
studies claim that (Conn and Connell, 1990, p. 708) ‘...there is no compelling reason 
to incur the extra research cost with the more complex dual-index model’.
3.3.2 CAPM
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) was developed by Markowitz (1959), 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965b, 1969) and Mossin (1966). Recently Sharpe (1991), 
and Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) have reviewed the CAPM.
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The CAPM is an equilibrium model for ‘normal’ returns and is based on the following 
assumptions:
1. There are no transaction costs7 or taxes.
2. Investors are price-takers. Any individual investor cannot affect the price of a 
stock by his buying or selling. Perfect competition exists in the capital market.
3. All investors make their portfolio decisions relying on expected values and 
standard deviations of the returns on their portfolios. Also they are assumed to be 
risk-averse.
4. Each investor has access to unlimited short sales and unlimited lending and 
borrowing at the risk-free rate.
5. Investors possess the same information about the distribution of returns among all 
assets. Also, they plan to invest over the same horizon.
6. The market portfolio consists of all publicly traded assets.
Given these assumptions, the Sharpe and Lintner version of the CAPM in terms of 
expectations states that (time series regression):
E (R it) =  R ft +  Pi [E (R mt)  -  R ft] 8
(3.9)
where
E(Rit) = the expected return of security i at time t, and 
Pi I +  Dit
Rit = In [— -------] , where Djt is cash dividend paid per share of firm i at time t.
P i , t -  1
7 To include transaction costs in the model adds a great deal o f  complexity. Given the low  
value o f  transaction costs, they are probably o f  minor importance to the validity o f  the model.
8 A simple approach to derive the CAPM is as follows: the reward-to-risk ratio for asset i in
Ri'\ _
an efficient portfolio is ----------------------  where R* is an efficient portfolio. This ratio is the
2 C O V ( R i ,R * )
same for all risky assets including the efficient market portfolio. So
E ( R i ) - R f  E ( R m) -  R f  „  ,
---------------------- = ------------------ . By cross-multiplying terms the equation becomes
2 C O V ( R i , R m) 2  V A R (R m)
E (R i)  -  R f  C O V ( R i , R m) _  . C O V ( R i , R m) _  0 L
----------------- = -------------------t . To replace    w ith  (3i the equation becom es the
E(Rm )  -  R f  VAR(Rm) VAR(Rm)
form o f  the CAPM in terms o f  expectations.
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Rft = the continuously compounded risk-free rate of return 
E(Rmt) = the expected return on the efficient market portfolio at time t, and 
Pm tRmt= In [-----:—], where Pmtis adjusted with dividends and capital gains/losses.
Pm, I -1
(3j =  ^ which measures the systematic risk between security i and the
K VAR(Rm) J
efficient market portfolio
What the CAPM says is, therefore, that the only factor which determines the 
difference in expected return is the risk coefficient Pi and the relationship between the 
expected return and the market return is linear. The effect of any other factors that 
may affect returns can be reduced to zero through diversification. When p is high, the 
asset is very sensitive to market movements and therefore is more risky. The asset is 
not sensitive to market movements when p is low. Negative/Zero p means that asset is 
negatively-correlated/uncorrelated with the market.
Relationship between the Market Model and the CAPM
The theoretical motivation between the two models is different. The market model is 
not an equilibrium model like the CAPM. The basic market model does not make any 
assumptions about how investors optimize their portfolio but makes the assumption 
about the statistical relationship within the market. The CAPM uses the value- 
weighted market portfolio. The market portfolio is the portfolio of all risky assets 
which is completely diversified. In practice ‘all risky assets’ are not observable so a 
market index is typically used.
The CAPM is related to the market model as follows. First, consider the market model 
regression
Rit — Ctj +  P iR mt"  ^ Sit
where Sjt is i.i.d..
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Let Rf denote the risk-free rate. Now subtract Rf from both sides of the equation above 
to give:
Rit " R f  — CXj - R f  +  PiRmt Sit 
Next, add and subtract pi R f from the right-hand-side of equation to give
Rit - R f=  Otj - R f (1 - p i ) +  pi(Rmt-  R f ) +  Sit 
— CC j +  P i(R m t" R f  )  Sjt
where a  * = a; - Rf (1 - p i)
This re-expressed market model is called the market model in excess return form (or 
the excess return market model). One of the focuses of empirical tests of the Sharpe- 
Lintner CAPM is the hypothesis that
Ho: a* = a* - Rf (1 - p i) = 0 vs Hi: a* ^ 0
When the null hypothesis Ho= 0 is not rejected, the excess return market model is 
equivalent to the CAPM in the Sharpe-Lintner version.
3.3.3 MV and MTBV Adjusted Approaches
MV and MTBV approaches also used in the short run analysis are based on the 
findings that the combination of MV and MTBV provides a good explanation of the 
average return of shares (Fama and French, 1992, 1993). There are two ways of 
assessing asset prices with the adjustments for MV and MTBV: the Fama-French 
three-factor model and the MV/MTBV-matched model. In Section 3.3.3, I discuss 
them in turn.
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3.3.3.1 Fama-French Three-factor Model
General Discussion o f the Fama-French Three-factor Model
Although the CAPM assumes the beta coefficient captures all cross-sections of 
average share returns, previous work shows that average returns on common stocks 
are related to firm characteristics such as MV (stock price times number of shares in 
issue), the price-eamings ratio (P/E), MTBV (the ratio of the market value to book 
value of common equity), past sales growth, etc. These patterns in average returns are 
not explained by the CAPM (e.g. Fama and French, 1996).
In an influential paper, Fama and French (1992) bring together MV, leverage, E/P, 
MTBV and beta in a single cross-sectional study. They find for the US market in the 
period 1962-1989 (p. 445): \ \ ) .  When we allow for variation in beta that is unrelated 
to MV, there is no reliable relation between beta and average return. (2) The opposite 
roles of market leverage and book leverage in average returns are captured well by 
MTBV. (3) The relation between E/P and average return seems to be absorbed by the 
combination of MV and MTBV.’ Subsequently, Fama and French (1993) develop the 
Fama-French three-factor model (the FF model for convenience). The FF model is 
applied by regressing the post-event monthly excess returns for firm i on a market 
premium factor, a MV factor and a MTBV factor. Fama and French claim that many 
of the CAPM average-retum anomalies are captured by this model. Additionally, 
Fama and French (1996) show that the FF model performs well to portfolios formed 
on the cash-flow/price ratio, P/E, and sales growth. Specifically, the model is in 
regression form:
Rit ■ R ft=  ctj+ Pi (Rmt ■ Rft) +  Si S M B t +  hj HM Lt +  £u
(3.10)
where
Rit = the simple return on the common stock of firm i at time t 
Rft = the risk-free rate of return
R m t= the return on a value-weighted market index at time t
SMBt = the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks less the return on a 
value-weighted portfolio of big stocks at time t
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HMLt = the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high MTB V stocks less the return 
on a value-weighted portfolio of low MTB V stocks at time t 
a*, pi and Si, and hi are regression parameters and 
8jt = residual error
In addition, (Fama and French, 1996, p.56) conclude ‘...at a minimum, the available 
evidence suggests that’ the FF model in (3.10) ‘with the intercepts (a ’s) equal to 0, is 
a parsimonious description of returns and average returns’. Therefore the mean 
intercept term is used to test the null hypothesis that the mean monthly abnormal 
return of firms is equal to zero.
The FF model tends to produce significant coefficients on all three factors, and 
regression R values are close to 1 for most portfolios in their tests. Portfolios of value 
stocks9 tend to have a high value for h, while growth portfolios will have a negative h. 
Large portfolios tend to load negatively on SMB and small portfolios will have a large 
positive value for s. In practice, most of the studies that both apply the FF model and 
examine the issue of M&A are limited to long-term event studies (e.g. from one year 
to five years). For example, Gregory (1997), and Gregory and McCorriston (2000).
One advantage of the FF model over the MV/MTBV-matched model is that it does 
not require MV or MTBV data for sample firms. Removing this requirement implies 
firms without available data on MV or MTBV can be included in the analysis. 
Another advantage is that the FF model does not require pre-event data if it is used in 
the long run study. When the FF model is employed on short-run event studies is that 
it may sacrifice the advantage that this model does not require pre-event data. This is 
because, in the short-run study, the coefficients of the three factors have to be 
estimated using a pre-event estimation window (see Barber and Lyon, 1997, p.372, 
footnote 5), analogous to a conventional market model approach.
9 Fama and French define value stocks as those stocks that have high ratios o f  book value to 
market value and ‘glamour’ stocks as those that have low ratios o f  book value to market 
value.
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Deriving the Fama-French Three-factors
There are three factors in the Fama-French three-factor model: (R mt - RfO, SMBt and 
HMLt. The method to derive the (Rmt - Rft) factor is straightforward. To calculate the 
SMB and HML factors for the FF model in this study, I follow Fama and French 
(1993, pp.8-9)10. In January of each year t all stocks on the market are ranked by MV 
(price times shares in issue). The median MV is then used to split stocks into two 
groups, small and big (S and B). MTBV is measured by market equity for the fiscal 
year ending in year t-1, divided by book common equity at the end of December of t-
1. I then break all stocks on the market into three MTBV groups based on the 
breakpoints for the bottom 30% (low, L), middle 40% (medium, M), and top 30% 
(high, H) of the ranked values of MTBV. At this stage I construct six portfolios (S/L, 
S/M, S/H, B/L, B/H, B/M) from the intersections of the two MV and the three MTBV 
groups. For example, the S/L portfolio contains stocks in the S group that are also in 
the L group. Monthly value-weighted returns on the six portfolios were calculated 
from January of year t to December of t. The portfolios are re-formed in January of 
each year. The portfolio SMB (small minus big) is the difference, each month, 
between the simple average of the returns on the three small-stock portfolios (S/L, 
S/M, and S/H) and the simple average of the returns on the three big-stock portfolios 
(B/L, B/M, B/H). The portfolio HML (high minus low) is defined similarly. It is the 
difference, each month, between the simple average of the returns on the S/H and B/H 
portfolios and the simple average of the returns on the two low MTBV portfolios (S/L 
and B/L).
3.3.3.2 Control-Firm Model
It has been mentioned that an alternative approach to the FF model that also adjusts 
for MV and MTBV is the matched-MV/MTBV approach. Based on Fama and French
10 Only firms with common equity are included in their tests. Fama and French select non- 
fmancial firms for their test because they think the high leverage that is normal for financial 
firms probably does not have the same meaning as for non-financial firms. Barber and Lyon 
(1997) suggest the impact o f  this exclusion is minimal. Foerster and Sapp (2004) find the 
model works w ell for financial firms but the estimated coefficients on som e Fama-French 
factors have different signs from those for non-financial firms.
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(1992)’s results, they conclude (p. 452) ‘.. .our results then imply that the performance 
of managed portfolios ... can be evaluated by comparing their average returns with 
the average returns of benchmark portfolios with similar MV and MTBV 
characteristics. Likewise, the expected returns for different portfolio strategies can be 
estimated from the historical average returns of portfolios with matching MV and 
MTBV properties.’ Also, Fama (1998, p. 293) states: ‘...it is now common to 
estimate abnormal returns by matching event stocks with non-event stocks similar in 
terms of MV and MTBV’.
One such model is the control-firm model (the CF model) which is used as an 
alternative in my short run share price study (Chapter 4). Sample firms are matched to 
a matched firm on the basis of MV and MTBV characteristics. The control firms are 
selected by first dividing all stock-listed firms on DataStream into 10 equal sized 
portfolios based on their MVs at the beginning of each calendar year t. Each sample 
firm is then matched with the non-merging firm from its MV portfolio which has the 
closest MTBV in December of each calendar year t-1. This procedure is repeated for 
each post-acquisition calendar year. Lyon et al. (1999) show that the control firm 
approach avoids the skewness and rebalancing biases inherent in a reference portfolio 
as discussed later in Section 3.4.2. This model follows the BHAR approach and has 
the form:
B H A R i,-  f l ( l  +  * „ ) - f l [ l  +  * ( * » ) ]
/=1 /=1
(3.11)
where
Rit = dividend adjusted return for security i at time t
E(Rjt) = the expected dividend adjusted return for security i at time t
BH A R jT = the x period buy-and-hold abnormal return for security i
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3.3.3.3 Control-Portfolio Model
General Discussion o f the Control-portfolio Model
Another model following the MV/MTBV-matched framework is the control-portfolio 
model (the CP model). When applying the control-portfolio approach, the control 
portfolio (whose firms are similar in MV and MTBV characteristics) returns can be 
calculated using the ‘buy-and-hold’ method described in Lyon et al. (1999)11:
where
bh denotes ‘buy-and-hold’
p, s, x denote portfolio, the beginning period and the period of investments in turn 
r = the buy-and-hold return for the control portfolio during period x starting from 
time s
ns denotes the number of securities traded in month s, the beginning period for the 
return calculation
Rit = the simple net return (incorporating the effect of dividends) on security i of the
identified control portfolio at time t, and
Pit — Pi, t -  1 +  Dit 
 P ~ , --------r i , t  -1
This method of calculating returns on a reference portfolio involves first 
compounding the returns on securities constituting the portfolio and then summing 
across securities.
1 1 M
An alternative measurement o f  portfolio returns is R t, -  n n  + -£=!— ] - 1, where ‘reb’
denotes ‘re-balanced return’ and nt denotes the number o f  securities at time t. When x is 1, 
namely single period (e.g. one month using monthly data), nt and ns must remain unchanged 
and the two measurements o f  portfolio returns are equivalent. When x are multi-periods (e.g. 
long-term event study), Lyoh et al. (1999) object to the use o f  R"* r because it suffers the re­
balancing and the new-listing biases as discussed in Section 3.4.2.
i=i
(3.12)
nt
nt
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We therefore calculate abnormal returns as:
A R jT R jT - E(Rpx)
(3.13)
where
ARjT = the x period buy-and-hold abnormal return for security i
Rjx = the x period dividend adjusted buy-and-hold return for security i
E(RpX) = the expected x period buy-and-hold dividend adjusted return for the matched
portfolio p. In the thesis, I use R ^  r as the benchmark of the expected x period buy-
and-hold return, E(Rpt).
Method to Construct Control- portfolios
In constructing the control portfolios, I follow Lyon et al. (1999). At first I construct 
10 MV portfolios as follows:
1. I calculate firm MV at the beginning of each year for all firms.
2. In each year t, I rank all firms on the market on the basis of firm MV and then 
form MV decile portfolios based on these rankings.
3. Then the returns of the MV portfolios are tracked from January of year t to 
December of year t for each month.
I then construct 5 MTBV-matched portfolios for each MV decile as follows:
1. I obtain firms’ MTBV in December of year t-1.
2. In December of year t-1, 1 rank all firms on the basis of relative position of MTBV 
in the population and then form 5 deciles based on these rankings
3. Then the returns of the MV portfolios are tracked from January of year t to 
December of year t for each month.
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Therefore I in fact obtain 50 different portfolios. In each month I find the control 
portfolio for an event firm that is similar in MV and MTBV characteristics. Then I 
calculate holding returns for the identified MV and MTBV - matched portfolios using 
equation (3.12). The portfolios are re-formed at the beginning of each year.
Section 3.4 Models of ‘Normal* Returns for the Long-run Study
I have discussed a number of asset pricing models. However, some of these models 
are not appropriate to measure share price performance in the long horizon although 
they are well-specified in short run studies. Section 3.4.1 explains why these models 
are not appropriate for long horizon tests. In section 3.4.2 and section 3.4.3 I 
introduce some well-specified models of measuring abnormal returns in the long 
horizon. In particular, they are the control firm model and the control portfolio model 
along with the use of the skewness-adjusted t-statistic, which are both used in my long 
run share price performance study (Chapter 5). Section 3.5 will discuss some further 
issues of model selection.
3.4.1 Problems in the Long-run Study
So far I have presented a number of models to measure abnormal returns from M&As.
Kothari and Warner (1997) perform a simulation test using 250 randomly selected
samples of 200 securities from the CRSP monthly return tape from Jan. 1980 to Dec.
1989. All models tested (the market model, the CAPM, and the FF model) yield no
problem within the first month. The criterion of model performance is the percentage
10of 250 samples that the null hypothesis of zero abnormal returns is rejected. For 
example, the means and cross-sectional standard deviations of the t test statistics 
obtained from the 250 samples are close to zero and 1 respectively. Thus within short 
horizon (e.g. one month) these models can generate convincing results.
12 This criterion is also used for other studies discussed in this section.
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However, in long horizon studies the picture is totally different. The tests by Kothari 
and Warner (1997) over longer horizons yield some suspicious results. For example, 
the mean and cross-sectional standard deviation of the t test statistics obtained from 
250 samples now become over 0.82 and over 1.33 respectively13. Therefore the use of 
the market model, the CAPM and the FF model in long horizon event studies is less 
certain.
A number of reasons have been documented in recent papers14 that may explain the 
inability of these three models (the market model, the CAPM and the FF model) in 
detecting the long horizon share price performance. A first issue is that these models 
pre-assume that the coefficients of the parameters are constant over time. A second 
issue is the lack of cross-sectional independence among sample firms. A third issue is 
model imperfection problems (e.g. Fama, 1998, pp. 292-293). Any asset pricing 
model does not completely describe expected returns. For example, the Sharpe- 
Lintner CAPM and the basic market model do not explain the small-stock effect 
found by Banz (1981).15 The FF model does not explain the short-term return 
momentum found by Jegadeesh (1990), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). These are 
likely to become more important in longer period studies. A fourth issue is data 
requirements and the survival problem. For one thing the results could be biased 
toward firms with data and which remain alive, for another a potential problem (when 
the MV and MTBV matched approaches are used) can arise from how to weight firms 
that do not survive the whole period in the long horizon.16 In the short horizon these 
problems are very minor but in the longer horizon they can be significant as the 
effects aggregate over time.
Barber and Lyon (1997) document that test statistics based on abnormal returns 
calculated using a matched portfolio model (e.g. a market index or a MV/MTBV
13 Ideally, they should be zero and one.
14 For example, Kothari and Warner (1997), Barber and Lyon (1997), Fama (1998), Lyon et 
al. (1999), Mitchell and Stafford (2000), and Kothari (2001).
15 Banz (1981) finds that the stock o f  firms with low market capitalization have higher 
average returns than large capitalization stocks.
16 Lyon et al. (1999) use the return o f  the matched portfolio to replace that o f  the delisted 
firm. Alternatively, Conn et al. (2002) use the next firm available that has the closest MV and 
MTBV characteristics. Either way can cause their results slightly biased.
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1 7matched portfolio ) are also misspecified in terms of empirical rejection rates that 
exceed theoretical rejection rates. Tests are based on 1000 random samples of 200 
firms. They find the CAR approach yields significantly positively biased results and 
the BHAR approach yields significantly negatively biased results when using the 
control-portfolio approach in the long horizon. They suggest that these are the results 
of the skewness biases, rebalancing biased and new-listing biases.18
In brief, the market model, the CAPM, the FF model and the original CP model yield 
no problem in the short horizon event study. However, all these models are 
inappropriate for long horizon studies. Now I move on to discuss the models that are 
appropriate for the long horizon event study.
3.4.2 Using the Control-firm Model in the Long Run Study
Barber and Lyon (1997) find the MV/MTBV-matched firm approach (the CF model) 
yields well-specified test statistics in random samples. Tests are based on 1000 
random samples of 200 firms. No matter whether the CAR or the BAHR approach is 
used, the mean abnormal returns over three event windows (12, 36 and 60 months) are 
close to zero. The rejection frequencies (percentage of firms in a sample that reject 
zero abnormal performance) are low and insignificant for all event windows. In 
addition the control-firm approach yields virtually no skewness in all situations 
considered, which enhances the power of test statistics. Therefore, the authors 
conclude (p. 370) ‘...most importantly, we identify a method of measuring long-run 
abnormal returns that yields well-specified test statistics...’. This control-firm method 
to measure the long horizon share price performance is adopted in several event 
studies nowadays, for example Cosh and Guest (2001).
Barber and Lyon (1997) indicate three reasons why the control-firm model 
outperforms some other models in long horizon event studies. Firstly, the control-firm 
model avoids the new-listing bias. Firms that constitute the index (or reference 
portfolio) include newly listed firms which in general (e.g. Ritter, 1991) under-
17 See Section 3.3.3.3 for details o f  the control-portfolio model.
18 See Section 3.4.2 for more detailed discussion o f  these biases.
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perform the market average. Consequently, the population mean for CARs will be 
positively biased. BHARs using the control-portfolio model are also affected by this 
problem. Barber and Lyon refer it as the new-listing bias. Secondly, the control-firm 
model avoids the rebalancing bias. When buy-and-hold abnormal returns are 
calculated using an equally weighted market index, the long-run return on the index is 
compounded assuming monthly rebalancing of all securities constituting the index. To 
maintain equal weighting of all securities in the index, securities that have beaten 
market averages are sold, while those that have lagged market averages are purchased. 
Since the consecutive monthly returns for individual securities are negatively 
correlated, the purchased firms subsequently perform well and the sold firms 
subsequently perform poorly. Therefore this monthly rebalancing leads to an inflated 
return on the market index and a negative bias in BHARs. The rebalancing bias does 
not affect the calculation of cumulative abnormal returns, since the monthly returns of 
sample firms and the index are both summed rather than compounded. Thirdly, the 
control-firm model avoids the skewness bias. Long horizon BHARs are severely 
positively skewed. For example, it is common to observe a sample firm with an 
annual return in excess of 100%, but uncommon to observe a return on the market 
index in excess of 100%. The positive skewness leads to a negative bias in test 
statistics. The skewness bias is less pronounced in CARs because the monthly returns 
of sample firms are summed rather than compounded.
In short, the use of the MV/MTBV control-firm approach alleviates the new listing 
bias (since both the sample and control firm must be listed in the identified event 
month), the rebalancing bias (since both the sample and control firm returns are 
calculated without rebalancing), and the skewness bias (since the sample and control 
firms are equally likely to experience large positive return. In this sense, the control 
firm model is appropriate for the long run share price performance study.
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3.4.3 Using the Control-portfolio Model and the Skewness-adjusted t-statistic
The BHARs based on the control-portfolio model are typically skewed as just 
discussed. Sutton (1993) concludes that a bootstrapped statistic may be preferred to 
the t test when the parent distribution is asymmetrical. To eliminate the skewness bias 
when long-run abnormal returns are calculated based on a portfolio’s performance, a 
bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic can be used as follows:
ts,= i^(,s+y-s2+^ -r)
3 6n
(3.14)
where
AR r~
S = ------  — and S is the conventional t-statistic
cr(ARr)
-ARry
y  = —------------- r-----which is an estimate of the coefficient of skewness
n<j(AR )
Bootstrapping the test statistic involves drawing b resamples of size nb from the 
original sample. The skewness adjusted test statistic is calculated in each of these b 
bootstrapped resamples and the critical values for the transformed test statistic are 
calculated from the b values of the transformed statistic. Specifically, firstly to draw
n n1000 bootstrapped resamples from the original sample of size nb= —. The choice of —
4 4
is based on the recommendation of Lyon et al. (1999). They indicated: ‘Our choice of 
nnb=—is based on empirical analysis. The skewness adjustment results in more
conservative test statistics as the size of the bootstrap resample decreases. Bootstrap 
nresample sizes of — also yield well-specified inferences, while bootstrap resample 
sizes of n do not...’. Secondly, in each resample, calculate the statistic:
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From the 1000 resamples, I calculate the two critical values, x * and x* , for the
transformed test statistic, tsa , to reject the null hypothesis that the mean long-run 
abnormal return is zero at the a significance level by solving:
Pr[/‘ <x' ] = Pr[f‘ <x' ]= —L sa I J L sa u ^
Finally, reject the null hypothesis that the mean long-run abnormal return is zero if
tsa< X *  Or tSa<X*  .
Barber and Lyon (1997) provide evidence that the MV/MTBV control-portfolio 
model along with the use of the skewness-adjusted t-statistic yields well-specified test 
statistics in random samples. This approach is nowadays adopted by event studies to 
examine the issue of M&A profitability in the long period. One example is Gregory 
and McCorriston (2005), which is based on the control-portfolio model and employ 
the skew-adjusted t-statistic in a long run study.
Section 3.5 Further Issues in Testing Abnormal Returns
3.5.1 Change in Systematic Risk
One of the problems in applying the basic market model, the CAPM and the FF model 
to event studies is the instability of parameters over time. M&As may alter firms’ 
systematic risk by changing MVs, operating and/or financial risks of both buyer and 
seller firms, whereas non-merger events, such as earnings announcements, are less 
likely to alter the firm’s systematic risk. If an acquisition increases a firm’s p then that 
firm’s CAR will indicate positive gains from merger, whereas in reality risk-adjusted 
returns may not have changed. Similarly, if an acquisition decreases a firm’s 
systematic risk then the firm’s CAR will be negatively biased. Only if the parameters
are constant over both the pre-merger period and the acquisition-related period will 
the model yield unbiased results.
A number of studies argue that beta changes around M&A dates are not important. 
Haugen and Langetieg (1975) find that the percentages of mergers that have 
statistically significant changes (10% level) in betas are quite similar between sample 
firms and non-merging control firms. Dodd (1980) tests various estimation windows 
and also states (p. 109) ‘...different estimation periods were tried and in no case are 
the results and conclusions of this paper altered’. Similarly, Elgers and Clark (1980), 
and Pettway and Yamada (1986)19 find that systematic risk is essentially unchanged 
over the event periods that they examined.
In comparison, a number of event studies find that beta changes are important over
onthe event period. One paper by Mandelker (1974) finds that beta increases steadily 
in the per-merger periods (-100 months to -20 months) and then decreases in the next 
60 months (-20 months to +40 months). In order to adjust for the changes in beta, 
Mandelker (1974) suggests using both pre-acquisition data (-30 months to -1 months) 
and post-acquisition data (+1 months to +30 months) to estimate beta. Some other 
studies, e.g. Lahey and Conn (1990), Kiymaz and Mukheijee (2001),21 also report 
significant beta reduction in the post-acquisition period. As an example, Kiymaz and 
Mukheijee (2001) find that betas decline irrespective of the location of the target, 
although the degree of decline and its level of significance vary across countries.
While these studies report a downward shift in the post-event beta, Langetieg, 
Haugen and Wichem (1980) find that mergers tend to be associated with an increase 
in levels of systematic risk.
19 A study o f  Japanese mergers.
20 See Conn (1985, p. 49) for a few  other studies with similar findings that were published 
before the year 1980.
21 Both two studies find no significant changes in ‘alpha’ (intercept) over time. Shrieves and 
Lubatkin (1990) report results inconsistent with them. Shrieves and Lubatkin (1990) find 
strong evidence for changes in ‘alpha’ but only find weak evidence for beta reductions. They 
conclude (p.67): ‘mergers appear to lower beta...although the effect was only o f  marginal 
statistical significance in one o f  the three sub-samples’.
22 See Conn (1985, p. 49) and Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2001, p. 252) for a few  more 
examples.
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Hence, a number of existing empirical studies did not find significant role of 
parameter shifts and a number of others argue that parameter shifts are important. It 
could be worthwhile to test the parameter stability in the event study framework. If 
specific breakpoints of systematic-risk change are hypothesized, versions of the Chow 
(1960) test can be computed and this is done in Chapter 4.
3.5.2 Cross-sectional Dependence in Share Returns in the Long Run Study
3.5.2.1 Cross-sectional Dependence in Share Returns
So far the discussion above typically pre-assume that the abnormal returns are 
uncorrelated across time and across assets. In practice both assumptions can be 
violated. In short horizon event studies, the effects of these problems are minimal. In 
long horizon tests, they are more important as the effects aggregate over long periods, 
which causes the statistical tests to lack power.
The first assumption can be violated because abnormal returns may in fact be 
correlated across time. It is often referred to as ‘overlapping share returns’. This is a 
statistical problem of including abnormal returns for the same firm which overlap in 
calendar time, which causes the conventional /-statistic to be biased upward because 
the returns are positively correlated (e.g. Lyon et al., 1999 and Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000).
To overcome this problem, it is necessary to select firms which had no other 
significant firm-specific events for a reasonably long period around the announcement 
date. For example, Conn and Connell (1990) only select firms which had no other 
significant event during several years around M&As. Alternatively, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2000) include the first acquisition and exclude the next if it occurs within 
the pre-defined event window. In this thesis I follow the first way because when 
BHARs are used the second way is flawed. For example, if I want to examine the 
average share price performance of the 4th year’s holding abnormal return, it could be 
mixed with the impacts of the 1st years’ holding abnormal return of other overlapping 
M&As.
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For the long horizon study, some studies find that to use or not to use non-overlapping 
sample significantly changes abnormal returns in certain circumstances. For the short 
term study, in practice the effect of pursuing a non-overlapping sample is usually not 
strong. Lahey and Conn (1990) examine 91 US major mergers during 1960-1979. 
They find evidence that (p. 436) ‘...there is no significant difference in the market’s 
reaction to acquiring firms with one merger as opposed to those with multiple 
mergers’.
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) show that abnormal returns of different acquirers are 
correlated so the second assumption above (abnormal returns uncorrelated across 
assets) can be violated. Again this is a very minor problem in short horizon event 
studies, but becomes an important issue in longer horizon tests as effects aggregate 
over longer period.
Abnormal returns of different acquirers can be correlated through similar 
characteristics of acquirers (such as similar MV, MTBV, industry, etc.). Lyon et al.
(1999) find that non-random samples often yield mis-specified test statistics for long 
horizon tests. They investigated 7 types of non-random samples: firms in the biggest 
MV decile only and in the smallest MV decile only, firms in the highest MTBV decile 
only and in the smallest MTBV decile only, firms with superior pre-event return 
performance only and with poor pre-event return performance only, firms with 
extreme industry clustering only, firms with extreme calendar clustering only 
(therefore cross-sectional dependence will be most severe when all sample firms share 
the same event date), and firms with extreme overlapping returns only. Although the 
control-firm model (or the control-portfolio model along with the skewness-adjusted 
t-statistic) still outperform other models, they yield mis-specified test statistics in 
testing the long run share price performance of these groups. Although their tests are 
based on some extreme cases, they provide evidence that lack of independence in 
abnormal returns weakens the power of the tests.
Thus, at this stage I conclude that when I test a random sample where firm 
characteristics are roughly evenly distributed, the control-firm model (and the control- 
portfolio model with the use of the skewness-adjusted t-statistic) can yield convincing
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results because they avoid the misspecifications I have discussed. However, the 
results become less certain when the cross-sectional dependence between abnormal 
returns becomes stronger, particularly for long horizon tests as the effects can 
aggregate over a long time period. In Section 3.5.2.2 I introduce the use of the 
calendar time portfolio approach to tackle these problems.
3.5.2.2 Calendar Time Approach
Both Fama (1998), and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) strongly advocate a monthly 
calendar-time portfolio approach to measure long term share price performance. The 
calendar time approach tracks the average abnormal returns of event firms over a 
calendar period of time rather than over an event window period as I have discussed 
in Section 3.2. There are some advantages for using this model (see Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2000, p. 288). At first, by forming monthly calendar-time portfolios, all 
cross-correlations of event firm abnormal returns are automatically accounted for in 
the variance. On the other hand, the distribution of this estimator is better 
approximated by the normal distribution, allowing for classical statistical inference. 
For these reasons, the calendar time portfolio approach is used in my long run study, 
especially in the measurement of overlapping share price performance (Chapter 5). 
However, there are a few disadvantages with this approach: 1) this approach is that it 
does not precisely measure investor experience as BHAR does, and 2) this approach 
only tracks the performance of a portfolio.
Generally there are two ways to employ the calendar time portfolio approach. One is 
to incorporate the calendar-time portfolio into the FF model, which I call the CTFF 
model. In each calendar month, I form a portfolio composed of event firms that had 
events within the last 5 years. I take the average cross-sectional returns of the 
portfolio for each month. The obtained average cross-sectional returns are then used 
in a Fama-French three-factor model regression.:
Rpt -  Rft =  oti +  pi(Rmt -  RfO +  Pi SM B t +  pi H M Lt +6*
(3.15)
where
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Rpt = the simple monthly return on the calendar-time portfolio,
Rmt = the return on a value-weighted market index at time t
SMBt = the return on a value-weighted portfolio of small stocks less the return on a 
value-weighted portfolio of big stocks at time t
HMLt = the return on a value-weighted portfolio of high MTBV stocks less the return 
on a value-weighted portfolio of low MTBV stocks at time t 
oij, pi and Sj, and hj are regression parameters respectively.
Each firm that had an event within last 5 years will only be counted once to construct 
Rpt for each calendar month. The average abnormal return for the entire sample is the 
time series average of the intercept of the Fama-French three-factor model regression. 
The CTFF model yields robust test statistics in non-random samples, and enables me 
to use the conventional test statistics (see also Lyon et al., 1999). One potential 
problem in using the CTFF model is that changing portfolio composition may 
introduce heteroskedasticity as the variance is related to the number of firms in the 
portfolio. However, both Lyon et al. (1999) and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) find the 
potential heteroskedasticity problem is minimal. Another potential problem is that the 
CTFF model may co-suffer from the model misspecification of the FF model (e.g. the 
pre-assumed constant parameters over time).
An alternative method is to incorporate the calendar time approach into the 
MV/MTBV-matched portfolio model. Lyon et al. (1999)’s simulation tests suggest 
that the calendar time portfolio approach employing control-portfolio abnormal 
returns (the calendar time control portfolio model for convenience, or the CTCP 
model) also yield well-specified test statistics, especially when equally weighted 
calendar-time portfolios are used. Suppose the event period of interest is 5 years. 
For each month in calendar time, I calculate the abnormal return for each security that 
had an event within the last five years of the calendar month. I then take the equally 
weighted average cross-sectional abnormal return for that month. For each month I 
repeat this procedure but no longer test securities that become irrelevant (namely 
having no significant event within the last five years) and additionally include the
23 Lyon et al. (1999) call it ‘mean monthly calendar-time abnormal returns’. In this thesis I 
refer it as the CTCP model.
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securities that become relevant. The abnormal return for calendar month t in the 
equally-weighted CTCP model is:
A R jt — Rit — Rpt,
(3.16)
where
A R jt = the abnormal return for security i at time t
Rit = the actual return for security i at time t
Rpt = the return on the MV and MTBV matched portfolios
In each calendar month t, I calculate a mean abnormal return across firms in the 
portfolio:
AR,= ]Tx„ * ARU
/=1
(3.17)
where
nt is the number of firms in the portfolio in month t
the abnormal return of each firm could either be equally-weighted or value-weighted, 
which is reflected by Xjt
A mean monthly abnormal return is therefore calculated as:
AR = - Y A R ,
T t t
(3.18)
where
T = the total number of calendar months
To test the null hypothesis of zero mean monthly abnormal returns, a conventional t- 
statistic is applied.
Lyon et al. (1999) show that the calendar-time approach is well-specified in random 
samples. This is applicable for either the CTFF model or the CTCP model. Secondly,
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they find the calendar-time approach performs well when cross-sectional dependence 
is severe, such as in the case of overlapping returns. Finally, they find the calendar­
time approach does not eliminate misspecification when samples are drawn from a 
single industry. This suggests that the misspecification from industry clustering can be 
a problem at least partially attributable model misspecification.
Section 3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I have discussed the structure of event studies as well as the model of 
‘normal’ returns for the short-run and long-run study in turn. I now briefly summarize 
these models.
For short horizon tests, the market model, the CAPM, the FF model, the CF model 
and the CP model are all valid options. These models suffer no major problems in 
short horizon tests. Another model - the two-factor international market model as 
discussed earlier, may be helpful in providing more precise inferences for cross- 
border M&As.
When employing regression models such as the market model, I estimate the 
parameters first. I follow, for example, Franks and Harris (1989), and Conn and 
Connell (1990), and use 60 months pre-event data beginning at one year prior to 
estimate the parameters if a regression model (like the market model) is used. If the 
estimated parameters are unstable around the events, I employ the Chow (1960) test to 
test the stability of regression coefficients.
For long horizon tests, I have shown that two models are able to produce credible 
results: one is the control-firm model, another is the control-portfolio approach 
employing the skewness-adjusted t-statistic (reference portfolios must be free of the 
new-listing and rebalancing biases). Both models are used in my study of the long-run 
post-acquisition share price performance (Chapter 5).
However, one must be careful in detecting the long-run share price performance. The 
lack o f  cross-sectional independence in share returns may weaken the power of the
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test statistics and lead to a biased conclusion. When there is a lack of cross-sectional 
independence across sample firm returns due to e.g. overlapping events, there are two 
approaches to solve the problem: one is to pursue a non-overlapping sample and 
another is to employ the CTFF and CTCP models. However, the disadvantages of the 
calendar-time-approach are that this approach does not precisely measure investors’ 
experience and it tracks portfolio performance only. Therefore, both two approaches 
will be used in my long run study (Chapter 5).
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Chapter 4 Short-term Excess Returns
Section 4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the empirical results focusing on share price performance 
around the M&A announcement period.
Numerous studies have examined the wealth effects of target and bidding firms 
around the announcement time of the M&A. Many earlier findings, e.g. Franks and 
Harris (1989) who studied UK M&As in 1955-1985, and Mulherin and Boone (2000) 
who studied US M&As in 1990-1999, suggest that target firms in M&As experience 
positive wealth effects.
However, results are mixed for bidding firm shareholders in earlier short run event 
studies. For example, Franks and Harris (1989) reported an average excess return of 
1% (statistically significant at the 5% level) over the event month for bidder 
shareholders. In contrast, Sudarsanam, Holl and Salami (1996) studied UK M&As in 
1980-1990. They found that the short run average excess return for bidder 
shareholders is -1.3% (statistically significant at the 1% level) on the event day.
On the other hand, in Chapter 2 {Literature Review) we see that earlier event studies 
have been more limited to the US and UK M&A markets. Relatively few short run 
studies have examined EU markets for the post-1990 period. For example, Campa and 
Hernando (2002) studied EU M&As in 1998-2000. They found that the average short 
run excess return for EU bidder shareholders is not statistically significant.
Chapter 2 raised two questions on short run wealth effects of M&As. First, higher 
‘hubris’ may be found in cross-border M&As due to greater information asymmetry 
between target and bidding firms in cross-border than domestic M&As. This suggests 
we would expect higher target gains and lower bidder gains1 in cross-border than 
domestic M&As (for convenience I call it the ‘cross-border effect’)? Second, there is
1 More explanations have been discussed in Section 2.3.2.2 o f  Chapter 2 {Literature Review), 
e.g. culture differences may lower or delay synergy gains to cross-border bidders.
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higher shareholder protection in the UK than Continental EU equity markets (see also 
La Porta et al., 2000). Besides, there is a more liquid and developed equity market as 
well as higher M&A competition in the UK than Continental EU markets. Hence, we 
expect higher target gains in the UK than Continental EU markets (for convenience I 
call it the ‘market effect’).
Chapter 4 aims at bringing all issues above together and undertakes a comprehensive 
investigation on the short run wealth effects of M&As. This chapter focuses on three 
countries: the UK, France and Germany, as they are the most active M&A markets in 
the EU. Tables 4.1 to 4.10 present results for this chapter.2
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the data and 
methodology used for this chapter. Section 4.3 investigates the entire sample focusing 
on three issues: 1) the short run wealth effects for target shareholders; 2) the short run 
wealth effects for bidding firm shareholders; 3) examining the cross-border effect. 
Section 4.4 undertakes sub-sample analysis for each country, focusing on the three 
issues above plus an examination of the market effect. Some further issues such as 
short term pre-merger and post-merger share price performance are discussed in 
Section 4.5. The last section, Section 4.6, concludes the findings in this chapter.
Section 4.2 Data and Methodology
Data sources and sample selection:
This study focuses on UK and EU M&As. In particular, it concentrates on three 
countries: the UK, France and Germany. This is because both the data availability and 
sample size for other EU countries are very limited. This has been noted by Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004) who studied short run wealth effects of EU M&As with a deal 
value of at least USD 100 million3 during the period 1993-2000. In their study (p.14)
2 In Tables 4.3-4.10, *** , ** and * denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.
3 Goergen and Renneboog (2004)’s results only show the wealth effects for large European 
bidders. As it will be shown later in Chapter 6, post-merger bidder shareholder wealth effects
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they comment the ‘lack of share price and/or accounting information reduced the 
sample to 187 offer announcements in 18 European countries’. In particular, in their 
study there are only 3 bids for Scandinavia, 6 bids for Benelux, 10 bids for Southern 
Europe and 2 bids for Central Europe, whereas there are about 100 bids4 for the UK, 
France and Germany altogether. Similar problems affected this study and I focus here 
on data for these three larger countries in this study.
Data on European M&As -  involving both bidders and targets -  were collected from 
Acquisitions Monthly for the period 1992-2003. Additional efforts were made to 
collect bidding information (e.g. correct announcement date) by directly searching 
business news in the newspapers. For a firm to be included in the sample, the 
following conditions were applied.
First, both target and bidding firms had to be publicly listed on EU stock exchange 
markets. This condition reduced the sample size to approximately less than half of the 
original number of bids collected from Acquisitions Monthly for three reasons: 1) as 
noted by Goergen and Renneboog (2004) data availability is low, especially for target 
firms listed in Acquisitions Monthly; 2) acquisitions into Non-EU markets were 
excluded as they are not the focus of this study; 3) acquisitions of private targets were 
not included in the sample of this chapter5 because private target firms do not have 
share price data.
Second, bidding firms with other significant M&A activities within 2 years 
surrounding the announcement time were not included in the sample. There are two 
benefits from this condition: 1) a firm in a M&A often has significant share price 
movement over a period before or after the M&A. For example, as in Section 2.4.1 of
may be significantly different between large and small bidders. Therefore, Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004)’s results do not fully reveal the shareholder wealth effects for all (large 
and small) European bidders.
4 Goergen and Renneboog (2004)’s UK sample also consists o f  Ireland M&As, and their 
Germany sample also includes Austrian and Swiss M&As. Therefore, the exact number o f  
bids for UK, France and Germany is not clear.
5 This restriction will not affect the results in this chapter. In Chapter 6 o f  this study, the 
regression analysis shows that in the short run, domestic acquirers o f  publicly-listed targets do 
not perform significantly differently compared with domestic acquirers o f  private targets. In 
the long run event study (Chapter 5) which investigates share price performance for only the 
bidder side, acquirers o f  both listed and private targets are examined.
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Chapter 2 (Literature Review), Gregory (1997) studied UK bidders in 1984-1992 and 
found an average CAR of -9.2% (statistically significant at the 1% level) over one 
year after M&As. This may have a significant impact on the CARs of this firm’s 
successive M&A activity that occurs within a relevant period of time; 2) it reduces the 
possibility of a change in systematic risk when a regression model (e.g. the market 
model) is employed, as I have discussed in Section 3.5.1 of Chapter 3 (Methodology). 
The condition above further reduces by approximately one-fourth of the original bids 
collected from Acquisitions Monthly for this chapter.
Third, for a firm to remain in the sample, it had to have been listed on the stock 
market for over 24 months. This condition reduces the sample size further, however, 
there are important reasons for doing it. When any regression model, such as the 
market model, is employed, this measurement ensures that the p values can be 
calculated relatively efficiently; when the CF/CP models are employed, this condition 
ensures that at the beginning of the calendar year of the announcement, the size and 
MTBV of the sample firm are available in order to identify a potential control firm (or 
control portfolio). The CF/CP models have been discussed in Section 3.3.3 of Chapter 
3 (Methodology). One more advantage of this condition is that it offers the benefit of 
preventing new-listing biases from contaminating the results. Biases could be induced 
by newly listed sample firms (and newly listed control firms for the CF/CP models) 
because these firms in general under-perform the market average (Ritter, 1991).
By applying all three screening procedures above, the final sample consisted of 347 
targets and 362 bidders. The details of the sample composition are shown in Table 4.1 
below.
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Table 4.1 Sample Composition for the Short Rim Study
Country
UK
France
Germany
ALL
Bid Type Targets Bidders
Cross-
border 38 60
Domestic 187 187
Cross-
border 33 39
Domestic 41 41
Cross-
border 31 18
Domestic 17 17
Cross-
border 102 117
Domestic 245 245
Table 4.1 shows that UK firms are a large portion in the entire sample, followed by 
French firms. In total, there are 247 bidders and 225 targets for the UK, 80 bidders 
and 74 targets for France, and 35 bidders and 48 targets for Germany. The sample size 
may be compared to two earlier studies which have overlapping time periods. 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) studied the short run wealth effects of EU M&As 
during the period 1993-2000, but they restricted the sample firms to those with a deal 
value of at least USD 100 million. In their study, there are 66 bidders and 70 targets 
for the UK & Ireland, 26 bidders and 14 targets for France, and 16 bidders and 18 
targets for Germany, Austria & Switzerland. Another study, Campa and Hernando 
(2002) studied European M&As for the period 1998-2000. In their study, there are 35 
bidders and 37 targets for the UK. They also have 36 bidders and 34 targets for France, 
and 58 bidders and 61 targets for Germany. Therefore, on balance the sample size of 
this thesis is larger with the exception of Germany in the Campa and Hernando (2002) 
study.
Table 4.2 below shows the distribution of MVs and MTB Vs for the firms included in 
the samples of this chapter.
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Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics for the Short Run Study
Panel A:
Target
UK
Bidder
Domestic Cross-border Domestic
Cross-
border
MV Mean 444.13 702.88 1670.71 2685.56
(£,Millions) Median 76.45 110.19 334.87 637.73
MTBV
Mean
Median
2.44
1.82
2.34
1.81
2.43
1.46
3.52
2.62
Panel B:
Target
France
Bidder
Domestic Cross-border Domestic
Cross-
border
MV Mean 2090.72 1945.06 7687.02 9170.55
(€,Millions) Median 223.72 478.49 1282.07 2856.62
MTBV
Mean
Median
2.30
1.71
2.71
1.55
2.35
1.77
3.49
1.93
Panel C:
Target
Germany
Bidder
Domestic Cross-border Domestic
Cross-
border
MV Mean 2452.72 4437.00 5902.64 17420.56
(€,Millions) Median 685.36 331.47 704.67 6303.31
MTBV
Mean
Median
1.54
1.48
2.78
2.28
2.43
1.99
1.83
1.67
Table 4.2 highlights that in general the market values of bidders are larger than those 
of targets. This is consistent with earlier studies, e.g. Franks and Harris (1989). A
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more recent study, Goergen and Ronneboog (2004), examined EU M&As with larger 
deal values for the period of 1993-2000. In their study, the mean market value for 
targets is USD 17,878 million and that for bidders is USD 21,568 million. On average, 
the mean MVs are smaller in this study compared to Goergen and Ronneboog (2004). 
It may be the consequence that they applied a sample selection criterion of a 
minimum bid value of USD 100 million in their study. On the other hand, the average 
MTBVs in my study range from 1.54 to 3.52. The average MTBVs in Goergen and 
Ronneboog (2004)’s study is 4.26 for targets and 4.01 for bidders. The differences 
may also be due to their sample selection criterion of a minimum bid value of USD 
100 million. There is a higher proportion of large firms (which tend to have high 
MTBVs) in Goergen and Ronneboog (2004) compared with the samples of this thesis.
Methodology
I measure the short-term wealth effects for target and bidding firms by calculating the 
cumulative average abnormal returns in an event study framework. To calculate the 
expected returns and verify the robustness of the returns, I used three different models. 
First, I used the market model as in Section 3.3.1.1 of Chapter 3 (.Methodology). The 
all-share index for each country was used as the market index. For example, for UK 
targets and bidders, the FT-A11 Share Index was used. Second, as in Section 3.3.1.2 of 
Chapter 3, a two-factor market model was calculated. The additional factor in the two- 
factor market model is the FT-Europe Index. Third, to avoid the problem that sample 
companies are also part of the market index, the control firm model was used as I 
have discussed in Section 3.3.3.2 of Chapter 3. The control firm approach compares 
sample firm average returns with the average returns of benchmark firms with similar 
MV and MTBV. This approach eliminates any misspecification that might be 
introduced by the use of the market index. As none of the major results of this chapter 
was influenced by the choice of the model, I only report results based on the market 
model6. This is also consistent with earlier event studies which largely reported that, 
for the short run period surrounding the announcement time of M&As, the selection
6 At the request o f  an examiner, I also looked at the possibility o f  outliers in the data. 
Examination o f  the data suggested there could be one outliner in the German target firms. 
Omitting this firm, however, only slightly weakens the significance o f  the results for the 
German sub-sample o f  target firms.
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of models has little impact on the results. For example, Gregory (1997) used six 
different models to study the shareholder wealth effects for the UK in the period 
1984-1992. The results are very similar across the six models over the announcement 
month. Another study, Goergen and Renneboog (2004), used several different 
approaches to estimate the p values but they also concluded that the impacts on the 
results were minimal.
As shown in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3, the market model is specified as:
Rjt — (Xj +  PiRmt"^" Sit
where Rjt is the dividend adjusted return on security i during period t, R mt is the 
dividend adjusted return on the market portfolio during period t.
As noted in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3, to assess the coefficients of the risk factors (ctj 
and pi values in this case), one needs to define the estimation windows. In practice the 
estimation window is usually chosen to be large enough (e.g. 5 years in Franks and 
Harris, 1989) as I have discussed in Section 3.2. Therefore, I followed Franks and 
Harris (1989) and estimated <Xj and pi values by running the market model over up to a 
60-month period starting at t= -71, ending 6 months prior to the event month. For 
some sample firms that did not have 71 months pre-event price data, the market model 
was run from the earliest month the price data were available, and a minimum of 24 
months pre-event price data was required or the firm was dropped from the sample as 
I have discussed earlier.
The excess return is therefore defined as:
A R it=  Rit - E (R jt)
where E is the expectation sign.
The mean abnormal return is defined as:
  1 n
A R t=  — V  ARn
where i denotes the zth firm and N denotes the number of firms.
I l l
The abnormal return observations must be aggregated in order to draw overall 
inferences for the event period of interest. The cumulative average abnormal return
( CAR) is then defined as:
CAR(t,,t2) = f lAX,
t = t l
where (ti, t2 ) is the event window.
The event window is often calculated for some time before and after the event in order 
to control for information leakage (or market anticipation) as well as to allow for 
possible slow price adjustment. For these reasons, it is common in earlier event 
studies that a period like (-5D, +5D) or (-1M, +1M) is chosen as the event window. In 
this thesis, several alternative periods are used as in Tables 4.3-4.10. They are CAR (- 
ID, +1D), CAR (-5D, +5D), CAR (-1M, +1M) and CAR (0M). For example, CAR (- 
ID, +1D) means cumulative abnormal return aggregated from one day before the 
announcement to one day after; CAR (0M) is equivalent to AR(OM) which means 
abnormal return of exactly the announcement month.
Finally, a two-tailed t-test was applied to detect whether the obtained CAR was 
statistically significant.
Section 4.3 Short-run Excess Returns for EU M&As
This section focuses on the wealth effects of M&As for all EU (including UK) firms. 
There are three hypotheses that are relevant to this section: 1) whether M&A 
transactions deliver a premium return to target firm shareholders; 2) whether M&A 
transactions deliver a premium return to bidder firm shareholders M&A transactions; 
3) whether the cross-border effect exists; specifically, in the short run cross-border 
target shareholders experience higher average CARs than domestic target 
shareholders, while cross-border bidder shareholders gain less than domestic ones. 
The results are presented in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3 Excess Returns (Entire Sample)
(-1D, +1D)
Event Window 
(-5D, +5D) (-1M, +1M) (0M)
Cross-border 0.105611
6 . 6 4 7 3 5 9
*** 0.173233 *** 
6 . 5 4 7 6 6 7
0.188957
6 . 6 4 6 3 0 5
0.148048
7 . 1 2 6 3 4 9
Percentage Pos. 76.47% 76.47% 82.35% 87.25%
Targets
Domestic 0.128352
1 3 . 2 0 2 7 9 5
*** 0.207608 ***
1 2 . 5 2 2 8 3 6
0.171593
7 . 0 6 5 7 0 3 8
0.141856
1 1 . 0 1 0 3 4 4
***
Percentage Pos. 84.02% 81.15% 80.74% 80.33%
Diff -0.022741 -0.034375 0.017364 0.006193
P-value 0.212549 0.265515 0.678315 0.796792
Cross-border -0.003371 -0.002258 -0.005653 -0.003226
- 0 . 3 5 6 2 3 6 - 0 . 0 8 9 9 7 6 - 0 . 3 4 6 4 7 5 - 0 . 3 0 2 2 2 0
Percentage Pos. 51.28% 45.30% 51.28% 52.14%
Bidders Domestic 0.004359 0.032366 ** 0.012783 -0.001756
0 . 7 0 0 2 5 4 2 . 2 2 5 6 6 0 1 . 2 2 1 9 6 6 - 0 . 2 7 9 0 3 5
Percentage Pos. 50.61% 54.69% 50.10% 50.20%
Diff -0.007730 -0.034623 -0.018437 -0.001470
P-value 0.487825 0.204895 0.329328 0.900204
Table 4.3 show s m ean excess returns and differences in m ean excess returns of the  entire sam ple. 'Diff = C ross-border - Domestic, t- 
values are in italics. 'P ercentage P os.' denotes percen tage of positive CARs.
Result One: Table 4.3 shows that M&A transactions deliver a premium return to 
target firm shareholders. Table 4.3 further shows evidence that this finding holds for 
both domestic and cross-border targets.
For targets involved in cross-border M&As, abnormal returns range from 10.56% 
over the days (-1D, +1D) to around 18.90% over the period (-1M, +1M). All 
abnormal returns are statistically significant at the 1% level for all event windows. 
Around 76.47% to 82.35% of the target firms in cross-border M&As display positive 
abnormal returns. For target firms in domestic M&As, abnormal returns range from 
12.84% over the days (-1D, +1D) to 20.76% over the days (-5D, +5D). Similarly, all 
abnormal returns are significant at the 1% level. There are around 80.74% to 84.02% 
of target firms which show positive abnormal returns.
The results may be compared to some earlier studies. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) 
find the average excess return over several days around the announcement date for 
large EU target firms (over the period 1993-2000) in domestic M&As is around 
10.2% to 12.7%, while for those in large cross-border M&As it is around 11.3% to 
13.5%. Campa and Hernando (2002) find that EU target firms (over the period 1998- 
2000) in domestic M&As enjoy excess returns of from 6.3% over the days (-7D, +7D) 
to 9.3% (-30D, +30D), while those in cross-border M&As enjoy excess returns of 
from 4.7% to 8.7% respectively. All results are statistically significant. My results 
confirm the positive and statistically significant excess returns to target firms involved 
in both domestic and cross-border M&As. However, the excess returns of my results 
are on a slightly larger scale, ranging from 10.56% to 20.76% depending on the event 
window and the type of acquisition.
Result Two: Table 4.3 also shows that in general M&A transactions have 
insignificant effects on bidder firm shareholders in the short run, although there is 
one exception in which positive CARs are statistically significant.
For bidding firms in cross-border M&As, excess returns are on average negative but 
only on a small scale, and statistically insignificant across all event windows. Table 
4.3 also shows that around 45.30% to 51.28% of the firms enjoy positive abnormal 
returns in cross-border M&As.
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For those bidding firms in domestic M&As, three event windows report insignificant 
results. However, over the days (-5D, +5D), the average abnormal return is 3.24% and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. The percentages of positive abnormal returns 
range from 50.61% to 55.10% depending on the selected event window. The result for 
the event window (-5D, +5D) show at least there were positive wealth effects to 
domestic bidders for this period.
My results for bidding firm shareholder abnormal returns are slightly different from 
some recent studies. In Goergen and Renneboog (2004)’s study, they find the average 
excess return over several days around the announcement date for EU large domestic 
bidders is around -0.5% to -0.1% (both insignificant), while for those involved in 
large cross-border M&As is around 2.4% to 3.1% (both statistically significant). 
Hence their study suggests a different picture to that presented here. Another study, by 
Campa and Hernando (2002), does not show any significant short term abnormal 
returns regardless of the event window selected.
Overall the evidence in this study suggests that M&As do not generate any gain (or 
loss) for the bidding firm shareholders, except in the case of domestic bidders in the 
period (-5D, +5D).
Result Three: There is no evidence to show that a cross-border effect exists in the 
entire EU sample.
As I have discussed in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter 2 {Literature Review), we may expect 
higher target gains and lower bidder gains in cross-border than domestic M&As. The 
main reason may be greater information asymmetry between target and bidding firms 
in cross-border M&As (e.g. Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000). Also culture differences may 
increase the difficulties for cross-border bidders to claim synergy gains at the early 
stage of post-M&A period (e.g. Megginson, Morgan and Nail, 2004). The results from 
the entire EU sample of this chapter, however, do not provide evidence for the cross- 
border hypothesis. I will further examine this hypothesis in the sub-sample analysis of 
the next section.
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Section 4.4 Analysis by Country
This section analyzes the short term excess returns for different countries. Four 
hypotheses are relevant to this section: 1) whether M&A transactions deliver a 
premium return to target firm shareholders; 2) whether M&A transactions deliver a 
premium return to bidder firm shareholders M&A transactions; 3) whether the cross- 
border effect exists in the nation-wide sub-samples; 4) whether the market effect 
exists; specifically, target firms in the UK market may receive higher premiums than 
those in the France/Germany markets. Tables 4.4 to 4.6 provide empirical results for 
the section. Tables 4.7 to 4.8 provide additional results for examining the market 
effect.
Result Four: In general, Tables 4.4 to 4.6 show that M&A transactions deliver a 
statistically significant premium return to target firm shareholders for the UK, France 
and Germany.
UK: Table 4.4 shows that the average excess returns for UK domestic targets peak at 
23.74% over the (-5D, +5D) event window, which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. On the other hand, the average excess returns peak at 32.06% over the (-1M, 
+1M) window for UK cross-border targets, which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.
Franks and Harris (1989) study UK domestic targets for the period 1955-1985. The 
average abnormal return for the event month in their study is 23.3% (statistically 
significant at the 1% level). Danbolt (2001) reports that the average abnormal return is 
20.2% (statistically significant at the 1% level) over the (-2M, +1M) event window 
for UK domestic targets over the period 1986-1991. A few other studies have 
examined UK targets in cross-border M&As. For example, Danbolt (2001) reports 
that the average abnormal return for UK targets in cross-border M&As in 1986-1991 
is 31.0% over the (-2M, +1M) event window, which is statistically significant at the 
1% level. These results are similar to the results reported in my study.
France and Germany: Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show the distribution of excess returns to 
targets and bidders over different event windows for the French and Germany sub-
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Table 4.4 Excess Returns (UK)
(-1D, +1D)
Event Window 
(-5D, +5D) (-1M.+1M) (0M)
Cross-border 0.209843
6 . 6 9 1 3 3 0 6
*** 0.283398 *** 
5 . 2 3 0 4 6 8 8
0.320096
6 . 1 0 4 8 5 8 7
*** 0.235158
6 . 8 6 3 5 0 7 8
* * *
Domestic
Targets
0.153056
1 3 . 7 0 9 5 4 5
** 0.237379 *** 
1 3 . 2 1 8 9 7 5
0.222915
1 0 . 4 3 0 5 0 4
*** 0.169943
1 2 . 1 0 3 1 5 7
***
Diff 0.056787 0.04602 0.097181 ★ 0.065215 *
P-value 0.047482 0.325229 0.067828 0.061916
Cross-border 0.010228
1 . 4 9 8 5 3 5 4
0.026609
1 . 8 9 7 3 8 6 1
0.011652
0 . 7 1 2 4 7 5 4
0.012503
0 . 9 3 2 7 3 6 3
Domestic
Bidders
-0.00049
- 0 . 0 7 3 5 1 3
0.031987
2 . 0 1 7 3 9 5 9
0.015617
1 . 2 9 9 5 2 1 3
-0.00242
- 0 . 3 3 6 6 6 1
Diff 0.010721 -0.00538 -0.00396 0.014918
P-value 0.433886 0.863776 0.86422 0.313341
Table 4.4 shows mean excess returns and differences in mean excess returns of the UK sample. 'Diff = Cross-border - Domestic, t-
values are in italics.
Table 4.5 Excess Returns (France)
(-1D, +1D)
Event Window 
(-5D, +5D) (-1M, +1M) (0M)
Cross-border 0.024595
1 . 4 5 5 3 0 5 5
0.069785 ** 
2 . 4 2 4 8 7 5 2
0.120468
2 . 3 7 2 5 0 7 9
** 0.101614
2 . 3 7 5 7 7 9 8
**
Domestic
Targets
0.043378
2 . 3 9 4 0 5 1 2
0.080137
1 . 8 5 5 7 4 8 7
0.046665
0 . 7 0 9 7 1 7 5
0.05899
2 . 1 8 3 8 2 8 6
**
Diff -0.01878 -0.01035 0.073803 0.042624
P-value 0.4581 0.849312 0.392978 0.386345
Cross-border -0.0206
- 0 . 9 9 8 7 9 3
-0.05386
- 0 . 8 6 4 4 5
-0.04782
- 1 . 2 7 5 8 2 8
-0.03029
- 1 . 3 9 0 7 1 6
Domestic
Bidders
0.01828
1 . 2 6 0 2 4 1
0.032065
0 . 8 1 9 0 9 7 1
0.018143
0 . 8 9 5 2 9 9 1
0.004102
0 . 3 1 1 5 9 4 5
Diff -0.03888 -0.08593 -0.06596 -0.03439
P-value 0.124152 0.241582 0.120692 0.175654
Table 4.5 shows mean excess returns and differences in mean excess returns of the French sample. 'Diff = Cross-border - Domestic, t-
values are in italics.
Table 4.6 Excess Returns (Germany)
(-1D, +1D)
Event Window 
(-5D, +5D) (-1M, +1M) (0M)
Cross-border 0.064086
4 . 0 4 7 6 0 0 8
*** 0.148315 *** 
3 . 8 5 6 5 6 1 4
0.101115
3 . 7 0 8 3 1 8
*** 0.090699
4 . 3 5 9 5 4 8 2
* * *
Domestic
Targets
0.05655
1 . 8 0 9 3 0 5 5
0.180067 **
2 . 5 6 3 3 5 7 9
-0.099
- 0 . 5 1 6 9 2 1
0.027876
0 . 4 1 9 1 0 8 5
Diff 0.007537 -0.03175 0.200115 0.062823
P-value 0.81155 0.667142 0.175215 0.271025
Cross-border -0.01137
- 0 . 9 1 3 8 0 6
0.013336
0 . 3 4 3 0 9 3 9
0.028015
0 . 7 0 9 4 1 5 1
0.002981
0 . 1 2 8 9 9 0 2
Domestic
Bidders
0 . 0 2 4 1 6 2
0 . 6 4 2 8 9 3 5
0 . 0 3 7 2 5 3
0 . 5 2 2 2 9 6
- 0 . 0 3 1 3 2
- 0 . 5 7 4 1 0 3
- 0 . 0 0 8 6 3
- 0 . 2 6 4 2 3 5
Diff - 0 . 0 3 5 5 3 - 0 . 0 2 3 9 2 0 . 0 5 9 3 3 3 0 . 0 1 1 6 1
P-value 0.36489 0.766823 0.380707 0.771484
Table 4.6 shows mean excess returns and differences in mean excess returns of the German sample. 'Diff = Cross-border - Domestic, t-
values are in italics.
samples. For France, the average excess returns for French targets in cross-border 
M&As range from 2.46% to 12.05%, depending on which event window is used. The 
average excess returns for domestic targets range from 4.34% to 8.01% which 
depends on the event window used. These figures are generally statistically significant 
but there are two exceptions: the average excess return for French targets in cross- 
border M&As over the (-1D, +1D) event window and that for French domestic targets 
over the (-1M, +1M) event window are not statistically significant. For Germany, the 
average excess returns for targets in cross-border M&As range from 6.41% to 14.83% 
(all are statistically significant at the 1% level), depending on which event window is 
used. The average excess returns for German domestic targets are statistically 
significant for the (-1D, +1D) and (-5D, +5D) event windows, which are 5.66% and 
18.01% in turn.
Few studies have examined share price performance for French and German target 
firms. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) study European targets involved in M&As 
with large deal values for period 1993-2000. They report that the average excess 
returns in the short run range from 3.57% to 17.15% (all are statistically significant) 
for French targets, depending on which sub-sample and which event window are used. 
My results for French targets are close to theirs. On the other hand, they did not report 
the average excess returns for the German-firm sub-sample.
Result Five: In general (two exceptions can be found in the UK sample), Tables 4.4 to 
4.6 show that M&A transactions have insignificant effects on bidder firm  
shareholders in the short run for the UK, France and Germany.
UK: Table 4.4 shows that a majority of results are not statistically significant. 
However, two exceptions can be found. The average excess returns for UK cross- 
border bidders over the (-5D, +5D) event window is 2.66% and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Also, the average excess returns for UK domestic bidders 
over the (-5D, +5D) event window is 3.19% and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. The UK results obtained by this study are generally consistent with earlier 
studies (e.g. Franks and Harris, 1989), which report that there are either small gains 
or insignificant results associated with bidders in M&As.
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France and Germany: Tables 4.5 to 4.6 show the average excess returns for French 
and German bidding firms are consistently insignificant, regardless of the selected 
event window or the bid type (domestic or cross-border). Few studies have examined 
the share price performance for French and German bidders. Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) find that the average excess returns in the short run for French bidders with 
large deal values range from -1.91% to 2.83%, depending on which sub-sample and 
which event window are used. Some of their results are statistically significant. For 
example, they report that large French domestic bidders lose by -1.72% over the (-1D, 
0D) event window, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. They also report 
that large French cross-border bidders gain 2.83% over the (-2D, +2D) event window, 
which is statistically significant at the 5% level. Therefore, the French results of my 
study are slightly different from theirs. On the other hand, no comparable data for 
Germany appear to exist.
Result Six: Tables 4.4 to 4.6 provide evidence that the cross-border effect exists for 
the UK target firms, but not for UK bidders, nor for targets or bidders in France and 
Germany.
Table 4.4 shows that CARs of UK target firms in cross-border bids are consistently 
higher than those in domestic bids, regardless of the selected event window. Over the 
(-1M, +1M) event window, the UK target firms in cross-border M&As outperform 
those in domestic ones by a CAR of 9.72% which is statistically significant at the 
10% level. Over the announcement month window the former outperform the latter by 
a CAR of 6.52%, which is statistically significant at the 10% level. Over the much 
shorter event window (-1D, +1D), the difference becomes 5.68% which is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. The only exception is the difference over the (-5D, +5D) 
window which is insignificant but remains positive. On the other hand, there is no real 
evidence that the cross-border effect also exists for UK bidders, nor in France and 
Germany.
The result for target firms in the UK indicates that foreign EU firms are paying higher 
premiums for UK target firms than UK domestic bidders. There are two possible 
reasons for this. One is that cross-border acquisitions into the UK market could be 
likely motivated by managerial factors such as empire building or increasing the
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company’s global reach at the cost of paying higher premiums. Another possible 
reason is cross-border acquisitions into the UK market could be affected by ‘hubris’ 
(resulting from greater information asymmetry in cross-border M&As) such that 
managers of bidding firms overestimate the true values of UK target firms.
The cross-border hypothesis also suggests that cross-border bidders underperform 
domestic ones. The possible reasons have been discussed earlier (e.g. Section 2.3.2.2). 
However, this is not supported by the results in Tables 4.4 to 4.6. In practice, it may 
take extra time for a cross-border bidder to develop synergy gains (e.g. adapt to 
culture differences). For these reasons, in Chapter 6 {Regression Analysis) I will 
further examine whether the cross-border effect exists in the long run for UK bidders.
My short-run results of the cross-border effect for target firms are more in line with 
Danbolt (2001). Danbolt (2001) finds that UK target firms in 1986-1991 in cross- 
border bids significantly outperform UK target firms in domestic bids. The out- 
performance ranges from 4.15% to 13.4% depending on the event window. However, 
my results are in contrast with Campa and Hernando (2002). Campa and Hernando 
(2002) studied EU M&As in 1998-2000. They find that the share price performance 
of domestic and cross-border targets is not statistically significantly different in most 
cases.
Result Seven: Table 4.7 provides evidence for the existence o f the market effect for 
targets. Namely, target shareholders in the UK market experience significantly higher 
premiums than those in France and Germany. Table 4.8 shows no evidence o f a 
market effect between the UK and France and Germany for bidding firms.
In Tables 4.4 to 4.6 we can see that in general targets in the French and German 
markets receive lower average excess returns than those in the UK market. Also, we 
find that some average target excess returns for France and Germany samples are not 
statistically significant, which is in contrast with the UK results where average target 
excess returns (across different event windows) are all statistically significant at the 
1% level. To further examine the issue, Table 4.7 provides a direct comparison 
between the UK targets and the French and German ones. It indicates the existence of 
market effects between the UK and these continental EU markets.
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Table 4.7 UK versus Continental-EU (Targets)
Bid Type
Cross-
border
Window 
(-1D, +1D) 
(-5D, +5D) 
(-1M, +1M) 
(OM)
UK_____________
0.209843 6 . 6 9 1 3 3 0 6  
0.283398 5 . 2 3 0 4 6 8 8  
0.320096 6 . 1 0 4 8 5 8 7  
0.235158 6 . 8 6 3 5 0 7 8
Con-EU___________
0.043723 3 . 7 1 1 1 2 4 9  
0.107823 4 . 4 6 7 4 7 8 3  
0.111094 3 . 8 1 4 4 4 5 8  
0.096327 4 . 0 0 1 7 6 8 3
Diff
0.16612
0.175576
0.209002
0.138831
P-value
0.000000
0 . 0 0 1 0 7 3
0 . 0 0 0 2 6 6
0 . 0 0 0 9 8 5
Domestic
(-1D, +1D) 
(-5D, +5D) 
(-1M, +1M) 
(0M)
0.153056 1 3 . 7 0 9 5 4 5  
0.237379 1 3 . 2 1 8 9 7 5  
0.222915 1 0 . 4 3 0 5 0 4  
0.169943 1 2 . 1 0 3 1 5 7
0.047306 3 . 0 2 6 3 8 4 6  
0.109941 2 . 9 7 1 1 8 3 5  
0.003221 0 . 0 4 4 1 6 5 9  
0.04971 1 . 8 3 0 8 5 1 7
0.10575
0.127438
0.219694
0.120232
0 . 0 0 0 0 0 3
0 . 0 0 1 0 4 3
0 . 0 0 0 1 0 6
0 . 0 0 0 0 6 3
Table 4.7 show s m ean excess returns and differences in m ean excess returns between UK targe ts  and Continental-EU targets. 'Diff = UK - Continental-EU. t-values are  in italics.
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Table 4.8 UK versus Continental-EU (Bidders)
Bid Type
Cross-
border
Window 
(-1D, +1D) 
(-5D, +5D) 
(-1M, +1M) 
(OM)
UK_____________
0.0102276 1 . 4 9 8 5 3 5 4  
0.026609 1 . 8 9 7 3 8 6 1  
0.0116523 0 . 7 1 2 4 7 5 4  
0.0125029 0 . 9 3 2 7 3 6 3
Con-EU____________
-0.017686 - 1 . 2 1 2 7 5 2 7  
-0.032644 - 0 . 7 3 6 4 1 3 6  
-0.02387 - 0 . 8 3 1 6 2 3 6  
-0.019783 - 1 . 1 9 1 3 8 7 5
Diff
0 . 0 2 7 9 1 3 7
0 . 0 5 9 2 5 2 5
0 . 0 3 5 5 2 2 5
0 . 0 3 2 2 8 6 3
P-value
0 . 1 4 1 1 1 6
0 . 2 3 9 4 9 8
0 . 2 7 8 4 2 4
0 . 1 3 1 2 0 2
Domestic
(-1D, +1D) 
(-5D, +5D) 
(-1M.+1M) 
(0M)
-0.000494 - 0 . 0 7 3 5 1 3  
0.0319875 2 . 0 1 7 3 9 5 9  
0.0156172 1 . 2 9 9 5 2 1 3  
-0.002415 - 0 . 3 3 6 6 6 1 2
0.020004 1 . 3 4 6 5 0 6 7  
0.033585 0 . 9 7 8 1 8 6 3  
0.003646 0 . 1 7 0 4 4 9 5  
0.000371 0 . 0 2 8 0 8 3 4
- 0 . 0 2 0 4 9 8
- 0 . 0 0 1 5 9 8
0 . 0 1 1 9 7 1 7
- 0 . 0 0 2 7 8 6
0 . 1 6 2 0 3 6
0 . 9 6 2 8 6 3
0 . 6 2 7 6 2
0 . 8 5 1 1 5 6
Table 4.8 show s m ean excess returns and differences in m ean excess returns between UK bidders and Continental-EU bidders. 'Diff = UK - Continental-EU. t-values are in italics.
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Table 4.7 shows that on average UK targets receive higher excess returns than these 
continental-EU targets. The differences of CARs between the two groups of target 
firms are statistically significant at the 1% level, regardless of the selected event 
window or the bid type (domestic or cross-border). On average UK target firms 
receive higher premiums than these continental-EU target firms by around 10.58% to 
21.97%, depending on the selected event window.
On the other hand, Table 4.8 shows that the market effect does not exist between the 
UK and these continental EU bidders. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find weak 
evidence that UK bidding firms receive significantly higher premiums than 
continental-EU bidding firms. This is not confirmed by my results.
The results of higher excess returns for UK targets may be due to a number of factors 
as I have discussed in Section 2.3.1.1. Conn and Connell (1990) suggest that 
regulations that facilitate the flow of information regarding M&As can encourage 
competitive bids. Hence, returns to target firms in better regulated markets (such as 
the UK market) should be more than those observed in other markets. La Porta et al. 
(2000) suggest that a target country’s corporate governance system (e.g. the English 
common law, the French civil law and the German civil law) may have impacts on 
shareholder wealth effects. A higher degree of shareholder protection may lead to a 
higher premium paid by bidders. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) further suggest that 
the market effect is the combined result of a high degree of disclosure in the UK, a 
liquid and well-developed equity market and a higher degree of shareholder protection 
(see also La Porta et al., 2000). My results provide further support for their 
suggestions.
Section 4.5 Short Run Pre- and Post- Acquisition Share Price Performance
The short run pre- and post- acquisition share price performance is presented in 
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 in turn.
Table 4.9 shows that there is evidence of positive and statistically significant excess 
returns for target firms in the UK in the period one month before the announcement.
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Table 4.9 One Month Pre-acquisition Performance
Sub-sample-*
Window—*
ALL
(-1M)
UK
(-1M)
France
(-1M)
Germany
(-1M)
Cross-border 0.030252 ** 0.066613 0.006536 0.010928
2 . 5 0 2 4 2 2 8 2 . 6 2 0 9 7 2 6 0 . 4 7 7 8 0 8 6 0 . 5 8 9 6 0 9 3
Targets Domestic 0.030847 *** 0.04241 -0.00055 -0.02247
2 . 8 3 9 6 1 6 7 3 . 7 7 8 6 8 3 9 - 0 . 0 1 6 2 3 1 - 0 . 4 4 5 5 3 1
Diff -0.00059 0.024202 0.007089 0.033396
P-value 0.974427 0.378123 0.858276 0.459259
Cross-border -0.00879 -0.02328 *** 0.015218 * -0.01246
- 1 . 5 4 2 0 8 2 - 2 . 6 7 4 5 9 4 1 . 9 9 4 8 1 2 8 - 0 . 9 6 8 5 5 1
Bidders Domestic 0.007501 0.009238 * 0.003998 -0.00315
1 . 5 1 1 3 3 7 4 1 . 6 9 7 6 7 9 7 0 . 2 7 7 6 1 4 5 - 0 . 1 6 4 7 8
Diff -0.01629 i r k -0.03252 •kirk 0.01122 -0.00931
P-value 0.047559 0.002746 0.499448 0.681098
Table 4.9 show s m ean excess returns and differences in m ean excess returns a t one month before the M&A announcem ent. 'Diff = UK - Continental-EU. t-values a re  in italics.
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Table 4.10 One Month Post-acquisition Performance
Sub-sample-*
Window-*
ALL
(+1M)
UK
(+1M)
France
(+1M)
Germany
(+1M)
Cross-border 0.010657 0.018325 * 0.012319 -0.00051
1 . 4 7 9 6 9 2 2 1 . 8 9 0 0 9 9 6 1 . 0 0 1 3 6 3 5 . - 0 . 0 3 2 1 8 2
Targets Domestic -0.00111 0.010562 -0.01177 -0.10441
- 0 . 1 1 4 7 9 4 1 . 4 6 8 6 3 2 4 - 0 . 3 7 8 5 9 9 - 1 . 2 1 0 2 1 9
Diff 0.011766 0.007763 0.024091 0.103896
P-value 0.453283 0.639639 0.506077 0.127299
Cross-border 0.006359 0.022434 ** -0.03274 * 0.037497
0 . 7 0 6 1 9 4 9 2 . 5 4 8 4 1 3 - 1 . 7 6 4 2 3 4 1 . 3 8 9 3 3 0 2
Bidders Domestic 0.007038 0.008795 0.010043 -0.01953
1 . 3 6 3 0 8 9 4 1 . 4 6 7 3 3 4 5 0 . 8 1 0 3 3 9 4 - 1 . 1 4 4 3 9 2
Diff -0.00068 0.01364 -0.04279 * 0.057032 *
P-value 0.944353 0.244883 0.056635 0.087275
Table 4.10 show s m ean excess returns and differences in m ean excess returns a t one month after th e  M&A announcem ent. 'Diff = UK - Continental-EU. t-values are  in italics.
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The average excess return over the one month per-acquisition event window is 6.66% 
for targets in cross-border bids and 4.24% for targets in domestic bids. Both are at 
least statistically significant at the 5% level. This suggests some evidence of trading 
on rumours, in the target shares or of insider trading in the UK data. This is in line 
with Sudarsanam et al. (1996), who found about a 10% average excess return for UK 
target firms (in the period 1980-1990) over the (-20D, -ID) event window.
On the bidder side, there is some evidence of pre-acquisition share price movements 
in bidder share prices in the UK sample. In addition, the average excess returns of 
bidding firms over the one month pre-acquisition event window show different signs 
for cross-border bidders and domestic bidders. In Table 4.9, the average one month 
pre-acquisition excess return for UK bidders in cross-border bids is -2.33%, 
statistically significant at the 1% level; but that for UK bidders in domestic bids is 
0.92%, statistically significant at the 10% level. Interestingly, the difference between 
these values, -3.25%, is statistically significant at the 1% level. It seems that in the 
UK investors have different reactions and expectations on bidding rumours between 
domestic and cross-border bids. Specifically, it suggests that in the UK market 
investors in bidders, when they face bidding rumours, are much more in favour of 
domestic M&As than cross-border ones. Some possible reasons could be that 
investors worry about the potential problems such as culture differences and 
difficulties of valuing a foreign firm which may reduce the profitability of the bidding 
firm or lead to overpayment for targets. The evidence on premium paid for targets, 
albeit for UK targets, suggests there may be sound reasons for this.
On the other hand, Table 4.9 shows no strong evidence of rumour trading or insider 
trading for French and German firms. This holds for both French/German bidding and 
target firms. The only exception is the average excess return of 1.52% for French 
firms that make cross-border bids, which is statistically significant at the 10% level.
The short run pre-acquisition share price performance for the entire sample is similar 
to that for the UK sample, perhaps because the UK sub-sample is a large portion in 
the entire sample.
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Table 4.10 shows one month post-acquisition share price performance. In general we 
find no strong evidence of significant average excess returns over this window. This 
suggests the major adjustment process is completed speedily. There are some 
exceptions, however, worth mentioning. One is that UK cross-border bidding firms on 
average receive a 2.24% excess return, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
Another is French cross-border bidding firms on average receive a -3.27% excess 
return, which is statistically significant at the 10% level.
By comparing Table 4.9 and Table 4.10, we may see that investors in cross-border 
bidders seem to change their views before and after the announcement. For UK cross- 
border bidders, the average excess return is -2.33% (statistically significant at the 1% 
level) over the one month pre-acquisition event window but is changed to 2.24% 
(statistically significant at the 5% level) one month after the announcement. For 
French cross-border bidders, the average excess return is 1.52% (statistically 
significant at the 10% level) over the one month pre-acquisition event window and is 
changed to -3.27% (statistically significant at the 10% level) one month after the 
announcement. One possible reason is high information asymmetry in cross-border 
M&As which makes it difficult to value or access to information of a foreign firm. 
Therefore, investors may revise their views as the evidence/performance of foreign 
acquisitions become clearer.
Section 4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has performed an analysis of excess returns to both target and bidding 
firms around the announcement period of an M&A involving UK, French and German 
firms. This chapter mainly focuses on the hypotheses listed in Section 4.1, which are 
developed in Chapter 2, but also examines short run pre- and post- M&A share price 
performance. There are a number of major findings as follows:
First, the results in this chapter support the hypothesis that M&A transactions deliver 
a premium return to target firm shareholders. Indeed, Table 4.3 shows that around 
76% to 87% of the transactions have positive excess returns for targets in the short run. 
Furthermore, this chapter shows that in general the hypothesis remains true
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irrespective of countries (the UK, France and Germany) and bid types (domestic and 
cross-border).
Second, a majority of the results in this chapter suggest that the average excess returns 
to bidding firms are not systematically different from zero. Table 4.3 shows that there 
is roughly a fifty-fifty chance of excess returns to be positive (or negative) for bidders. 
In other words, M&As have either a small or insignificant wealth effect for bidder 
firm shareholders.
Third, the results in this chapter provide evidence that the cross-border effect exists 
for UK target firms. Table 4.4 shows that in general UK cross-border targets receive 
high premiums than UK domestic targets, thus indicates that foreign EU firms are 
paying higher premiums for UK domestic firms than domestic bidders. There are two 
possible reasons for this as I have discussed in Section 4.4.
Fourth, the results in this chapter provide evidence for the existence of the market 
effect for target firms. Table 4.7 shows that UK targets receive higher excess returns 
than continental-EU targets, regardless of domestic or cross-border bids. One possible 
reason is that it is the combined result of a high degree of M&A competitiveness in 
the UK, a liquid and well-developed equity market, and a higher degree of 
shareholder protection in the UK as I have discussed in Section 4.4.
Finally, this chapter further examined the short-run pre- and post- M&A share price 
performance for all three countries. There are two main findings. The first is that the 
results provide evidence of trading on rumours (or insider trading) in the UK market 
but not in France and Germany; the second is that the results show that the share price 
adjustment process is completed speedily for domestic M&As. There is some 
evidence that share price adjustment process is less speedy for cross-border M&As in 
some cases. Some possible reasons have been discussed (e.g. difficulties in valuing 
foreign firms) in Section 4.5.
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Appendix: Chapter 4 (Sample List)
UK DOMESTIC
1
BIDDING FIRMS 
HANSON
2 LASMO
3 TR PROPERTY INV.
4 PENTOS
5 REDLAND
6 LAPORTE
7 EIT GP.
8 CARLTON COMMS.
9 FROGMORE ESTATES
10 RAINE
12 MOORFIELD GROUP
13 MEGGITT
14 YORKS.TYNE TEES TV.
11 Tl GROUP
15 PRONTAPRINT
16 ACT GROUP
17 TOMKINS
18 SPRING RAM CORP.
19 ALBERT FISHER
20 GCAP MEDIA
21 UNIQ
22 HELENE
25 PITTENCRIEFF
23 VODAFONE GROUP
24 WILLS GROUP
26 MCKECHNIE
27 CAIRN ENERGY
28 PEARSON
29 GREENALLS GP.'A'
30 STRATAGEM GROUP
31 MAI
32 GKN
TARGET FIRMS
BEAZER
ULTRAMAR
NEW ENGL.PROPS.
WILDING OFFE.EQUP.
STEETLEY
EVODE
SINTROM
PICKWICK GROUP
TREVIAN
LAWRENCE WALTER 
GROSVENOR GROUP 
MICRELEC GP.
TYNE TEES TV ED 
DOWTY GROUP 
CNTU.STATIONERY 
NMW COMPUTERS 
RANKS, HOVIS 
STAG FURNITURE 
HUNTER SAPHIR 
MIDLANDS RADIO 
CLIFFORDS FOODS 
GABICCI 
ABERDEEN PTL. 
HAWTHORN LESLIE 
PLATON INTL. 
SAVAGE GROUP 
TEREDO PTL. 
THAMES TV. 
DEVENISH (JA) 
HARRISON INDS. 
ANGLIA TV.GROUP 
WESTLAND GP.
YEAR MONTH DAY
1991
1991
1991
1991
1991
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992
1992
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1993
1993
1994 
1994
16
17
23
6
10
6
7 
28 
22 
31
14 
6
17 
10
18 
20 
29 
6 
22 
22 
12 
26
15
8
15
27
8
22
23
9
18
8
9
10
12
12
12
1
1
1
1
3
5
5
6
6
8
10
10
11
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
4
4
4
6
7
1
2
132
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
54
55
53
52
56
58
57
51
59
47
48
49
50
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
SIG FREEMAN GROUP 1994
GARNER REJECT SHOP 1994
CLAREMONT GARM. MAGELLAN INDS. 1994
SUTER WILKES (JAMES) 1994
INCHCAPE HOGG GROUP 1994
BRITTON GP. NMC GROUP 1994
SLOUGH ESTATES BREDERO PROPS. 1994
EVANS HALSHAW ED DAVENPORT NON 1994
DE LA RUE PORTALS GP. 1994
TRAVIS PERKINS BMSS 1995
HYDER SOUTH WLS.ELTY. 1995
WACE GROUP FERRY PICKERING 1995
ABACUS GROUP POLAR 1995
TANDEM GP. CASKET 1995
PREMIER OIL PICT PETROLEUM 1995
ASH & LACY Cl GROUP 1995
MISYS ACT GROUP 1995
MARCONI EXCH F VSEL 1995
WILSON CONNOLLY LDN.& CLYDESIDE 1995
AGA FOODSERVICE VICTAULIC 1995
ABBEY NATIONAL FIRST NAT.FIN. 1995
MORLAND UNICORN INNS 1995
LYNX GP. VISTEC GP. 1995
UNITED UTILITIES NORWEB 1995
MENVIER-SWAIN SCANTRONIC 1995
BRITISH EMPIRE SECS. SELECTIVE ASSETS 1995
MATTHEW CLARK TAUNTON CIDER 1995
DE E GROUP BODDINGTON GP. 1995
I TV FORTE 1995
TBI MOLYNEUX ESTS. 1995
ABBOT GROUP OIS INTL.INSPEC. 1995
SPECTRIS BURNFIELD 1996
PEARSON SELECTV 1996
COURT CVNDSH.GP. GREENACRE GP. 1996
ROYAL & SUN ALL.IN. ROYAL IN. 1996
ASCOT SUTER 1996
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
6
12
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
6
6
6
7
8
9
9
9
9
9
10
11
12
12
1
1
4
5
7
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
HOMESTYLE GROUP REXMORE 1996
BOOKER NURDIN & PEACOCK 1996
MENTMORE BRIT.DATA MAN. 1996
WILLIAMS CHUBB SECURITY 1997
WELLINGTON UNDERWRITING J PREMIUM UNDWRT. 1997
CHARTER HOWDEN GROUP 1997
BARDON GROUP CAMAS 1997
BARLOWS ROWLINSON SECS. 1997
TIBBETT &.BRITTEN APPLIED DS.GP. 1997
ANGLIAN GROUP HARTLEPOOL WATER 1997
MCALPINE(ALFRED) RAINE 1997
AWG HARTLEPOOL WATER 1997
SMG GRAMPIAN TV. 1997
ABBEY NATIONAL CATER ALLEN 1997
BANK OF SCOTLAND EFT GROUP 1997
BRITANNIA GROUP BRIT.BLDG.& ENGR. 1997
ENNSTONE BRUNTCLIFFE AGG. 1997
T & S STORES M&W 1997
NOVARA HARRIS (PHILIP) 1997
MIRROR GP. MIDL.INDE.NWSP. 1997
MILNER ESTATES SPECIALITY SHOPS 1997
HISCOX HISCOX SLT.IN.FD. 1997
YULE CATTO HOLLIDAY CHM. 1997
UNITED INDS. NEEPSEND 1997
AUSTIN REED 'A' COUNTRY CASUALS 1997
AVIVA GENERAL ACCIDENT 1998
HOME RETAIL GROUP ARGOS 1998
WESTBURY MAUNDERS (JOHN) 1998
TELEWEST COMMS. GENERAL CABLE 1998
HEMINGWAY PR. OLIVES PROPERTY 1998
INTERSERVE HOW GROUP 1998
ST. IVES HUNTERS ARMLEY 1998
Tl GROUP EIS GROUP 1998
ASSD.BRIT.PORTS AMERICAN PORT SERVICES 1998
VARDY (REG) TRUST MOTOR GP. 1998
HOLI DAYBREAK BALDWIN 1998
8
9
9
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
7
8
9
9
10
10
12
12
12
12
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
5
5
6
7
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
137
139
116
118
124
117
119
140
121
120
122
123
125
126
127
128
141
142
129
130
131
133
134
135
144
MAYFLOWER CORPORATION DENNIS GROUP 1998
LAPORTE INSPEC 1998
SLOUGH ESTATES BILTON 1998
SCOT.& SOUTHERN ENERGY SOUTHERN ELEC. . 1998
BRIT-BORNEO OIL & GAS HARDY OIL & GAS 1998
WASSALL . TLG 1998
COURTAULDS CLAREMONT GARM. 1998
BRITISH VITA DOEFLEX ED 1998
KINGFISHER VCI ED 1998
PETERHOUSE GROUP JACKSON GROUP 1998
PENDRAGON EVANS HALSHAW 1998
MAI BEARING POWER INTL. 1999
REVENUE ASSURANCE SVS. XAVIER COMPUTER GP. 1999
LADBROKES STAKIS 1999
MINORCO (LON) REUNION MINING 1999
ACAL SEDGEMOOR 1999
BUNZL PROVEND GROUP 1999
RYLAND GP. WYNDHAM GROUP 1999
PRUDENTIAL M&G GROUP 1999
STANLEY LEISURE CAPITAL CORP. 1999
IMI POLYPIPE 1999
SSL INTERNATIONAL LONDON INTL.GP. 1999
LASMO MONUMENT OIL&GAS 1999
SHANKS GROUP CAIRD GROUP 1999
WOLSELEY BRIT.FITTINGS 1999
FAIREY SERVOMEX 1999
GRAINGER TRUST PARK ESTATES (LIPOOL) 1999
MERCHANT RETAIL DE GRUCHY (A) 1999
JENNINGS BROTHERS CAFE INNS 1999
BRIT INSURANCE WREN 1999
ATKINS(WS) LAMBERT SMITH HAMPTON 1999
CELLTECH GROUP CHIROSCIENCE GP. 1999
ORB ESTATES ALBEMARLE PR INVS 1999
MENTMORE BIRKBY 1999
COATS HICKING PENTCST. 1999
GREENE KING MORLAND 1999
8
8
9
9
9
9
9
9
9
12
12
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
132
136
143
138
145
147
146
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
16
14
23
28
08
12
7
4
14
28
14
29
27
17
13
2
16
31
31
13
10
28
25
17
16
25
25
19
8
9
18
26
9
16
13
4
BSS GROUP PTS 1999
BANK OF SCOTLAND HILL HIRE 1999
TRAVIS PERKINS SHARPE & FISHER 1999
MARSTON'S MARSTON THOMPSON 1998
RMC GROUP RUGBY GROUP 1999
LIMIT TORCH 1999
COMMUNISIS WADDINGTON 1999
NATIONAL EXPRESS PRISM RAIL 2000
GLAXOSMITHKLINE SMITHKLINE BHM. 2000
JOHNSON SERVICE GROUP SEMARA 2000
LAING JOHN A BEECHCROFT 2000
ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP. NAT.WSTM.BANK 2000
TELEWEST COMMS. FLEXTECH 2000
E WOOD MERISTEM 2000
BP BURMAH CASTROL 2000
FIRST TECHNOLOGY CITY TECHNOLOGY. 2000
RENEW BRITANNIA GROUP 2000
PEARSON DORLING KINDER. 2000
YEOMAN GP. LASER SCAN 2000
GCAP MEDIA BORDER TV. 2000
LUMINAR NORTHERN LEIS. 2000
ENNSTONE BREEDON 2000
BIG FOOD GROUP BOOKER 2000
I TV COMPASS GROUP 2000
MARYL.WARWICK BALFOUR LIBERTY 2000
BIG FOOD GROUP BOOKER 2000
BLOOMSBURY PBL. BLACK A&C 2000
WYEVALE GDN.CENTRES COUNTRY GARDENS 2000
AMVESCAP PERPETUAL 2000
HOMESTYLE GROUP HARVEYS FURNISHINGS 2000
NATIONAL EXPRESS PRISM RAIL 2000
HILL & SMITH ASH & LACY 2000
BARCLAYS WOOLWICH 2000
SMITHS GROUP Tl GROUP 2000
PILLAR PROPERTY WATES CTY.LDN. 2000
BRITISH AIRWAYS BRIT.REGIONAL AIRLINES 2000
7
9
10
11
11
11
12
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
7
7
8
9
11
12
177 TAYLOR WOODROW
178 PERSIMMON
179 XENOVA GROUP
180 MISYS
181 JOHNSON MATTHEY
182 GREENE KING
183 WPP GROUP
184 JJB SPORTS
185 EVOLUTION GROUP
186 HIT ENTERTAINMENT
187 TESCO
UK CROSS-BORDER
1
BIDDING FIRMS 
WOLSELEY
2 HAYS
3 BLUE CIRCLE INDS.
4 PLYSU
5 HICKSON INTL.
6 BTR
7 SAGE GROUP
8 KINGFISHER
9 KALON GROUP
10 KELDA GROUP
11 WHATMAN
12 SPIRAXSARCO
13 MEDEVA
14 INTERCARE GROUP
15 ASPREY
16 TEMPUS GROUP
17 CADBURY SCHWEPPES
18 PHOTOME INTL.
19 ACAL
BRYANT GROUP 
BEAZER GROUP 
CANTAB PHARMS.
DBS MANAGEMENT 
MECONIC 
OLD ENG.INNS 
TEMPUS GROUP 
HUGHES (TJ)
BEESON GREGORY GROUP 
GULLANE ENTM.
T & S STORES
2001 1 15
2001 1 15
2001 2 17
2001 5 .10
2001 6 21
2001 8 15
2001 8 16
2002 3 8
2002 5 30
2002 6 25
2002 10 30
YEAR MONTH DAY
1992 2 7
1992 6 23
1992 6 4
1992 6 23
1992 7 9
1992 7 14
1992 10 6
1993 2 5
1993 2 4
1993 4 1
1993 4 2
1993 4 2
1993 4 2
1993 5 11
1993 5 28
1993 12 24
1994 1 20
1994 1 26
1994 3 9
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20 MANDERS 1994
21 CHARTER 1994
22 FKI 1994
23 LAIRD GROUP 1994
24 NOBO GROUP 1994
25 NEWMAN TONKS 1994
26 ALBEMARLE PR INVS 1995
27 VITEC GROUP 1995
28 LAPORTE 1995
29 SMITH & NEPHEW 1995
30 LILLESHALL 1995
31 MORGAN CRUCIBLE 1996
32 SIG 1996
33 BPB 1996
34 ROTORK 1998
35 LAVENDON GROUP 1999
36 SALVESEN(CHRIS.) 1999
37 DOMNICK HUNTER 1999
38 RECKITT BENCKISER 1999
39 LEGAL & GENERAL 1999
40 SERCO GROUP 1999
41 BBA AVIATION 1996
42 ALLIANCE BOOTS 1996
43 WAGON 1999
44 SCHRODERS 2000
45 FIRST CHOICE HOLS. 2000
46 REED ELSEVIER 2000
47 RPC GROUP 2000
48 ENERGIS 2000
49 TOREX GROUP 2000
50 PACE MICRO TECHNOLOGY 2001
51 REUTERS GROUP 2001
52 NOVAR X 2001
53 ABBOT GROUP 2001
54 DAVIS SERVICE GROUP 2002
55 SPECTRIS 2002
5
6
6
8
9
10
3
3
3
4
7
1
3
4
2
1
5
6
7
7
8
9
9
9
6
6
7
7
12
12
2
3
3
8
3
7
19
30 
17 
4 
22 
21 
16 
22 
14
3 
11 
16
19
25
4 
4
24 
4 
27
26 
10 
10
20 
27 
7 
16
25 
19 
19 
12 
6 
2 
16
31 
22 
17
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56 HALMA 2002
57 AGA FOODSERVICE 2002
58 AMEC 2002
59 ASHTENNE 2003
60 SABMILLER 2003
UK CROSS-BORDER
TARGET FIRMS YEAR
1 JUPITER TYNDALL 1995
2 FISONS 1995
3 BET 1996
4 TRADE INDEMNITY  ^ 1996
5 APPLEBY WWARD.GP. 1997
6 ATLAS CONVERTING 1997
7 MARLING INDS. 1997
8 BORTHWICKS 1997
9 REDLAND 1997
10 ETAM 1997
11 UDO 1997
12 CODA GROUP 1998
13 COURTAULDS 1998
14 OLIVER ASHWORTH GP. 1998
15 BRIT.DREDGING 1998
16 JEYES 1998
17 PARAMOUNT FOODS 1998
18 GARDINER GROUP 1998
19 BCH GROUP 1998
20 COPYRIGHT PROMOTIONS 1999
21 BWI 1999
22 GUARDIAN RYL. 1999
23 LIBERFABRICA 1999
24 SERVISAIR 1999
25 TIE RACK 1999
10 16
10 28
12 5
3 19
5 14
MONTH DAY
3 30
8 18
2 16
2 1
1 31
4 4
8 29
8 8
10 13
11 12
12 19
2 23
4 20
4 22
4 24
5 7
8 5
10 20
12 23
1 11
1 6
2 1
2 19
3 11
4 6
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26 ILION GROUP 1999
27 RIVA GROUP 1999
28 ALLIED CARPETS 1999
29 ARJO WIGGINS APL. 2000
30 SAATCHI & SAATCHI 2000
31 HAZLEWOOD FOODS 2000
32 ELLIS & EVERARD 2000
33 HEPWORTH 2000
34 KENWOOD APP. 2000
35 COMMUNITY HOSPITALS 2001
36 BLUE CIRCLE INDS. 2001
37 LYNX GP. 2001
38 ENTERPRISE OIL 2002
FRANCE DOMESTIC
BIDDING FIRMS
1 TAITTINGER
2 NAVIGATION MIXTE
3 AFFINE (EX IMMOBAIL)
4 MATRAHACHETTE
5 IMMEUBLES DE LYON
6 ZODIAC
7 ESSILOR INTL.
8 DOCKS DE FRANCE
9 GALERIES LAFAYETTE
10 LAGARDERE GROUPE
11 NAVIGATION MIXTE
12 CREDIT COML.FRANC
13 ATOS ORIGIN
14 ALLIANCE SANTE DS.
15 PINAULT PRINTEMPS
16 IMMOB.BATIBAIL
17 CEGID GROUP
4 15
7 8
8 17
5 16
6 19
9 8
10 24
11 1
12 13
1 15
1 8
12 19
4 2
TARGET FIRMS YEAR MONTH DAY
BACCARAT 1991 12 10
FABRIQUE SUCRE 1991 12 26
SOVABAIL 1992 2 25
MATRA 1992 10 22
MAGASINS LYONGERLAND 1992 12 7
SICMA AERO SEAT 1993 3 19
BACOU-DALLOZ 1993 5 5
ALSAC.SUPERMARCH 1993 6 17
MONOPRIX 1993 10 30
MATRAHACHETTE 1994 2 1
ECCO 1994 7 4
BANQUE HYDRO-ENERGIE 1996 5 21
SLIGOS 1996 10 31
ILE DE FRANCE PHARMAC 1997 11 21
GUILBERT 1998 1 22
FONCIERE DES REGIONS 1998 4 8
SERVANT SOFT 1999 1 8
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18 SOCIETE GENERALE
19 GREVIN ET COMPAGNIE
20 WORMS ET CIE R
21 FIMALAC
22 SUEZ
23 TOTAL SA
24 CARREFOUR
25 GECINA
26 ZODIAC
27 DIOSOS
28 AIR FRANCEKLM
29 CDACIE.DES ALPES
30 PPR
31 SOPHIA
32 VALEO
33 VINCI (EX SGE)
34 OENEO
35 BAIL INVESTI.
36 ACCOR
37 CANAL +
38 TECHNIP
39 CREDIT LYONNAIS
40 SEB
41 VRANKENPOMMERY MONOPOLE
FRANCE CROSS-BORDER
BIDDING FIRMS YEAR
1 SIBILLE 1993
2 ALCATEL LUCENT 1994
3 AXA 1994
4 AVENTIS 1995
5 SUEZ 1995
6 PERNODRICARD 1997
PARIBAS 1999 2
MUSEE GREVIN 1999 3
PARTICIP HOTEL FIN 1999 3
FACOM SA 1999 3
L'ENTREPRISE INDUST. 1999 4
ELF AQUITAINE 1999 7
PROMODES 1999 8
IMMOB.BATIBAIL 1999 9
INTERTECHNIQUE 1999 10
SEGUIN MOREAU 1999 11
REGIONAL AIRLINES 2000 1
MERIBEL ALPINA 2000 1
SURCOUF 2000 3
SOCIETE GENERALE 2000 5
SYLEA 2000 5
GROUPE GTM 2000 7
DIOSOS 2000 10
ICC 2000 10
EUROPEENNE CASINOS 2001 1
EXPAND 2001 6
ISIS 2001 7
MARC ORIAN 2001 7
MOULINEX 2001 10
CHAMPAGNE POMMERY 2002 4
MONTH DAY
6 2
9 21
9 7
8 18
11 23
1 31
1
22
3
24
16
5
30
7
28
19
19
24
13
26
2
13
23
11
17
18
3
3
22
3
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7 SOMMERALLIBERT 1997
8 EAUX (GENERALE DES) 1997
9 ARCELOR 1997
10 ETAM DEVELOPEMENT 1997
11 ARTEMIS FINE ARTS 1998
12 PPR 1998
13 INFOGRAMES ENTM. 1999
14 ACCOR 1999
15 AXA-UAP 1999
16 FLAMMARION 1999
17 PENAUILLE POLYSERVICES 1999
18 LVMH 1999
19 PENAUILLE POLYSERVICES 1999
20 AVENTIS 1999
21 DANONE 1999
22 RUBIS 1999
23 GEODIS 1999
24 THALES (EX THOMSONCSF) 2000
25 SEQUANA CAPITAL 2000
26 PUBLICIS GROUPE 2000
27 INFOSOURCES 2000
28 ALSTOM 2000
29 ALCATEL LUCENT 2000
30 PUBLICIS GROUPE 2000
31 FI SYSTEM 2000
32 PECHINEY 2001
33 LAFARGE 2001
34 TRANSICIEL 2001
35 PENAUILLE POLYSERVICES 2001
36 ATOS ORIGIN 2001
37 LVMH 2001
38 STMICROELECTRONICS 2002
39 FROMAGERIES BEL 2002
5
8
10
11
5
10
1
1
2
2
3
3
3
5
6
6
9
1
5
6
6
6
8
9
9
4
1
5
5
7
11
4
9
28
28
14 
12 
18 
20
25
26 
1
3 
11 
19 
11 
16 
16 
21
25
4 
16
19
29
20 
17
7 
11 
3
8 
1
30 
27
26
15 
19
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FRANCE CROSS-BORDER
TARGET FIRMS YEAR
1 GERLAND 1992
2 DARTY 1993
3 MATRAHACHETTE 1993
4 UNION INTL.IMMOB. 1994
5 LAMBERTRIVIERE 1994
6 MOULINEX 1995
7 SUDOUEST 1995
8 BRASSERIE FISCHER 1996
9 SICLI 1996
10 LOCATEL 1996
11 UNION FINC.FRANC. 1997
12 HIT 1997
13 SOCIETE GENERALE 1998
14 ECIA 1999
15 FICHET-BAUCHE 1999
16 DEXIA FRANCE 1999
17 FRAIKIN 1999
18 UBIQUS 2000
19 CR.COML.DE FRN.CCF 2000
20 SELF TRADE 2000
21 PERNODRICARD 2000
22 JET MULTIMEDIA 2000
23 VIA BANQUE 2000
24 FIVES LILLE 2000
25 SIDEL 2001
26 SAINTLOUIS 2001
27 SAUPIQUET 2001
28 FIVES LILLE 2000
29 ROCHETTE (LA) 2002
30 LABEYRIE 2002
31 BOUYGUES OFFSHORE 2002
32 DE DIETRICH 2002
33 REXEL 2003
MONTH DAY
1
2
5
10
12
10
10
2
5 
11 
7 
10 
2 
4 
4
9
10
3
4 
9 
9 
9 
9 
12 
3
6 
12 
12 
1 
3
5 
7 
3
9
5
5
2
6
16
5
13
15
11
22
1
2
23
21
19
4
16
1
13
28
18
11
4
27
29
1
4
2
15
8
16
19
GERMANY DOMESTIC
BIDDING FIRMS
1 HOECHST
2 VIAG
3 GILDEMEISTER
4 HUCKE
5 THYSSENKRUPP
6 DEUTSCHE REAL ESTATE
7 FRI.KRUPPHOESCH KRUPP
8 SONAE INDUSTRIA SGPS
9 HOLSTEN-BRAUEREI
10 SCHENCK CARL
11 DEGUSSA
12 WCM BETEILIGUNG
13 DEUTSCHE BANK
14 ALLIANZ
15 WALTER BAU
16 BILFINGER BERGER
17 FREENET
GERMANY CROSS-BORDER
BIDDING FIRMS YEAR
1 SIEMENS 1993
2 COMMERZBANK 1995
3 RWE 1995
4 DRESDNER BANK 1995
5 DEUTSCHE BANK 1998
6 IWKA 1999
7 BAYER 1999
8 IVG IMMOBILIEN 1999
9 DEUTSCHE TELEKOM 1999
TARGET FIRMS YEAR MONTH DAY
BAYER SCHG.PHARMA
COMPUTER 2000
DECKEL-MAHO
MHM MODE HLDG.MUNCHEN
FRI.KRUPPHOESCH KRUPP
STINNES
THYSSENKRUPP
GLUNZ
BAVARIA & ST.PAULI 
SCHENCK (CARL)
SKW TROSTBERG
KLOECKNERWERKE
VARTA
DRESDNER BANK 
DYCKERHOFF & WIDMANN 
RHEINHOLD & MAHLA 
MOBILCOM
1993 7 10
1994 6 11
1994 7 26
1996 7 4
1997 3 20
1999 6 30
1997 11 5
1998 9 11
1998 11 11
1999 10 29
2000 8 23
2000 11 22
2000 11 6
2001 4 1
2001 4 11
2002 6 6
2003 2 17
MONTH DAY
11 18
3 30
4 19
6 26
12 23
1 6
2 5
3 8
4 18
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10 GEA GROUP 1999 7 8
11 DAIMLERCHRYSLER 1999 10 5
12 HENKEL 1999 12 22
13 TUI 2000 4 4
14 ERGOSICHERUNG 2000 8 17
15 DAB BANK 2000 9 13
16 DEGUSSA 2000 12 15
17 SUEDZUCKER 2001 6 29
18 VOSSLOH 2002 7 16
GERMANY CROSS-BORDER
TARGET FIRMS YEAR MONTH DAY
1 CAMPINA 1993 10 4
2 DVB BANK 1994 1 18
3 MAXDATA 1994 6 30
4 AEG SEE 1994 9 21
5 HARTMANN & BRAUN 1995 10 31
6 AMB AACH&MUNCH BET.REGD. 1997 12 19
7 ROSENTHAL 1997 12 4
8 VDN.DTL.NICKELWERKE 1998 4 3
9 BASF 1998 5 4
10 I FA HOTEL & TOURISTIK 1999 1 6
11 ALBINGIAS. 1999 2 1
12 HOECHST 1999 5 17
13 GERRESHEIMER GLAS 1999 6 16
14 BUS BERZELIUS 1999 7 6
15 DEBITEL 1999 7 9
16 BMW 1999 10 25
17 PRAKTIKER BAU UND HEIM 1999 11 3
18 MANNESMANN 1999 11 13
19 COMPUTEC MEDIA 2000 2 22
20 DEGUSSA 2000 3 29
21 RICARDO 2000 5 15
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22 TELEGATE 2000 5
23 AGIV REAL ESTATE 2000 5
24 DAIMLERCHRYSLER 2000 9
25 KIEKERT 2000 6
26 ISION INTERNET 2000 12
27 GRAMMER 2001 4
28 ALSTOM 2001 5
29 MICROLOG LOGISTICS 2002 10
30 GILDE BRAUEREI 2002 11
31 WELLA 2003 3
4
3 
20 
7 
19 
26 
15 
18
4 
18
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Chapter 5 Long-term Excess Returns
Section 5.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the empirical results of the long term excess returns of firms 
after M&As. The investigation will reveal a more complete consequence of 
shareholders’ wealth effect by further looking into the one-year to 5-year event 
window than solely examining the short term share price performance.
Earlier long term share price performance studies reported mixed results as I have 
examined in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2 {Literature Review). For example, Higson and 
Elliott (1998) studied UK bidders in the period 1970-1990 and they report that the 
average long term excess returns are statistically insignificant, whereas Gregory (1997) 
studied UK bidders in the period 1984-1992 and their results are negative and 
statistically significant.
On the other hand, some earlier long term event studies could suffer from a number of 
problems such as (see also Barber and Lyon, 1997): 1) new listing biases; 2) 
rebalancing biases; 3) skewness biases; 4) cross-sectional dependence in abnormal 
returns and/or 5) an ‘imperfect’ model. Sections 3.4-3.5 of Chapter 3 {Methodology) 
have discussed the problems above and identified some possible solutions. First, using 
the control firm (CF) and/or the control portfolio (CP) model can effectively avoid the 
new listing biases by selecting reference firms from non-event firms only. Second, the 
CF and/or CP model also effectively avoid the rebalancing biases because no market 
index is involved. Third, a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic can be used to 
reduce the skewness biases in long term abnormal returns. Finally, if the abnormal 
returns are severely correlated across time (e.g. a bidder with overlapping M&A 
activities) and across assets (e.g. bidders with similar MV, MTBV, industry, etc.), a 
calendar time (CT) approach can be employed as advocated by Fama (1998) and 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000). My study will take into account these issues. Also, there 
will be some further discussions for these issues in the current chapter (where 
appropriate).
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My study for the long term share price performance focuses on the EU markets and in 
particular three countries: the UK, France and Germany as they have the best data 
availability and they are the most active M&A markets in the EU as noted in Chapter 
4 {Short-run Excess Returns). This study differs from some earlier long run M&A 
studies for the follows reasons. First, few studies have examined the long run share 
price performance for the French and German markets. Second, this chapter includes 
bidders of both domestic and cross-border M&As, and bidders involved in acquiring 
privately held targets. Few earlier studies have examined all these different types of 
M&As. Third, this chapter utilises the CF (and CP) model as well as the calendar time 
approach, models which are robust to the recent criticisms of commonly used long run 
methods.
The rest of the chapter is organised as six parts: 1) data and methodology; 2) long 
term share price performance of the non-overlapping samples; 3) an alternative 
approach to detect long term share price performance when the industry factor is 
considered as a risk factor in evaluating average returns; 4) long term share price 
performance of the overlapping samples; 5) an extra section comparing high MV 
bidders and low MV bidders in the long run - as few studies have thoroughly 
examined the impacts of MV on long term share price performance; and 6) a 
conclusion of the findings.
Section 5.2 Data and Methodology
Data sources:
Data on the UK, French and German acquisitions were collected from Acquisitions 
Monthly for the period of 1992-2003. To be included in the sample for long term 
share performance analysis, the bidders involved in M&As must be listed in their 
local markets. In addition, I required the targets to be an EU firm as this study focuses 
on EU markets. M&A cases with unclear announcement date and inconsistent bidding 
descriptions (e.g. when there were inconsistent bidding descriptions from news and 
from Acquisitions Monthly) were not selected. Finally, I also required that there was
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unambiguous share price information on DataStream for a firm to be selected. Some 
firms that were not clearly identified on DataStream were not selected.
Sample selection and methodology
The exact sample size is subject to the selection of model to be used. As I have 
discussed, some earlier long run event studies suffer from problems such as: 1) new 
listing biases; 2) rebalancing biases; 3) skewness biases; 4) cross-sectional 
dependence in abnormal returns and/or 5) an ‘imperfect’ model. As a result, model 
selection has to take into account the factors above.
An influential paper, Fama and French (1992), brought together size, leverage, the 
eamings-price ratio, market-to-book-ratio, and beta in a single cross-section study. 
They found that that average stock returns are well explained by the combination of 
size (MV) and market-to-book-ratio (MTBV). Based on this finding, Lyon, Barber 
and Tsai (1999) made an important contribution to long-run event studies. They 
suggest the control firm (CF) approach or the control portfolio (CP) approach with 
skewness adjusted t-statistics yield well-specified tests in random samples for studies 
of long run share price performance. The control firm or control portfolio approach 
estimates an abnormal return as the difference between an event firm’s return and the 
return on a non-event firm or portfolio that is similar on characteristics known to be 
related to average returns (MV and MTBV in this case). Furthermore, they suggest 
that the buy-and-hold return is a better indictor of investors’ experience than the 
cumulative return.
As a result, the buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) in the CF model is calculated 
as:
BH A R j, =  f J ( l  +  A ,) - f ] [ l  +  E(Ru)]
t =1 1=1
where
Rit = the return for security i at time t
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E(Rit) = the expected return for security i at time Here I use the return of a matched 
firm that is similar in MV and MTBV characteristics. Security i is also called as 
reference firm.
B H A R jT = the x period buy-and-hold abnormal return for security i 
The long run abnormal return in the CP model is calculated as:
where
ARiT = the x period buy-and-hold abnormal return for security i 
Rix = the x period buy-and-hold dividend adjusted return for security /
E(RpT) = the expected x period buy-and-hold dividend adjusted return for the matched 
portfolio p
bh denotes ‘buy-and-hold’
p, s, x denote portfolio, the beginning period and the period of investments in turn 
R ^.r = the buy-and-hold return for the control portfolio during period x starting from 
time s
ns denotes the number of securities traded in month s, the beginning period for the 
return calculation
Rit = the simple net return (incorporating the effect of dividends) on security i of a
group of identified securities with similar MV and MTBV at time t, i.e.
Pit — Pi, t - 1 +  Dit
Ri,= ------ri.t -1
The control firm (CF) and/or the control portfolio (CP) model effectively avoid the 
new listing biases by selecting reference firms from non-event firms only, and 
effectively avoid the rebalancing biases because no market index is involved. Section 
3.3.3 of Chapter 3 (Methodology) has discussed how to identify a reference firm 
and/or a reference portfolio. Furthermore, to eliminate skewness biases, a
A R ix =  Rix - E(Rpx)
and
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bootstrapped application of the statistic is preferred to the standard t test. The 
bootstrapping approach has been discussed in Section 3.4.3 of Chapter 3 
{Methodology).
As I have discussed in Section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3 (,Methodology), the pursuit of non­
overlapping sample firms (e.g. bidders with no other significant firm-specific event 
for a reasonably long period around the announcement date) can greatly reduce the 
biases caused by cross-sectional dependence in share abnormal returns. This source of 
bias is a statistical problem in that the inclusion of overlapping abnormal returns can 
cause the conventional ^-statistic to be biased upward because the returns are 
positively correlated (e.g. Lyon, Barber and Tsai, 1999 and Mitchell and Stafford, 
2000). Therefore, to avoid the misspecification of test statistics as well as sample 
contamination, I pursue a non-overlapping sample to tackle this problem when I 
employ the CF/CP models.
I adopted two approaches to define a ‘non-overlapping’ sample. The first is to define 
‘bidding firms with no multi-bids within 5 years’ as non-overlapping sample firms. 
The sample that resulted from this concept is called the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’. 
In this case, the sample firms have no overlapping M&A activities within 5 years 
around the announcement year. Also the reference firms (used in the CF/CP models as 
the benchmark of expected returns) must be ‘clean’ firms (namely without significant 
events) for 5 years before the M&A announcement year. I further require that the 
reference firms have no significant events within 2 years after the M&A 
announcement year. This is to prevent the impacts of any unusual pre-M&A share 
price movement of the reference firms. The second approach is to define ‘bidding 
firms with no multi-bids within 3 years’ as non-overlapping sample firms. The sample 
that fulfilled this requirement is called the ‘3Y non-overlapping sample’ to make a 
distinction from the former case. In this case, the sample firms have no overlapping 
M&A activities within 3 years around the announcement year. Similarly the reference 
firms must be ‘clean’ firms for 3 years before the M&A announcement year. I also 
require that the reference firms have no significant events within 2 years after the 
M&A announcement year.
151
After pursuing the non-overlapping samples, the sample composition is shown in the 
table below. In Acquisitions Monthly the information for the completed acquisitions 
of private target firms is mainly available for the UK, therefore the acquisitions of 
private targets are not discussed for France and Germany.
Table 5.1 Sample composition for non-overlapping samples
5Y Non-overlapping Sample
Domestic Private Cross-border All
France 37 N/A 5 42
Germany 22 N/A 13 35
UK 24 34 17 75
Entire Sample 83 34 35 152
3Y Non-overlapping Sample
Domestic Private Cross-border All
France 56 N/A 14 70
Germany 35 N/A 20 55
UK 62 95 51 208
Entire Sample 153 95 85 333
From Table 5.1 we find that because of the high requirements of the ‘5Y non­
overlapping’ sampling method, as might be expected, there are only 152 sample 
acquisitions that are able to fulfil the requirements. On the other hand, the ‘3Y non­
overlapping’ sample doubles the sample size of the ‘5Y non-overlapping’ sample as 
there are 333 cases in the sample. The UK bidding firms take a large portion in both 
samples, followed by the French firms.
Table 5.2 below gives the descriptive sample statistics for the non-overlapping 
samples.
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Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics for the non-overlapping samples o f  the long run study
Panel A: UK
MV
(£,Millions)
MTBV
5Y Non-overlapping
Domestic Private Cross-border Domestic Private
Cross-
border
Mean 876.48 293.28 880.85 891.02 516.10 1404.79
Median 136.32 61.97 221.34 142.31 59.14 238.88
Mean 2.27 2.93 3.03 2.39 3.62 5.43
Median 1.24 1.75 2.66 1.31 1.81 2.71
3Y Non-overlapping
Panel B:
MV
(€,Millions)
MTBV
France
5Y Non-overlapping
Domestic Private Cross-border Domestic Private
Cross-
border
Mean 509.98 N/A 3045.46 775.38 N/A 3460.33
Median 113.28 N/A 722.85 133.97 N/A 778.26
Mean 2.30 N/A 3.30 2.33 N/A 3.10
Median 1.58 N/A 2.29 1.71 N/A 2.25
3Y Non-overlapping
Panel C:
MV
(€,Millions)
MTBV
Germany
5Y Non-overlapping
Domestic Private Cross-border Domestic Private
Cross-
border
Mean 1239.81 N/A 1844.90 2004.414 N/A 2647.832
Median 399.58 N/A 568.42 410.35 N/A 544.35
Mean 3.02 N/A 2.89 3.04 N/A 2.65
Median 2.81 N/A 2.16 2.77 N/A 2.12
3Y Non-overlapping
In Table 4.2, the average MTBVs range from 2.27 to 5.43. Also, we can see that the
v :
5Y Non-overlapping samples in general have lower average MVs than the 
corresponding 3Y Non-overlapping samples. This is because bidders with larger MVs
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are more frequently involved in M&As, and tend to be overlapping bidders. It is 
necessary to pursue non-overlapping samples to eliminate sample contamination and 
reduce the statistical biases caused by cross-sectional dependence in abnormal returns. 
In order to evaluate whether and to what extent purging overlapping bidders has any 
impact on the results, I also employ the calendar time approach in my study.
The calendar time approach is advocated by Fama (1998) and Mitchell and Stafford 
(2000). The approach is not commonly used in earlier event studies because it does 
not straightforwardly describe investors’ experience as well as it only tracks the 
performance of a portfolio. However, the calendar time approach has some 
advantages (e.g. Mitchell and Stafford, 2000, p. 288) over some other approaches (e.g. 
the CF/CP model together with the use of a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t- 
statistic). First, by forming a monthly calendar-time portfolio, all cross-correlations of 
event firm abnormal returns are automatically accounted for in the variance. Second, 
the distribution of this estimator is better approximated by the normal distribution, 
allowing for classical statistical inference. Therefore, although we need to be careful 
when we interpret the results from the calendar time approach because it does not 
straightforwardly measure shareholders’ investment experience, the use of the 
calendar time approach in this chapter can serve two useful purposes (there is more 
discussion of these issues later in Section 5.5): 1) as a robustness check to the results 
from the CF/CP model; 2) as a valid method to calculate the long run wealth effects 
for bidders with overlapping M&A activities.
To employ the calendar time approach, the abnormal return for calendar month t is 
calculated as:
ARit =  Rit — E(R jt),
where
ARit= the abnormal return for security i at time t 
Rit = the actual return for security i at time t
E(Rit) = the expected return for security i at time t (see below for more information)
As I have discussed in Section 3.5.2 of Chapter 3 0Methodology), E(Rjt) can be 
obtained by either the Fama-French model or the control portfolio model. For
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convenience, I call the former the CTFF approach and the latter CTCP approach. 
Then, in each calendar month t, I calculate a mean abnormal return across firms in the 
portfolio:
AR t  =  ARu  
/=1
where
nt is the number of event firms in the portfolio in month t
Xjt reflects whether the abnormal return of each firm is equally-weighted or value- 
weighted.
Lyon et al. (1999, pp. 194-195) show that both the CTFF and CTCP models perform 
well in extreme overlapping calculations when the calendar time portfolio is formed 
by equally-weighted average cross-sectional returns. For this reason, my study 
adopted the equally-weighted approach.
A mean monthly abnormal return is therefore calculated as:
A R  = - V A R ,r AmmJt=l
(3.18)
where
T = the total number of calendar months
To test the null hypothesis of zero mean monthly abnormal returns, a conventional t- 
statistic is applied.
There is a potential problem with the calendar time models in that heteroskedasticity 
could be induced because of the varying number of firms in the calendar time 
portfolio for each month. However, Mitchell and Stafford (2000)’s examination of 
this issue suggests the impact of heteroskedasticity on the long-run results is minimal.
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Section 5.3 Long Run Share Price Performance of the Non-overlapping Sample
This section examines the long run share price performance of the non-overlapping 
samples for the UK, France and Germany. The calculations are based on the CF and 
CP model with the use of a bootstrapped skewness-adjusted t-statistic as I have 
discussed in both the last section and Chapter 3 (Methodology). Tables A5.1 to A5.3 
and Figures A5.1 to A5.10 provided detailed results (BHARs) at every 12-month 
interval after the M&A announcements for bidders1. In many cases the F test shows 
that in general there is no fundamental difference between the results based on the CF 
and CP model, but in the case if they appear to be different I will discuss both sets of 
results (obtained from the CF model and from the CP model) in the text.
5.3.1 Long Run Share Price Performance of the UK Acquirers
At first I discuss domestic acquisitions (acquiring publicly listed target firms! for the 
UK sample. Based on the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample ’, UK domestic bidders 
consistently experienced negative abnormal performance within 5 years relative to the 
announcement date. We can see this in both Table A5.1 and Figure A5.1 (the yellow 
and the blue curves). These negative BHARs based on the ‘5Y Non-overlapping 
Sample’ are, however, not statistically significant using the skewness-adjusted t 
statistics. The results based on the ‘3YNon-overlapping Sample ’ are also negative but 
strongly statistically significant for most of the periods in Table A5.1. Table 5.3 
below reports the details for these results (BHARs) based on the CF model and the 
‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ at every 3-month interval2:
1 Because these tables are quite large, I gather them together at the end o f  this chapter,. 
Figures are also at the end o f  the chapter.
2 In the table B.t-stat = bootstrapped skewness adjusted t-statistic; B.p-value = p-value 
associated with the empirical B. t-stat, and Sig =  significance level. ***, **, * denotes 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
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Table 5.3 BHARs o f  UK domestic acquirers o f  public targets
/e Months Mean BHAR B. t-stat B. P-value Sig.
3 -0.0348 -2.5206 0.0029 ***
6 -0.0761 -2.7554 0.0165
**
9 -0.0995 -2.3445 0.0040
***
12 -0.1104 -1.8099 0.0956
*
15 -0.1032 -1.4806 0.1438
18 -0.1506 -2.6324 0.0005
***
21 -0.1768 -2.6746 0.0001
***
24 -0.1955 -2.5976 0.0010
**★
27 -0.1419 -1.6252 0.0228
**
30 -0.0969 -1.1023 0.1367
33 -0.0498 -0.5305 0.4355
36 0.0241 0.2281 0.8325
N - 6 2
Table 5.3 shows that the BHAR can be as low as -19.6% around Month +24 and this 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. After this time, the mean BHAR become 
less negative and statistically insignificant after Month +30. The results based on the 
CP model and the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ are similar to those in Table 5.3, but 
the evidence is less strong (see Table A5.1 and the blue line in Figure A5.1).
Figure A5.1 shows that BHARs based on each model are similar at least for the two 
years after the announcement date. After the 2nd year there are some variations in 
BHARs as presented in Figure A5.1. In Table A5.1 it appears that statistically 
stronger results are obtained for the larger ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’.
Turning to domestic acquisitions (acquiring private target firms) for the UK sample. 
The CP model based on the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample ’ shows that the mean 
BHAR for the 1st year relative to the announcement date is a positive 13.9% and 
statistically significant at the 5% level (see Table A5.1). This is not the case from the 
results based on the CF model and the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’, which are less 
positive in the 1st year and statistically insignificant.
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However, Table A5.1 shows strong evidence of negative and statistically significant 
BHARs for acquirers of private targets in the long run, based on the ‘3Y Non­
overlapping Sample \ The details for these BHARs based on the CF model and the 
‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ are reported at every 3-month interval as Table 5.4 
below:
Table 5.4 BHARs of UK domestic acquirers of private targets
/e Months Mean BHAR B. t-stat B. P-value Sig.
3 0.0014 0.0719 0.9413
6 0.0176 0.5170 0.5320
9 -0.0135 -0.3260 0.5153
12 -0.0535 -1.1118 0.0779 *
15 -0.0641 -1.1986 0.1023
18 -0.0430 -0.5627 0.6065
21 -0.1001 -1.3085 0.0277 **
24 -0.1408 -1.7398 0.0021 * * *
27 -0.1896 -2.3565 0.0006 ***
30 -0.2079 -2.4460 0.0002 * * ★
33 -0.2049 -2.0814 0.0017 ***
36 -0.1786 -1.8383 0.5091
N = 9 5
In Table 5.4, the mean BHARs are negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level after approximately 18 months relative to the announcement date. The mean 
BHAR in Table 5.4 is as low as -  20.8% around Month +30.
We can see a conflict of results between those based on the ‘5Y Non-overlapping 
Sample’ and those based on the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’. In Figure A5.2, the 
pink and the light blue curves are below zero for most of the periods while the blue 
and the yellow curves are persistently positive for a long period. The difference 
between the results based on the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ and those based on 
the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ are statistically significant at the 10% level over 
some periods. All sample1 acquirers of the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ are also in 
the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’. The rest of the sample acquirers in the *3Y Non­
overlapping Sample’ are similarly infrequent acquirers, however, they show some
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more desire for corporate expansions three years after the M&A announcement. This 
suggests that in long run event studies one should be careful in sampling methods and 
cautious in interpreting results.
Now I discuss cross-border acquisitions for the UK sample. Based on the ‘5Y Non­
overlapping Sample’, UK cross-border bidders mainly experienced negative share 
price performance within 5 years relative to the announcement, as shown in Figure 
A5.3. The magnitude of the negative BHARs is up to approximately -70% in both the 
CF and the CP model cases, as shown in Table A5.1. However, the bootstrapped 
skewness-adjusted t-statistics indicate that the BHARs are not statistically significant. 
Given the small sample size (n=17) for the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’, the results 
based on the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ may be more convincing.3 The ‘3Y Non­
overlapping Sample’ shows less negative BHARs (Table A5.1) than the ‘5Y Non­
overlapping Sample’, and these are also not statistically significant up to 3 years after 
the announcement date. The results based on the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ are, 
however, suggestive that there could be substantial negative abnormal returns over a 
longer 5-year holding period.
Now I discuss the overall results for the entire UK sample. In Figure A5.4 we can see 
that the sets of results are very similar to each other for the overall UK sample. Based 
on ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample \  there is strong evidence showing negative and 
statistically significant BHARs for the entire sample, irrespective of using the CF or 
the CP model. Only a few BHARs surrounding Month +48 are not statistically 
significant in Table A5.1.
Results based on the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample ’ provide even stronger evidence of 
negative BHARs in the long run. Table 5.5 below reports the detailed BHARs based 
on the CF model and the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ as an example for the entire 
UK sample.
3 In Section 5.4, it is shown that these mean BHARs obtained from the ‘5Y Non-overlapping 
Sample’ become less negative when based on the industry-adjusted benchmark.
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Table 5.5 BHARs o f  UK acquirers o f  the entire sample
se Months Mean BHAR B. t-stat B. P-value Sig.
3 -0.0068 -0.6391 0.0627 *
6 -0.0149 -0.7273 0.0773 *
9 -0.0305 -1.1335 0.0011 A1**
12 -0.0579 -1.7553 0.0000 ***
15 -0.0572 -1.5201 0.0001 ***
18 -0.0601 -1.1846 0.0061 ***
21 -0.1036 -2.0289 0.0000 ***
24 -0.1352 -2.4714 0.0000 ***
27 -0.1539 -2.8329 0.0000 ***
30 -0.1531 -2.7100 0.0000 *★*
33 -0.1437 -2.3392 0.0000 ***
36 -0.1004 -1.5239 0.0196 **
N = 2 0 8
In Table 5.5, the mean BHARs are in general statistically significant at the 1% level 
and can be as low as -15.4% around Month +27. The results based on the CP model 
and the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ (Table A5.1) are similar to those in Table 5.4.
Conclusion: the results for UK acquirers can be summarised as in Table 5.6 below:
Table 5.6 Long run share price performance of the UK sample
5Y Non-overlapping Sample 3 Y Non-overlapping Sample
Domestic 
Acquirers of 
Public Targets
Negative but statistically 
insignificant BHARs
Strong evidence of negative and 
statistically significant BHARs
Domestic 
Acquirers of 
Private Targets
Generally statistically 
insignificant BHARs, but 
some evidence of positive 
and statistically significant 
BHARs for the 1st post­
acquisition year
Strong evidence of negative and 
statistically significant BHARs
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Cross-border
acquirers
Negative but statistically 
insignificant BHARs
Insignificant BHARs
Entire sample Strong evidence of negative 
and statistically significant 
BHARs
Strong evidence of negative and 
statistically significant BHARs
From Table 5.6 I can make the following points: 1) Overall, there is some strong 
evidence that bidders underperform in the long run. The results are more in line with 
e.g. Gregory (1997) who found negative and statistically significant long run 
abnormal returns for UK domestic bidders in the period 1984-1992. In contrast, they 
differ from e.g. Higson and Elliot (1998) who reported long run abnormal returns on 
average insignificant for UK domestic bidders in the period 1975-1990. In my results, 
there is strong evidence of negative and statistically significant BHARs based on 
either the 5Y or 3Y non-overlapping sample in the long run for the entire sample. 
Also, in the case of the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ UK domestic acquirers 
(acquiring public targets) experience negative wealth effects in the long run; 2) 
Although bidders in UK market experience (mainly) insignificant abnormal returns in 
the short run as discussed in Chapter 4 (<Short-run Excess Returns), they appear to 
experience negative and statistically significant abnormal returns in the long run. The 
results on balance suggest that ‘hubris’ or ‘managerial motives’ may be dominant 
factors in driving domestic M&As in UK markets from a longer term point of view; 3) 
the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ seems to provide opposite patterns of BHARs for 
acquirers of private targets compared with the results based on the ‘5Y Non­
overlapping Sample’. This suggests that sample selection can be an important issue in 
long run studies. Nevertheless, on balance the evidence suggests that acquirers do 
performance poorly in the long run relative to both the CF and CP models.
5.3.2 Long Run Share Price Performance of French and German Acquirers
Table A5.2 in the appendix shows the results of the French non-overlapping samples. 
At a quick glance at Table A5.2, we can see that although most of the mean BHARs 
are negative, they are not statistically significant except in one case. Based on the ‘3Y
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Non-overlapping Sample’, the mean BHAR at one year after the announcement date 
for the entire French sample firms is -12.6% and statistically significant at the 1% 
level.
Figure A5.5 in the appendix presents the movement of the mean BHARs for the 
French domestic sample. It shows that the abnormal returns based on the ‘3Y Non- 
Overlapping Sample’ (the pink curve and the light blue curve) are generally higher 
than those based on the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ (the blue and the yellow curve). 
But the F test indicates that the differences are not statistically significant for most of 
the periods (p-values around 0.2).
Table A5.3 in the appendix shows the results of the German non-overlapping samples. 
The results based on the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ and the CF model indicate 
that German domestic acquirers on average are underperformers, and this is supported 
in most of cases by the CP model and/or the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’. However, 
only results for the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ and the CF model are statistically 
significant. Based on the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ and the CF model, the mean 
BHAR for German domestic acquirers is as low as -28.3% two years after the 
announcement date, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. On the other 
hand, there is no statistically significant evidence of abnormal share price 
performance for German cross-border acquirers, irrespective of the sampling methods 
and/or the benchmarks used.
Based on the CF model, the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ indicates that the entire 
German sample firms (domestic + cross-border) experienced negative BHARs in the 
long term post-acquisition period, which are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
There is also statistically significant evidence of under-performance in the first year 
using the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ and the CF model. The CP model does not 
generate statistically significant results based on either sample.
Also, based on Figures A5.8-A5.10, we can see a tendency for recovery of BHARs in 
the five year data for the German samples. For the entire German sample, the average 
BHAR over a one year horizon based on the CF model is -15.0% and statistically 
significant at the 10% level, whereas it is +12.3% (but insignificant) over a five year
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horizon. There is some tentative (but insignificant) evidence that the profitability of 
German firms recovers after two years.
Conclusion: The results for the French and German samples can be summarized as 
Table 5.7 below:
Table 5.7 Long run share price performance of the French and German samples
French Acquirers German Acquirers
Domestic Acquirers Insignificant BHARs
Negative and statistically 
significant but dependent 
on model used
Cross-border Acquirers Insignificant BHARs Insignificant BHARs
Entire Sample
Insignificant BHARs, 
except in one case
Negative and statistically 
significant for three years, 
dependent on model used
Table 5.7 suggests that: 1) there is no real (or at least statistically significant) evidence 
that acquirers under or over-perform in the long run for the French acquisition 
markets (except in one case); 2) the results for the German acquisition market are 
dependent on the model used. In general the CF model generates statistically stronger 
results than the CP model for German domestic acquirers. Based on the CF model, the 
average BHARs for German domestic acquirers are negative and statistically 
significant in the long run; 3) finally, there is no evidence of statistically significant 
abnormal share price performance in the long run German cross-border acquirers.
The results suggest that, unlike the UK results, the ‘hubris’ or ‘managerial factors’ 
may not be such dominant factors for M&A activities of bidders in French markets or 
for German markets dependent on the model used. This conclusion should be seen as 
tentative, however, at this stage.
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5.3.3 Long Run Share Price Performance of the Entire Sample
Table A5.4 in the appendix reports the mean BHARs for the entire non-overlapping 
sample, including all non-overlapping sample firms (not acquiring private targets) of 
the UK, France and Germany. All mean BHARs shown in Table A5.4 are negative 
and many are statistically significant.
In Table A5.4 we see strong evidence that overall domestic acquirers in the three 
countries experience negative and statistically significant BHARs in the long run. 
This conclusion holds up for any combination of the sampling methods and 
benchmarks used. The mean BHAR can be as low as -22.2% if the results are based 
on the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ and the CF model, and this is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.
The evidence for overall cross-border acquirers in the three countries is inconclusive. 
Based on the CF model, the results obtained from the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ 
are consistently negative but are only statistically significant at the 1% level after 
three years, whereas the results from the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ are negative 
but only statistically significant around the 1st year after the announcement date. The 
CP model generates weaker results than the CF model in most of cases.
Combining domestic acquirers and cross-border acquirers together, there is strong 
evidence of underperformance for almost all periods in the table (Table A5.4). The 
mean BHAR can be as low as -27.1% if the results are based on the ‘5Y Non­
overlapping Sample’ and the CF model, and this is significant at the 1% level. There 
is some evidence of improvement in performance after three years for domestic 
M&As and for all M&As (Table A5.4).
In conclusion, the results show evidence that overall M&As for the selected EU M&A 
markets as a whole are not profitable in the long run. The evidence is stronger in 
domestic bids as discussed above.
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Section 5.4 Alternative Approach to Detect BHARs
This section employs an alternative approach to calculate the mean BHARs for the 
long-run post-acquisition share price performance of acquirers. The basic idea is to 
adjust the mean BHARs for industry effects. For convenience I call it the industry- 
adjusted approach. I focus on the UK sample as the sample size is bigger than the 
French/German samples and given the large data collection exercise required in 
conducting these tests.
Different industry sectors are often associated with different characteristics such as 
risk ratings. For example4, in the US the aircraft, communication equipment and steel 
industry sectors are often considered as much riskier than some other industry sectors 
e.g. drugs and insurance. On the hand, different industry sectors may be linked with 
different growth opportunities. For example, the tobacco and aircraft sectors are often 
considered as low growth and high risk in the US, whereas the medical services, drug 
manufacturing, and educational services are often considered as high growth and low 
risk. These factors suggest that it may provide improved results for long run event 
studies to adjust the reference firms (which are used as the benchmark for the 
expected returns of the sample firms) with the industry sector effect, because it offers 
more similarities between the characteristics of the sample and reference firms.
To adjust the results with industry effects, first of all I group all firms in the markets 
by industry. The ‘I/B/E/S industry classification system’ of the DataStream is used. 
The ‘I/E/B/S industry classification’ is shown as Table 5.8 below:
Table 5.8 I/B/E/S industrial classifications
Sector I/B/E/S Sector mnemonic Sector description
Code appearing in
datatype
1 FINANCE Finance
2 HEALTH Health
4 Source: www.globalinsight.com
165
3 CONSNO Consumer non-durables
4 CONSSVC Consumer services
5 CONSDUR Consumer durables
6 ENERGY Energy
7 TRANSP Transportation
8 TECHNOL Technology
9 BASIC Basic industries
10 CAPITAL Capital goods
11 UTILITY Public utilities
99 UNDESIGN Unclassified
Secondly, I label each sample firm with an I/B/E/S code according to its industry. For 
example, a financial firm will have an industry code ‘one’ as in the table above. Then 
I identify all non-event firms with the same industry code as the candidate reference 
firms.
Thirdly, from those identified candidate reference firms, I select all firms with a 
market value (MV) of equity between 70% to 130% of the market value of equity of 
the sample firm as the candidate reference firms. In the original BHARs approach, the 
candidate reference firms are partitioned into several equal sized portfolios based on 
the MVs. Because the candidate reference firms are filtered by 12 industries, on 
average the number of candidate reference firms is only 1/12 of the number of 
candidate reference firms without the industry filter. I adopt the (70%, 130%) 
approach to increase the chance of finding a control firm with similar characteristics. 
The restriction is relaxed (e.g. from 50% to 150%) for a few sample firms in cases 
where I could not find enough candidate reference firms.
Finally, within the surviving candidate reference firms, I choose the firm with the
/
market-to-book-value (MTBV) closest to that of the sample firm as the control firm. 
Then the BHARs are calculated as the difference between the sample firm’s share 
return and the control firm’s share return each month.
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Table A5.5 in the appendix shows the results of the industry-adjusted approach for the 
UK sample. The results are divided into two parts: one is based on the ‘5Y Non­
overlapping Sample’ and the other is based on the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’. 
Figures A5.14 to A5.17 in the appendix compare the results based on the industry- 
adjusted approach with those based of the original CF model.
By examining Table A5.5 and the associated figures, I  can make the following points’.
1. The results of Table A5.5 which are based on the industry-adjusted CF model 
can serve as a robustness check to the results based on the original CF model. 
They show that, despite only a few variations, the results based on the 
industry-adjusted CF model are essentially similar to those based on the 
original CF model in Section 5.3. Take the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ as 
an example. Based on the industry-adjusted CF model, the long run BHARs 
for domestic acquirers (either acquiring public or private targets) are negative 
and strongly statistically significant at least for the 2nd year after the 
announcement date. The share price performance of the entire sample is also 
negative and strongly statistically significant after the 1st year relative to the 
announcement date. These results are similar to those in Table A5.1.
2. The results based the industry-adjusted CF model present a revised scale of the 
long-run share price performance, although it does not fundamentally change 
the conclusions. For exartiple, in Table A5.1 the mean BHARs for UK cross- 
border acquirers based on the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ are as low as 
approximately -70% and statistically insignificant. The results in Table A5.5 
show a revised amount of up to around -30% and statistically insignificant. 
Thus, in Figure A5.16, the yellow curve is less negative than the blue curve.
3. The adjustment for industry effects reduces the sources of the differences 
between the results of the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ and ‘3Y Non­
overlapping Sample’. I find that based on the industry-adjusted CF model, the 
differences between the mean BHARs of the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ 
and the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’ are smaller than those based on the 
original CF model. This is applicable for all Figures A5.14 to A5.17. For
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example, in Figure A5.15, the gap between the yellow curve and the light blue 
curve is smaller than that between the blue curve and the pink curve. In brief, 
to adjust the results with industry effects reduces the variations in BHARs.
Section 5.5 Long Run Share Price Performance of the Overlapping Sample
As noted in Section 5.2, although the pursuit of non-overlapping samples eliminates 
sample contamination and reduces the statistical biases caused by cross-sectional 
dependence in share abnormal returns, it is also important to evaluate whether and to 
what extent purging overlapping bidders has any impact on the results. When I purge 
the sample firms with the overlapping returns, I am forced to give up sample size 
because some bidders (especially some bidders with large MVs) are very frequently 
involved in M&A activities and they have to be left out of the non-overlapping 
samples. When the calendar time approach is employed, however, all bidders in the 
relevant calendar time periods are involved in the calculation, therefore it can serve 
the purpose of both a robustness check of the results based on the non-overlapping 
samples and an assessment of the impact of purging overlapping sample firms. This is 
important if the overlapping sample firms on average perform significantly differently 
from the non-overlapping sample firms. In this case, the detected abnormal returns 
based on the non-overlapping sample could be misleading about the overall 
performance of firms after M&A. Different performance could occur if ‘overlapping’ 
is a sign of experience in handling M&As and if experience is positively correlated 
with the post-M&A share price performance. Similarly, ‘overlapping’ could be linked 
to the bidding firm’s ambition, the speed of expansion, etc., which could have an 
impact on the long run share price performance.
To employ the calendar month approach, I use the equally-weighted formula:
  nt
A R i=  Y j a r "
i=1
as I have discussed in Section 5.2, where n represents the number of event firms at 
time t. In the study of this section I define the event period of interest to be 5 years 
and the examined period is 1995-1999 (see below). Also I require that there must be
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at least five event firms in each month5.1 selected Year 1995 to the end of Year 1999 
as the calendar period to examine because this period represents a high level of M & A  
activity in the volume of M & A  cases (and in the total value of the M & A  activity). 
This helps to fulfil the requirement of at least five event firms in each calendar month. 
Then in each calendar month t of 1995-1999, n represents how many firms have 
events within the last 5 years and ARjt represents the abnormal return for security i at
month t. Therefore A R t is the mean abnormal return at the calendar month t. For the 
whole period of 1995-1999, the mean abnormal return is
—  1 --------------
A R  =  - Y  A R t
as I have mentioned in Section 5.2, where T is the number of calendar months of the 
whole period.
As an example, In the case of my study in this section, a mean abnormal return of 
0.001 based on the calendar time approach translates to a compounded 5 year holding 
abnormal return of approximately 6.18%. However, as I have mentioned, the mean 
abnormal return based on the calendar time approach must be treated with care. For 
one thing, a mean abnormal return based on the calendar time approach only tracks 
portfolio performance; for another, a mean abnormal return based on the calendar 
time approach cannot be translated into a holding return because the number of event 
firms included in the calendar time portfolio keeps changing in every month. In brief, 
it does not straightforwardly measure investors’ experience.
To compare the results between the overlapping and the non-overlapping samples, I 
also calculate the performance of the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ using the same 
CTFF model as I have discussed in Section 5.2. Table A5.6 in the appendix presents 
the results of the overlapping sample and the non-overlapping sample for the UK, 
France and Germany in turn.
5 Namely, n>5 in the formula A R t = ^ ^ A R n . The requirement o f  ‘5 firms’ worked well in
M
my research and generally there were 5 or more in each month. For the UK overlapping 
sample, there can be tens o f  event firms for each month over the period 1995-1999.
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At first I discuss the results for the UK sample.
The non-overlapping domestic bidding firms perform poorly with a mean abnormal 
return = -0.77% (significant at the 5% level) in Table A5.6 over the period 1995 to 
1999. In contrast, the overlapping domestic acquirers’ mean abnormal return is only 
-0.05% over the same period and is statistically insignificant.
The non-overlapping acquirers of private target firms experience negative but 
statistically insignificant average abnormal returns. The overlapping acquirers of 
private target firms experience positive mean abnormal returns equal to +0.74% but 
this is still not statistically significant.
Non-overlapping cross-border acquirers experience negative mean abnormal returns 
equal to -0.68%, with t=-1.54 (insignificant). The overlapping acquirers of cross- 
border target firms experience positive but again not statistically significant mean 
abnormal returns.
The last row of Table A5.6 puts all bidding firms together. Overall the UK non­
overlapping sample experiences negative mean abnormal return equal to -0.77%, 
which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The entire UK overlapping sample 
produces small positive mean abnormal return which is not statistically significant.
By examining the UK results, we find that the mean abnormal returns of the non­
overlapping samples are all negative and uniformly smaller than those of the 
overlapping samples. On the other hand, the mean abnormal returns of the 
overlapping samples are generally positive but not enough to be statistically 
significant.
To examine the robustness of thd UK results in Table A5.6,1 also employ the CTCP 
model (calendar time control portfolio) to calculate the mean abnormal returns for the 
UK acquirers.6 The results are in Table 5.9 below. The numbers in the brackets are t- 
statistics.
6 Due to data limitations, this approach is not performed for the French and German samples.
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5.9 Post-M&A share price performance based on the CTCP model
UK Samples Domestic Private Cross-border All
Non­
overlapping
-0.00773***
( - 2 . 8 6 7 2 )
-0.00289
( - 0 . 7 1 3 6 )
-0.0003
( - 0 . 0 7 4 2 )
-0.00348
( - 1 . 5 4 5 9 )
Overlapping -0.00321
( - 0 . 6 2 9 4 )
0.008786***
( 2 . 6 8 6 1 )
0.002973
( 0 . 9 2 5 7 )
0.003253
( 1 . 1 0 6 1 )
Difference7 0.004526
( 0 . 8 2 8 5 )
0.011676**
( 2 . 5 0 5 7 )
0.003269
( 0 . 6 4 0 9 )
0.006729*
( 1 . 9 0 0 2 )
Table 5.9 again shows that the mean abnormal returns of the UK overlapping samples 
are uniformly higher than those of the UK non-overlapping samples. The mean 
abnormal returns for all UK non-overlapping sub-samples are all negative and for the 
‘Domestic’ non-overlapping sub-sample are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
On the other hand, most of the mean abnormal returns for the UK overlapping sub­
samples are positive in the table and for the ‘Private’ overlapping sub-sample are 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. We can see the results in Table 
5.9 are consistent with those in Table A5.6, except the evidence for the ‘Private’ 
overlapping sub-sample is statistically stronger.
Table 5.9 also shows that, for the ‘Private’ sub-sample, the difference between the 
overlapping and non-overlapping^ groups is 1.68% and statistically significant at the 
5% level. For the ‘All’ sample, the difference between two groups is 0.67% and 
statistically significant at the 10% level.
The results discussed above suggest that: 1) the results for the UK non-overlapping 
samples based on the calendar time approach are generally in line with those results in
Section 5.3 (which are based on the CF/CP models). In Table A5.6, the mean)
abnormal returns for both UK domestic non-overlapping bidders of public targets and 
for the entire UK non-overlapping sample are negative and statistically significant. 
These results echo the earlier conclusion that ‘hubris’ or managerial motives may be 
important factors for non-overlapping bidders in the UK M&A markets; 2) it has been
7 Difference=0verlapping-Non-overlapping
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shown that generally the overlapping sub-samples outperform the non-overlapping 
samples. In a few cases, the differences of the average abnormal returns between two 
types of samples are statistically significant. This suggests that experienced and 
frequent UK acquirers perform much better than less experienced UK acquirers. This 
suggests that factors such as M&A experience may play a positive role in long run 
share price performance for UK bidders.
Turning to the French and German samples.
o
In Table A5.6 the French results are not very different between the overlapping 
group and the non-overlapping group. All mean abnormal returns are small and not 
statistically significant.
The results for the Germany sample, however, are more clear-cut. The non­
overlapping German domestic bidding firms experience insignificant post-acquisition 
share price performance, while the overlapping German domestic bidding firms have 
a negative mean abnormal return of -1.86%, which is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The last section of Table A5.6 shows the mean abnormal returns for the entire 
non-overlapping sample and the entire overlapping sample. The mean abnormal 
return of the entire non-overlapping sample is -0.35% and not statistically significant. 
The mean abnormal return of the entire overlapping sample is -1.80%, which is 
significant at the 1% level. It indicates that ‘overlapping’ contributes negatively to the 
post-acquisition share price performance of German acquirers.
The results for the French and German samples suggest that: 1) the results of non­
overlapping samples for the French and German markets are on balance in line with 
the results of Section 5.2. The French and German non-overlapping acquirers in 
general have insignificant average abnormal returns; 2) the results provide evidence 
that German overlapping acquirers perform relatively poorly, especially for domestic 
acquirers. This once again shows the importance of examining overlapping sample 
firms. However, the results contrast with the UK ones in which overlapping acquirers
g
Unfortunately, there is insufficient data to make a comparison between non-overlapping and 
overlapping acquirers in some cases. I label them w ithN /A  in Table A5.6.
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generally outperform non-overlapping acquirers. Surprisingly, in the German sample, 
more frequent acquirers appear to do less well than less frequent acquirers.
Section 5.6 High MY Bidding Firms versus Low MV Bidding Firms
Many studies on long term share price performance examine the impact of MTBV on 
long-run abnormal returns by partitioning their sample firms into different MTBV 
groups. However, very few studies have examined the impact of bidding firm’ size 
(MV) on long term share performance. Therefore, this section pays attention to the 
impact of MV on long term share price performance.9
The impact of MV could be either positively or negatively related to share price 
performance. As a bigger bidder, the power of the agents may also be bigger, which 
makes monitoring more difficult and costly. Also, a bigger bidder may have less focus 
on the acquired firms. If these are true, we may see that lower average abnormal 
returns are associated with bigger bidders e.g. because of higher agency costs (or 
greater ‘hubris’). On the other hand, a bigger bidder could also have more bargaining 
power in the acquisition process, more flexibility in financing the acquisition deal, 
and more adaptability and experience in absorbing target firms. If these are true, we 
may find that higher average abnormal returns are associated with bigger bidders 
because of lower premiums paid to targets and/or higher management skills. 
Therefore, by the analyses above we see mixed consequences, which make it 
important to examine the actual impact of MV on share price performance.
To actually examine the impact of MV on share price performance, I partition the 
parent sample into two sub-samples: one with ‘bigger’ MVs and another with 
‘smaller’ MVs. First, for each market (the UK, France and Germany), I partition all 
listed firms in that market into ten equal sized groups according to the rankings of the 
MVs of firms. Therefore, firms in Groups 1-5 have MVs bigger than the median MV 
of all listed firms. Also, firms in Groups 6-10 have MVs smaller than the median MV 
of all listed firms in that market. Second, for each sample firm at Month -1 of the
9 The impact o f MTBV on long term share price performance is studied in the next chapter.
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announcement, I define it as a firm with ‘bigger’ MV if it belongs to Groups 1-5 
ranked by the sample firm’s MV. In contrast, I define a sample firm as a firm with 
‘smaller’ MV if it belongs to Groups 6-10. For most of the experiments in this section, 
the approach above will divide the parent samples to roughly two equal-sized sub­
samples, namely one with ‘bigger’ MVs and another with ‘smaller’ MVs.10
One has to be very careful in dealing with MVs in studies of long-run share abnormal 
returns because sometimes asset pricing models cannot properly value average returns 
of portfolios formed from firms with very large or very small MVs. The issue is 
complex but as suggested by Lyon et al. (1999), the CF model (or the CP model with 
boot-strapped skewness-adjusted t-statistics) is more appropriate than other models 
when the scale of MV is the concern of the study. The experiments below are based 
on the CF model. The results based on the CP model are similar and not reported. To 
test the impact of MV I regress BHARs on MV dummies as below:
BHAR' = Intercept' + p' MV Dummy' + s '
where
BHAR' = the BHAR of firm i at month t relative to the announcement month
‘MV Dummy’ = 1 if, at month -1 relative to the announcement month, firm i has 
‘bigger’ MV; otherwise MV Dummy = 0.
Tables A5.7 to A5.9 in the appendix present the results for the UK, France and 
Germany in turn. Almost no intercept term is statistically significant in the tests, 
therefore in the tables only the coefficients of the MV dummy are reported. The ‘3Y 
Non-overlapping Sample’ shows very similar results to the ‘5Y Non-overlapping 
Sample’ for the first three years. Therefore in Tables A5.7 to A5.9 I report the results 
based on the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’ only, as it has the advantage of examining 
the 4th and 5th years’ performance.
10 Cross-border bidders often have big MVs. Therefore in a few  cases, I define a cross-border 
sample as a firm with ‘bigger’ M V if it belongs to Groups 1-3, and as a firm with ‘smaller’ 
MV if  it belong to Groups 4-10. This aim is to partition the parent sample into two roughly 
equal-sized sub-samples.
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In Tables A5.7 'there is some evidence that larger UK domestic acquirers of public 
targets are underperformers over the (+21M, +48M) period, compared with small UK 
domestic acquirers of public targets. The MV dummies are not statistically significant 
for UK domestic acquirers of private targets and UK cross-border acquirers (except 
one case). There is also some evidence that larger German cross-border acquirers 
perform better than relatively small ones over the (+33M, +60M) period as in Table 
A5.9. German domestic acquirers (Table A5.9) and all French acquirers (Table A5.8) 
are not very sensitive to MV effects.
I also make a closer examination on how exactly UK domestic acquirers of public 
targets and German cross-border acquirers perform in the long run.11 The results are 
presented by Figures A5.18 to A5.19 in the appendix.
Figure A5.18 in the appendix shows the mean BHARs in the long run for UK 
domestic acquirers of public targets. It shows that ‘smaller’ UK domestic acquirers of 
public targets experience about ‘zero’ performance in the long run, while large ones 
experience negative share price abnormal performance although this is only 
statistically significant at the 10% level around the 3rd and 4th year after the 
announcement date. The results based on the industry-adjusted benchmark of Section 
5.4 are similar (not reported), except the mean BHARs for smaller acquirers are less 
negative around the 3rd and 4th year than those BHARs based on the original 
MV/MTBV benchmark.
Figure A5.19 in the appendix presents the BHARs for German cross-border acquirers. 
It shows that German cross-border acquirers with ‘bigger’ MVs on average 
experience large positive abnormal share price performance after two years. On the 
other hand, German cross-border acquirers with ‘smaller’ MVs on average have 
negative wealth effects of up to -0.2.
In summary, by analysing all the results presented in this section, I  can make the 
following points’. 1) I find that the scale of bidding firms’ MVs before the 
announcement has impacts on long run share price performance. It is mainly
11 Because the MV only has impacts on these two groups, according to Tables A5.7 to A5.9.
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supported by UK domestic acquisitions of publicly-listed targets and German cross- 
border bidding firms. For UK domestic acquisitions of publicly-listed targets, 
‘smaller’ ones are better performers. This could be a result of the sharper focus given 
by relatively smaller acquirers to the combined firm. This also could be a result of 
higher agency costs associated with ‘larger’ bidders because it is more difficult to 
monitor managers of bigger firms. Later in Chapter 6, the impact of MV on share 
price performance will be further examined for the UK market using multi-factor 
regression models; 2) for German cross-border bidding firms, ‘smaller’ firms are 
underperformers however. ‘Bigger’ German cross-border bidders are more likely to 
perform well. This could indicate that there is less ‘hubris’ or ‘agency costs’ for 
‘bigger’ German cross-border bidders in contrast with the UK results above. This also 
could be the results of higher financial and bargaining power (or better management 
skills) associated with ‘bigger’ acquiring firms.
Section 5.7 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the long run share performance of bidding firms after 
M&As for the UK, France and Germany. This chapter has focused on the following 
issues: 1) it has performed a full examination of the long run wealth effects of bidding 
firms of both domestic and cross-border M&As. It has also examined the long run 
wealth effects of domestic acquirers of private targets for the UK markets; 2) it has 
employed a variety of methodologies which are robust to some recent criticisms of 
long run event studies; 3) it has particularly examined the wealth effects of 
overlapping bidders for all three countries, in response to the possible concerns that 
the sample size loss of pursuing non-overlapping samples and whether the share price 
performance is different between non-overlapping and overlapping samples; 4) it has 
particularly examined the impacts of MV on the long run share price performance for 
all three markets. The earlier studies on the third and fourth issues have been limited.
The results in this chapter show that there is some strong evidence that UK domestic 
bidders acquiring listed targets do underperform in the long run. This finding holds 
irrespective of which model (the CF/CP model and/or the calendar time approach) is 
used. This suggests that ‘hubris’ or ‘managerial motives’ are important factors in
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driving M&As in the domestic markets for the UK. On the other hand, it appears that 
the France non-overlapping sample firms are less likely to be motivated by ‘hubris’ or 
managerial reasons. There is little evidence of statistically significant long run 
BHARs for the France sample. The results for the German sample depend on the 
model used. There is some evidence that German non-overlapping domestic acquirers 
have statistically underperformed in the long run if the results are based on the CF 
model.
Also, the chapter reveals that profitability based on the non-overlapping sample could 
be an incomplete description of the performance of all acquirers. This is mainly 
shown in the UK sample where the mean abnormal returns of the overlapping sample 
are higher than those of the non-overlapping sample. Surprisingly, it is also observed 
in the German domestic sample that more frequent acquirers appear to do less well 
than their non-overlapping counterpart. These results suggest that factors such as 
experience of acquisitions, managers’ ambition and/or their corporate control strategy 
(e.g. aggressive or not aggressive) could play a role in explaining variations of post­
acquisition share price performance. However, because the calendar time approach 
used in this part of the study does not straightforwardly measure investors’ experience, 
we need to treat the results with care.
Finally, the chapter also shows that the scale of the bidding firms’ MVs before the 
announcement has an impact on the long run share performance in some cases. This is 
supported by UK domestic acquirers of public targets as well as German cross-border 
sample firms. For the former (the UK case), ‘smaller’ acquirers on average 
outperform ‘bigger’ acquirers. This could be a result of high agency costs associated 
with ‘bigger’ acquirers because managers of ‘bigger’ acquirers are more powerful and 
difficult to monitor. For the latter (the German case), ‘smaller’ acquirers under- 
perform ‘bigger’ acquirers. This suggests that there is less ‘hubris’ or managerial 
motives associated with ‘bigger’ German cross-border firms, in contrast to the UK 
case. This also could be the result of higher financial and bargaining power (or better 
management skills) associated with ‘bigger’ cross-border acquiring firms in Germany.
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Appendix: Chapter 5
Table A5.1
Mean BHARs of the UK sample, based on the "5Y Non-overlapping Sample"
Model-> CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR C. t-stat
c. P- e . 
value l®‘
B. t-stat
B.
Empirical Sig. 
P-value
BHAR C. t-stat c. P-value l^ ' B. t-stat
B.
Empirical Sig. 
P-value
1 year -0.141906 -2.053 0.052 -2.224 0.122 -0.049985 -0.645 0.525 -0.582 0.638
2 year -0.185997 -1.572 0.130 -1.574 0.180 -0.143670 -1.117 0.275 -1.037 0.943
Domestic
3 year -0.243788 -1.441 0.163 -1.382 0.539 -0.146839 -0.829 0.415 -0.777 0.878
4 year -0.440885 -1.821 0.082 * -1.917 0.195 -0.210177 -1.005 0.326 -0.977 0.870
5 year -0.104888 -0.547 0.590 -0.509 0.904 -0.016551 -0.096 0.925 -0.084 0.870
n=24
1 year 0.070597 0.900 0.375 0.942 0.249 0.138961 1.902 0.066 * 2.041 0.023 **
2 year 0.058236 0.453 0.653 0.481 0.495 0.028497 0.218 0.829 0.2401 0.5969
Private 3 year 0.095683 0.625 0.536 0.675 0.231 0.014484 0.095 0.925 0.123 0.456
4 year -0.003612 -0.012 0.990 0.037 0.426 -0.079145 -0.306 0.762 -0.224 0.320
5 year -0.157278 -0.841 0.406 -0.892 0.208 -0.255667 -1.512 0.140 -1.481 0.117
n=34
Model—> CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR C. t-stat
c. P- 
value
Sig. B. t-stat
B.
Empirical
P-value
Sig. BHAR C. t-stat c. P- value Sig. B. t-stat
B.
Empirical
P-value
Sig.
1 year -0.128777 -0.927 0.368 -0.860 0.976 -0.067273 -0.609 0.551 -0.583 0.885
2 year -0.395676 -1.807 0.090 * -1.789 0.680 -0.237970 -1.829 0.086 * -1.578 0.622
Cross-
border 3 year -0.707441 -2.862 0.011 ** -3.096 0.127 -0.528831 -2.865 0.011 * * -1.690 0.226
4 year -0.646239 -2.229 0.041 ** -2.148 0.660 -0.643112 -2.888 0.011 ** -2.128 0.739
5 year -0.701736 -1.742 0.101 -1.931 0.371 -0.673523 -2.304 0.035 i r k -1.494 0.707
n=17 - -
1 year -0.042595 -0.804 0.424 -0.782 0.283 0.031752 0.648 0.519 0.670 0.433
2 year -0.122805 -1.415 0.161 -1.390 0.104 -0.086996 -1.114 0.269 -1.056 0.100 *
ALL 3 year -0.194989 -1.787 0.078 * -1.752 0.041 ** -0.160291 -1.599 0.114 -1.483 0.042 ir k
4 year -0.289201 -1.733 0.087 * -1.546 0.695 -0.248908 -1.719 0.090 k -1.425 0.818
5 year -0.263924 -1.893 0.062 * -2.021 0.005 *** -0.273864 -2.337 0.022 i r k -2.196 0.009 k i r k
n=75 -
by ***, ** and *, respectively.
"C. t-stat"= Conventional t-statistics; "C. P-value" = P-value associa ted  with the conventional t-statistics; "Sig" = significance level; "B. t-stat" = bootstrapped skew ness- 
adjusted t-statistics; "B. Empirical P-value"= P-value associa ted  with the  empirical distribution of t-statistic from bootstrapped resam ples.
Table A5.1 -Continued.
Mean BHARs of the UK sample, Based on the "3Y Non-overlapping Sample"
Moc el-> CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover
BHAR C. t-stat ^P - Sjg
B.
B. t-stat Empirical Sig. 
P-value
BHAR C. t-stat £ £  Sig.
B.
B. t-stat Empirical Sig. 
P-value
Domestic
1 year
2 year
3 year
n=62
-0.110445 -1.800 0.077 * 
-0.195468 -2.397 0.020 ** 
0.024093 0.220 0.826
-1.810 0.096 * 
-2.598 0.001 *** 
0.228 0.833
-0.053639 -1.046 0.300 
-0.113076 -1.538 0.129 
0.004151 0.040 0.968
-0.987 0.718 
-1.539 0.015 ** 
0.055 0.476
Private
1 year
2 year
3 year
n=95
-0.053488 -1.097 0.275 
-0.140795 -1.819 0.072 * 
-0.178606 -1.954 0.054 *
-1.112 0.078 * 
-1.740 0.002 *** 
-1.838 0.509
-0.073099 -1.539 0.127 
-0.150770 -2.167 0.033 ** 
-0.174135 -1.993 0.049 **
-1.507 0.021 ** 
-2.034 0.001 *** 
-1.864 0.280
Cross-
border
1 year
2 year
3 year
n=51
-0.002194 -0.033 0.974 
-0.051779 -0.442 0.661 
-0.111764 -0.774 0.442
-0.028 0.794 
-0.375 0.802 
-0.717 0.932
0.010487 0.168 0.868 
-0.042512 -0.394 0.695 
-0.144590 -1.179 0.244
0.176 0.676 
-0.324 0.657 
-1.057 0.781
Model—>• CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR
C. t-stat
C. P- 
value
Sig. B. t-stat
B.
Empirical
P-value
Sig. BHAR C. t-stat c. P- value Sig. B. t-stat
B.
Empirical
P-value
Sig.
1 year -0.057889 -1.748 0.082 * -1.755 0.000 * * * -0.046804 -1.529 0.128 -1.499 0.000 * * *
2 year -0.135266 -2.626 0.009 * * * -2.471 0.000 *** -0.112990 -2.422 0.016 ** -2.244 0.000 ***
ALL 3 year 
n=208
-0.100407 -1.578 0.116 -1.524 0.020 ** -0.112519 -1.921 0.056 * -1.830 0.002 * * *
Figures shown are the BHARs for 1- to 5-year post acquisition periods together with the  significance level. Significant observations a t the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are  shown 
by ***, ** and *, respectively.
"C. t-stat"= Conventional t-statistics; "C. P-value" = P-value associa ted  with the conventional t-statistics; "Sig" = significance level; "B. t-stat" = bootstrapped skew ness- 
adjusted t-statistics; "B. Empirical P-value"= P-value associa ted  with the empirical distribution of t-statistic from bootstrapped resam ples.
Fig. A5.1 -Long Term Performance of UK Domestic M&As
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Fig. A5.3 --Long Term Performance of UK Cross-border M&As
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Table A5.2
Mean BHARs of the French sample, based on the "5Y Non-overlapping Sample"
Model—► CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR C. t-stat
c. P- 
value Sig. B. t-stat
B.
Empirical Sig. 
P-value
BHAR C. t-stat c. P- value B. t-stat
B.
Empirical Sig. 
P-value
1 year -0.087486 -1.548 0.130 -1.474 0.697 -0.099724 -1.380 0.176 -1.466 0.348
2 year -0.264654 -1.589 0.121 -1.557 0.549 -0.169846 -1.286 0.207 -1.159 0.978
Domestic
3 year -0.222553 -1.358 0.183 -1.364 0.749 -0.214913 -1.518 0.138 -1.479 0.233
4 year -0.220218 -1.008 0.320 -0.977 0.650 -0.152346 -0.832 0.411 -0.759 0.951
5 year -0.200379 -0.753 0.457 -0.732 0.947 -0.123155 -0.559 0.580 -0.506 0.897
n=37
Cross-
border n=5
(The French "5Y Non-overlapping Sample" has insuffiecient cross-border sample firms for meaningful statistical inference.)
1 year -0.094324 -1.759 0.086 * -1.680 0.429 -0.104718 -1.537 0.132 -1.629 0.171
2 year -0.277461 -1.841 0.073 * -1.792 0.525 -0.197225 -1.626 0.112 -1.438 0.829
Both 3 year -0.254170 -1.705 0.096 * -1.698 0.411 -0.243321 -1.874 0.068 * -1.804 0.186
4 year -0.228391 -1.147 0.258 -1.109 0.514 -0.175329 -1.041 0.304 -0.944 0.592
5 year -0.20549 -0.833 0.410 -0.809 0.684 -0.14442 -0.702 0.487 -0.641 0.671
n=42
Figures shown are the  BHARs for 1- to 5-year post acquisition periods together with the significance level. Significant observations at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are  shown 
by ***, ** and *, respectively.
"C. t-stat"= Conventional t-statistics; "C. P-value" = P-value associa ted  with the conventional t-statistics; "Sig" = significance level; "B. t-stat" = bootstrapped skew ness- 
adjusted t-statistics; "B. Empirical P-value"= P-value associa ted  with the empirical distribution of t-statistic from bootstrapped resam ples.
Table A5.2 -Continued
Mean BHARs of the French sample, based on the "3Y Non-overlapping Sample"
Moc el—► CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover
BHAR C. t-stat ^ P -  Sig.
B.
B. t-stat Empirical Sig. 
P-value
BHAR C. t-stat C ,P'  Sig.
value
B.
B. t-stat Empirical Sig. 
P-value
Domestic
1 year
2 year
3 year 
n=56
-0.086030 -1.314 0.194 
-0.007180 -0.051 0.959 
-0.011497 -0.077 0.939
-1.368 0.139 
-0.029 0.855 
-0.043 0.781
-0.034407 -0.590 0.558 
0.031820 0.268 0.790 
-0.000455 -0.004 0.997
-0.595 0.560 
0.295 0.490 
0.023 0.407
Cross-
border
1 year
2 year
3 year 
n=14
-0.287551 -1.473 0.165 
-0.185357 -0.738 0.474 
-0.092153 -0.375 0.714
-1.526 0.554 
-0.844 0.424 
-0.413 0.180
-0.136256 -0.877 0.397 
-0.053023 -0.252 0.805 
-0.011574 -0.066 0.949
-0.832 0.949 
-0.235 0.843 
-0.080 0.375
Both
1 year
2 year
3 year 
n=70
-0.126335 -1.935 0.057 * 
-0.042816 -0.349 0.728 
-0.026916 -0.208 0.836
-2.033 0.002 *** 
-0.332 0.907 
-0.179 0.769
-0.054777 -0.983 0.329 
0.014852 0.144 0.886 
-0.002581 -0.023 0.981
-0.983 0.132 
0.165 0.593 
-0.001 0.810
Figures shown are the BHARs for 1- to 3-year post acquisition periods together with the  significance level. Significant observations at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are shown 
by ***, ** and *, respectively.
"C. t-stat"= Conventional t-statistics; "C. P-value" = P-value associa ted  with the conventional t-statistics; "Sig" = significance level; "B. t-stat" = bootstrapped skew ness- 
adjusted t-statistics; "B. Empirical P-value"= P-value associa ted  with the empirical distribution of t-statistic from bootstrapped resam ples.
Fig. A5.5 -Long Term Performance of French Domestic M&As
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Table A5.3
Mean BHARs of the German sample, based on the "5Y Non-overlapping Sample"
Mod el-> CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR C. t-stat
c. P- e . 
value l®‘
B. t-stat
B.
Empirical Sig. 
P-value
BHAR C. t-stat c. P- value B. t-stat
B.
Empirical Sig. 
P-value
1 year -0.101112 -1.191 0.247 -1.417 0.184 -0.037727 -0.790 0.438 -0.726 0.885
2 year -0.183013 -1.607 0.123 -1.803 0.194 -0.082718 -1.341 0.194 -1.310 0.580
Domestic
3 year -0.128043 -0.930 0.363 -0.943 0.469 -0.084847 -0.872 0.393 -0.824 0.992
4 year -0.004237 -0.022 0.983 -0.058 0.715 0.049600 0.337 0.740 0.334 0.826
5 year 0.047871 0.134 0.894 0.102 0.728 0.234004 0.924 0.366 0.971 0.380
n=22
1 year -0.181621 -1.855 0.088 * -1.804 0.616 -0.053384 -0.762 0.461 -0.752 0.961
2 year -0.097134 -1.048 0.315 -1.119 0.534 -0.167074 -1.789 0.099 * -2.108 0.178
Cross-
border 3 year -0.003433 -0.028 0.978 -0.007 0.825 0.030443 0.250 0.807 0.243 0.960
4 year 0.173780 1.145 0.275 1.089 0.712 0.070297 0.475 0.643 0.469 0.992
5 year 0.247235 1.060 0.310 1.049 0.759 0.214838 1.249 0.236 1.281 0.526
n=13
189
Model—* CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR C. t-stat
c. P- 
value
Sig. B. t-stat
B.
Empirical Sig. 
P-value
BHAR C. t-stat c. P- Sig.value B. t-stat
B.
Empirical Sig. 
P-value
1 year -0.149814 -1.892 0.067 * -2.516 0.002 *** -0.057889 -1.663 0.106 -1.666 0.187
2 year -0.155925 -1.807 0.080 * -1.969 0.133 -0.117118 -2.047 0.048 ** -2.061 0.237
Both 3 year -0.096092 -0.978 0.335 -1.003 0.378 -0.060848 -0.771 0.446 -0.763 0.521
4 year 0.105066 0.786 0.437 0.747 0.888 0.085921 0.776 0.443 0.792 0.386
5 year 0.122915 0.530 0.599 0.477 0.779 0.197438 1.213 0.234 1.246 0.349
n=35
Figures shown are the BHARs for 1- to 5-year post acquisition periods together with the significance level. Significant observations a t the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are shown by ***, 
** and *, respectively.
"C. t-stat"= Conventional t-statistics; "C. P-value" = P-value associa ted  with the conventional t-statistics; "Sig" = significance level; "B. t-stat" = bootstrapped skew ness-adjusted t- 
statistics; "B. Empirical P-value"= P-value associa ted  with the empirical distribution of t-statistic from bootstrapped resam ples.
190
Table A5.3 -Continued
Mean BHARs of the German sample, based on the "3Y Non-overlapping Sample"
Moc el-* CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR C. t-stat C P ‘ Sig.value
B.
B. t-stat Empirical Sig. 
P-value
BHAR C. t-stat C ' P‘ Sig.value
B.
B. t-stat Empirical Sig. 
P-value
Domestic
1 year
2 year
3 year 
n=35
-0.144773 -1.813 0.079 * 
-0.283205 -2.545 0.016 ** 
-0.254016 -1.867 0.070 *
-2.197 0.014 ** 
-2.900 0.008 *** 
-1.943 0.071
-0.038937 -0.828 0.413 
-0.091665 -1.889 0.067 * 
-0.044987 -0.595 0.556
-0.859 0.433 
-1.799 0.175 
-0.579 0.650
Cross-
border
1 year
2 year
3 year 
n=20
-0.016115 -0.225 0.824 
0.002812 0.033 0.974 
-0.057483 -0.570 0.576
-0.217 0.926 
0.031 0.945 
-0.580 0.776
0.043458 0.568 0.577 
-0.015633 -0.166 0.870 
0.048751 0.470 0.644
0.608 0.518 
-0.139 0.793 
0.479 0.762
Both
1 year
2 year
3 year 
n=55
-0.120046 -1.733 0.089 * 
-0.179160 -2.194 0.033 ** 
-0.202374 -2.076 0.043 **
-2.142 0.001 *** 
-2.438 0.001 *** 
-2.202 0.007 ***
-0.022806 -0.532 0.597 
-0.061951 -1.312 0.195 
-0.022953 -0.369 0.713
-0.523 0.744 
-1.245 0.156 
-0.364 0.524
Figures shown are the BHARs for 1- to 3-year post acquisition periods together with the significance level. Significant observations at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are shown 
by ***, ** and *, respectively.
"C. t-s ta t '-  Conventional t-statistics; "C. P-value" = P-value associa ted  with the conventional t-statistics; "Sig" = significance level; "B. t-stat" = bootstrapped skew ness- 
adjusted t-statistics; "B. Empirical P-value"= P-value associa ted  with the empirical distribution of t-statistic from bootstrapped resam ples.
Fig A5.8 -L ong Term Perform ance of German Domestic M&As
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Fig. A5.10 -Long Term Performance of the Entire German Sample
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Table A5.4
Mean BHARs of the entire sample, based on the "5Y Non-overlapping Sample"
Moc el-> CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR C. t-stat
c. P- 
value
Sig. B. t-stat
B.
Empirical
P-value
Sig. BHAR C. t-stat c. P- value Sig. B. t-stat
B.
Empirical
P-value
Sig.
1 year -0.114761 -2.637 0.010 * * -3.164 0.000 M r t -0.074959 -1.865 0.066 * -1.902 0.020 i r k
2 year -0.222299 -2.538 0.013 ir k -2.528 0.002 * * * -0.140477 -1.960 0.053 * -1.801 0.050 i r k
Domestic
(not 3 year -0.209686 -2.220 0.029
ir k -2.221 0.001 *** -0.168691 -1.986 0.050 * * -1.922 0.017 i r k
including
Private 4 year -0.208568 -1.595 0.115 r -1.596 0.023 ir k -0.10347 -0.947 0.3462 -0.911 0.160
O ffers)
5 year -0.105402 -0.668 0.506 -0.673 0.404 -0.008700 -0.069 0.945 -0.053 0.588
n=83
1 year -0.152370 -1.901 0.066 * -1.748 0.146 -0.071803 -1.103 0.278 -1.077 0.487
2 year -0.281557 -2.408 0.022 ** -2.514 0.130 -0.235864 -3.025 0.005 *** -2.749 0.068 *
Cross-
border 3 year -0.419343 -2.936 0.006 * ★ * -3.374 0.003 'k irk -0.312317 -2.729 0.010 ** -2.330 0.404
4 year -0.292438 -1.709 0.097 * -1.788 0.122 -0.340315 -2.409 0.022 ir k -2.278 0.095 *
5 year -0.285926 -1.188 0.243 -1.290 0.257 -0.294126 -1.592 0.121 -1.443 0.390
n=34
Model—► CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR C. t-stat
C. P- 
value
Sig. B. t-stat
B.
Empirical
P-value
Sig. BHAR C. t-stat c. P- value Sig. B. t-stat
B.
Empirical
P-value
Sig.
1 year -0.125690 -3.263 0.001 *** -3.584 0.000 *** -0.074041 -2.174 0.032 ir k -2.188 0.000 k k k
2 year -0.239519 -3.393 0.001 * * ♦ -3.399 0.000 *** -0.168196 -3.024 0.003 k i c k -2.717 0.000 ***
Both 3 year -0.270612 -3.426 0.001 *** -3.508 0.000 *** -0.210428 -3.057 0.003 k k k -2.896 0.000 ***
4 year -0.232940 -2.220 0.028 ** -2.232 0.000 *** -0.172294 -1.960 0.052 k -1.865 0.002 ***
5 year -0.158314 -1.202 0.232 -1.224 0.027 ** -0.092359 -0.882 0.380 -0.847 0.174
n=117
Figures shown are the BHARs for 1- to 5-year post acquisition periods together with the  significance level. Significant observations at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are  shown 
by ***, ** and *, respectively.
"C. t-stat"= Conventional t-statistics; "C. P-value" = P-value associa ted  with the conventional t-statistics; "Sig" = significance level; "B. t-stat" = bootstrapped skew ness- 
adjusted t-statistics; "B. Empirical P-value"= P-value associa ted  with the  empirical distribution of t-statistic from bootstrapped resam ples.
Table A5.4- Continued.
Mean BHARs of the entire sample, based on the "3Y Non-overlapping Sample"
Moc el—> CF CP
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR C. t-stat £ £  Sig.
B.
B. t-stat Empirical Sig. 
P-value
BHAR C. t-stat ^  Sig.
B.
B. t-stat Empirical Sig. 
P-value
Domestic
(not
including
Private
Offers)
1 year
2 year
3 year 
n=153
-0.117291 -2.843 0.005 *** 
-0.146609 -2.195 0.030 ** 
-0.060553 -0.780 0.437
-3.100 0.000 *** 
-2.097 0.000 *** 
-0.752 0.061 *
-0.04821 -1.515 0.132 
-0.054402 -1.008 0.315 
-0.013306 -0.204 0.839
-1.491 0.000 *** 
-0.963 0.027 ** 
-0.188 0.994
Cross-
border
1 year
2 year
3 year 
n=85
-0.052470 -0.963 0.338 
-0.060935 -0.731 0.467 
-0.095416 -0.985 0.327
-0.977 0.042 ** 
-0.687 0.702 
-0.939 0.306
-0.005925 -0.122 0.903 
-0.03792 -0.500 0.619 
-0.076346 -0.928 0.356
-0.116 0.812 
-0.448 0.902 
-0.874 0.562
Both
1 year
2 year
3 year 
n=238
-0.094141 -2.862 0.005 *** | 
-0.116011 -2.222 0.027 ** j 
-0.072823 -1.200 0.231 j
-3.018 0.000 *** 
-2.125 0.000 *** 
-1.161 0.002 ***
-0.033107 -1.235 0.218 i 
-0.048515 -1.104 0.271 j 
-0.035492 -0.694 0.488 j
-1.220 0.000 *** 
-1.051 0.005 *** 
-0.671 0.101
by ***, ** and *, respectively.
"C. t-stat"= Conventional t-statistics; "C. P-value" = P-value associated with the conventional t-statistics; "Sig" = significance level; "B. t-stat" = bootstrapped skewness- 
adjusted t-statistics; "B. Empirical P-value"= P-value associated with the empirical distribution of t-statistic from bootstrapped resamples.
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Fig. A5.11 --Long Term Performance of ALL EU Domestic M&As
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Fig. A5.12 --Long Term Perform ance of ALL EU C ross-border M&As
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Fig. A5.13 --Long Term Performance of ALL EU M&As (Excluding Acquitistions of Private
Targets)
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Table A5.5
Mean BHARs of the UK sample, based on the industry-adjusted CF model
S am ple 5Y N on-overlapping S am ple 3Y Non-overlapping Sample
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR C. t-stat
c. P- 
value
111
Sig. | B. t-stat11
B.
Empirical Sig. 
P-value
BHAR C. t-stat c. P- value Sig. B. t-stat
B.
Empirical Sig. 
P-value
0.011535 0.153 0.880
1
1 0.15911
0.856 0.001505 0.024 0.981 0.021 0.735
-0.216324 -1.484 0.151
1
j -1.433a 0.197 -0.145499 -1.697 0.095
* -1.715 0.002 ***
-0.188908 -1.182 0.249 I -1.06411 0.922 -0.055855 -0.471 0.639 -0.468 0.885
-0.188950 -0.951 0.351
1
j -0.912 0.951
-0.135335 -0.652 0.521 ! -0.676 1 1
0.986
Domestic
1 year
2 year
3 year
4 year
5 year 
n=24 n=62
Private
Offering
1 year
2 year
3 year
4 year
5 year 
n=34
0.022235 0.293 0.771 0.287 0.396 -0.058590 -1.237 0.219 -1.276 0.003 ***
-0.109554 -0.694 0.493 -0.707 0.191 -0.163498 -2.024 0.046 ** -2.133 0.000 ***
0.016241 0.090 0.929 0.100 0.783 -0.253041 -2.496 0.014 ** -2.487 0.000 ***
0.022015 0.077 0.939 0.148 0.483
-0.107991 -0.697 0.491 -0.665 0.232
n=95
Sam ple 5Y N on-overlapping S am ple 3Y N on-overlapping S am ple
Bid Type Year post takeover BHAR C. t-stat
C. P- 
value
Sig.
B.
B. t-stat Empirical Sig. 
P-value
BHAR C. t-stat C. P- value
s1
Sig. j B. t-stat 1 1
B.
Empirical Sig. 
P-value
0.739 0.464
11
1 0.76811 0.636
0.327 0.745 j 0.378 1 0.350
-0.373 0.711
1
j -0.365
1t
0.908
Cross-
border
1 year 0.047070 0.383 0.707 0.395 0.692
2 year -0.012641 -0.056 0.956 -0.023 0.703
3 year -0.180971 -1.076 0.299 -1.005 0.922
4 year -0.314302 -1.783 0.095 * -1.690 0.545
5 year -0.318880 -1.302 0.213 -1.152 0.893
n=17
0.058226
0.042216
-0.049890
n=51
ALL
1 year 0.024187 0.490 0.626 0.491 0.710
2 year -0.123608 -1.262 0.211 -1.246 0.111
3 year -0.095967 -0.932 0.354 -0.897 0.536
4 year -0.123044 -0.830 0.409 -0.711 0.190
5 year -0.164758 -1.486 0.142 -1.464 0.039
n=75 -
-0.013663
-0.110015
-0.145282
-0.397 0.692 -0.398 0.282
-2.005 0.046 i r k -1.976 0.000
-2.171 0.031 i r k -2.161 0.000
n=208
Figures shown are the  BHARs for 1- to 5-year post acquisition periods together with the significance level. Significant observations at the  1%, 5% and 10% levels are shown 
by ***, ** and *, respectively.
"C. t-stat"= Conventional t-statistics; "C. P-value" = P-value associa ted  with the  conventional t-statistics; "Sig" = significance level; "B. t-stat" = bootstrapped skew ness- 
adjusted t-statistics; "B. Empirical P-value"= P-value associa ted  with the empirical distribution of t-statistic from bootstrapped resam ples.
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Fig. A5.16 --Long Term Performance of UK Cross-border M&As
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Fig. A5.17 -Long Term Performance of the Entire UK Sample
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Table A5.6
Long-run share price performance of the overlapping samples, based on the CTFF model
UK France Germany
Non­ -0.007694 ** 0.000775 -0.003264
overlapping - 2 . 0 0 8 3 2 4 0 . 1 4 2 9 2 3 - 1 . 0 6 4 3 6 5
Domestic Overlapping -0.000523 0.001026 -0.018573 ***
- 0 . 1 3 9 8 1 6 0 . 1 7 1 7 0 0 - 3 . 5 3 7 6 2 8
Diff 0.007171 0.000251 -0.015309
Non­ -0.001936 N/A N/A
overlapping - 0 . 3 9 2 6 5 3 N/A N/A
Private Overlapping 0.007402 N/A N/A
1 . 1 8 4 7 6 1
Diff 0.009338 N/A N/A
Non­ -0.006757 0.000334 -0.003524
overlapping - 1 . 5 4 2 5 5 8 0 . 0 5 6 6 2 6 - 0 . 8 1 4 7 3 9
Cross-
border Overlapping 0.003408 N/A N/A
0 . 9 8 1 1 5 9
Diff 0.010165 N/A N/A
Non­ -0.007717 -0.000037 -0.003455
overlapping - 2 . 3 1 1 5 1 1 - 0 . 0 0 7 3 4 2 - 1 . 1 5 5 2 8 5
ALL Overlapping 0.000803 -0.001633 -0.017973 ***
0 . 2 6 7 7 6 9 - 0 . 2 7 9 5 0 2 - 3 . 6 7 8 8 3 4
Diff 0.008520 -0.001597 -0.014518
"DIFF" = Overlapping - Non-overlapping
Table A5.7
The impact of MV on the long run share price performance of the UK acquirers
Month Relative to 
Announcment Date-* 2 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36
MV Dummy -0.02116 -0.08171 -0.09185 -0.06455 -0.16082 -0.27811 -0.40283 -0.60914 -0.53366 -0.59504 -0.64373 -0.68583
t-stat -0.62864 -1.06536 -0.7632 -0.52584 -1.05311 -1.56324 -1.98061
f t
-2.18982
f t f t
-1.89254 -1.98295 -1.86236
f t  i t  f t
-1.78352
*
Domestic
(n=24)
Month Relative to Announcment 
Date, Continued -> 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60
MV Dummy -0.78055 -0.917 -1.07761 -0.92931 -0.79152 -0.79999 -0.69843 -0.59109
t-stat -1.85939
f t
-2.12216
**
-2.30593
f t f t
-1.90966
*
-1.65141 -1.69963 -1.39012 -1.21338
Month Relative to 
Announcment Date-* 2 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36
MV Dummy 0.007952 0.068102 0.102657 0.230463 0.155565 -0.22956 -0.03568 -0.33859 -0.56414 -0.25485 -0.24322 -0.12269
t-stat 0.325577 0.741258 0.820802 1.534901 0.747827 -0.46338 -0.09186 -0.69137 -0.69782 -0.37746 -0.36696 -0.1844
Private
(n=34)
Month Relative to Announcment 
Date, Continued —* 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60
MV Dummy -0.21283 -0.04695 -0.18225 -0.13524 -0.01143 0.122683 0.182289 0.378073
t-stat -0.35312 -0.09148 -0.32881 -0.22624 -0.02057 0.247249 0.4186440.966084
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Month Relative to 
Announcment Date—► 2 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36
MV Dummy -0.0855 0.034099 0.025645 0.146081 0.248888 0.457666 0.513412 0.425989 0.451222 0.678457 0.652169 0.713379
t-stat -1.76681
*
0.1907380.118322 0.52047 0.7377780.869951 1.0572930.974125 1.021163 1.443314 1.612164 1.520389
Cross-border
(n=17)
Month Relative to Announcment, 
Continued -*■ 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60
MV Dummy 0.836172 0.828765 0.708191 0.788361 0.652026 0.920255 1.056323 1.181811
t-stat
- r
1.522498 1.358622 1.297019 1.3989860.974828 1.245092 1.430365 1.552469
MV Dummy = 1 if the sample firm has 'bigger1 MV as I have explained in the text. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A5.8
The impact of MV on the long run share price performance of French acquirers
Month Relative to 
Announcment Date-> 2 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36
MV Dummy 0.017434 0.0876 0.025752 -0.26055 -0.04996 0.0109 -0.01421 -0.02557 0.371765 0.594242 0.841061 0,689369
t-stat 0.184705 0.70171 0.155776 -0.47774 -0.13565 0.03222 -0.03155 -0.05892 0.9603 1.380959 1.72812
*
1.632197
Domestic
(n=37)
Month Relative to Announcment 
Date, Continued —► 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60
MV Dummy 0.779771 0.619283 0.481017 0.725076 1.359078 1.694076 1.788036 2.112242
t-stat 1.3803320.9067730.5741330.943437 1.135189 1.317249 1.378486 1.545586
Month Relative to 
Announcment Date-> 2 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36
MV Dummy 0.100554 0.114717 0.095502 0.309245 0.229855 0.237021 0.114133 0.046275 0.11723 0.182711 0.110712 -0.19174
t-stat 0.793634 0.568602 0.348523 1.2570380.8177770.742196 0.27271 0.1002070.3128650.4530740.254811 -0.38661
(Based on the '3Y Nonoverlapping Sample')
Cross-border
(n=14)
Month Relative to Announcment 
Date, Continued -> 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60
MV Dummy 
t-stat
(N/A) Insufficient sample firms
"
MV Dummy = 1 if the sample firm has 'bigger* MV as I have explained in the text. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A5.9
The impact of MV on the long run share price performance of German acquirers
Month Relative to 
Announcment Date-* 2 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36
MV Dummy 0.024077 0.020633 -0.10581 -0.07456 -0.02292 -0.10504 -0.13975 -0.14611 -0.0891 -0.06041 -0.03538 -0.07154
t-stat 0.701651 0.313163 -1.03666 -0.85756 -0.23498 -0.95113 -1.12229 -0.94698 -0.54848 -0.34275 -0.18849 -0.34097
Domestic
(n=22)
Month Relative to Announcment 
Date, Continued —* 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60
MV Dummy 
t-stat
- >- 0.0410290.171956
0.072856
0.301693
0.175164
0.639496
0.058151
0.162811
-0.11407
-0.26108
-0.15302
-0.30642
-0.05602
-0.1103
0.267179
0.545562
Month Relative to 
Announcment Date-* 2 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36
MV Dummy -0.09329 -0.09827 -0.12399 -0.02502 0.032585 0.02588 0.056677 0.122809 0.245032 0.335199 0.378033 0.472793
t-stat -1.64774 -1.15335 -1.42556 -0.15240.193163 0.167390.336881 0.647337 1.388853 1.521214 1.81508* 2.008576*
Cross-border
(n=13)
Month Relative to Announcment 
Date, Continued -* 39 42 45 48 51 54 57 60
MV Dummy 0.411194 0.432324 0.440204 0.470793 0.56722 0.59218 0.674853 0.719476
t-stat 1.787396* 1.47665 1.51736 1.71584* 2.519378fr k 2.491565** 2.494558** 2.519011*
MV Dummy = 1 if the sample firm has 'bigger* MV as I have explained in the text. ***, ** and * denote significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Fig. A5.18 -BHARs of High MV and  Low MV UK Acquirers
(Acquiring Public Targets)
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Chapter 6: Regression Analysis
This chapter examines the impact of a number of variables on both short-run and 
long-run post-acquisition share price performance for bidders. The descriptions of the 
EU M&A bids are often incomplete for non-UK cases in Acquisitions Monthly, 
therefore this chapter focuses on the UK sample only. Besides this, the UK sample 
also has a bigger sample size than other samples have.
Section 6.1 defines the selected variables, explains why they are selected for the 
regression analysis and what we can expect from the regression results. Section 6.2 
introduces the methodology used in this chapter. The rest of the chapter presents and 
interprets the results. They are organized as follows: Section 6.3 is the regression 
analysis for the short run profitability of M&As, and Sections 6.4-6.5 examine the 
determinants of the long run profitability of M&As. Finally, Section 6.6 is a 
conclusion for the chapter.
Section 6.1 Hypotheses and Definitions of the Variables
6.1.1 Hypotheses Developed in Chapter 2 (Literature Review)
In Chapter 2 {Literature review) a number of hypotheses on the relationship between 
bid characteristics and share price performance after M&As have been discussed. 
They are listed as follows in order to briefly review the hypotheses and define the 
variables to be tested,
/
The cross-border effect (for bidders) hypothesis
Roll (1986) argues that1 bidding companies tend to over-pay because bidding 
companies’ managers are affected by ‘hubris’. Overseas companies are often more 
difficult to value than domestic firms (e.g. due to different accounting standards). Due 
to greater information asymmetry in cross-border M&As than in domestic M&As
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(Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000), ‘hubris’ may be more relevant to cross-border M&As 
than domestic ones. If this is true, the size of overpayment may be larger in cross- 
border than in domestic acquisitions. Some studies also argue that (e.g. Megginson, 
Morgan and Nail, 2004) culture differences in cross-border M&As may make 
acquisition integration a difficult, time consuming and expensive process. In addition, 
cross-border M&As may be likely motivated by managerial motives if managers 
pursue global reputation by building international firms. For all these reasons, the 
cross-border effect (for bidders) hypothesis is: the post-bid share price performance of 
cross-border bidders is poorer than that of domestic ones. To test the hypothesis, a 
dummy variable ‘Cross’ is set to 1 if the bidder acquires a foreign firm. A negative 
sign is expected for this variable.
However, as noted in Chapter 2 {Literature Review), some studies (e.g. Sudarsanam, 
1995, p. 269) suggest that cross-border M&As may be more synergy-motivated. 
There are some unique positive factors in cross-border M&As, such as escaping small 
home market, extending markets served, achieving economies of scale, replacing 
inefficient management of a foreign firm, and responding to overseas clients’ needs. 
This group of factors provide an argument that synergy motive is more important in 
cross-border M&As than agency and hubris motives. If this group of factors is true, 
shareholders may respond positively to cross-border M&As contrasting to the cross- 
border effect hypothesis noted above.
The cash offer hypothesis
Jensen (1986) suggests that M&As financed by free cash flows are often costly 
because of a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. Managers may 
prefer to retain free cash flow and invest it in projects that increase managerial
i
benefits like compensation or power (and reputation). As a result, Jensen (1986) 
argues that firms with excess cash flows have a tendency to waste cash flows on 
unprofitable investments.; Therefore cash offers could have a negative impact on 
bidders’ share price performance.
Jensen (1986)’s views are also supported by Harford (1999) and Lang, Stultz and 
Walking (1991) as I have discussed in Section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2 {Literature review).
)
2 1 0
On the other hand, Heaton (2002) also argues that cash offers may be motivated by 
‘hubris’. Heaton (2002)’s view has been discussed in Section 2.2.3 and Section 2.5.1 
of Chapter 2. It also predicts a negative relationship between cash offers and share 
price performance.
There are mainly three types of payment methods in Acquisitions Monthly: cash 
payments, equity swaps and mixed offers combining cash and equity. To test whether 
cash offers reduce bidders’ profitability, a dummy variable ‘Payment’ is set to 1 if the 
acquisition is purely cash-financed. The variable ‘Payment’ is expected to have a 
negative sign based on Jensen (1986)’s view.
In contrast, as I have discussed earlier in Section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2, Myers and 
Majluf (1984)’s asymmetric information model suggests that cash offers have positive 
impact on share price performance. Myers and Majluf (1984) assume that: 1) the 
acquiring firm’s management possesses information about the intrinsic value of the 
firm which is not reflected in the pre-acquisition share price; and 2) managers are 
loyal to existing shareholders. Therefore, managers will favour a cash offer if they 
believe that their firm is undervalued, whereas they will favour a stock offer if they 
believe their stocks are overvalued. Consequently, a cash offer serves as good news to 
investors because it signals that the bidder is undervalued. In contrast with the cash 
offer hypothesis noted above, Myers and Majluf (1984)’s approach suggests that free 
cash flow is beneficial.
The bidder size hypothesis
The impact of MV could be either positively or negatively related to share price 
performance. With a bigger bidder, the power of the agents may also be bigger, which 
makes monitoring agents more difficult and costly. Also, a bigger bidder may have 
less focus on the acquired firms. If these arguments are true, we may see that lower 
average abnormal returns are associated with bigger bidders. In contrast, a bigger 
bidder could also have more bargaining power in the acquisition process, more 
flexibility in financing the acquisition deal, and more adaptability/experience in
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absorbing target firms, etc. If these arguments are true, we may find that higher 
average abnormal returns are associated with bigger bidders.
To actually examine the impacts of MV on share price performance, three dummy 
variables are introduced as follows: ‘MV_Domestic’ equal to 1 if acquirers are 
domestic bidders (bidding into publicly listed target firms) and have ‘bigger’ market 
values (see the next paragraph for the definition of ‘bigger’); ‘MV_Cross-border’ 
equal to one if acquirers are cross-border bidders and have ‘bigger’ market values; 
and ‘MV_Private’ equal to one if acquirers choose to acquire private target firms and 
have ‘bigger’ market values.
To define whether a sample firm has a ‘bigger’ MV, at first I partition all listed firms 
in the UK market into ten equal sized groups according to the rankings of the MVs of 
firms at each month. Therefore, firms in Groups 1-5 have MVs bigger than the 
median MV of all listed firms. Also, firms Groups 6-10 have MVs smaller than the 
median MV of all listed firms in that market. Second, for each sample firm at the 
month -1 of the announcement, I define it as a firm with ‘bigger’ MV if it belongs to 
Groups 1-5 ranked by the sample firm’s MV. In contrast, I define a sample firm as a 
firm with ‘smaller’ MV if it belongs to Groups 6-10. Because bidders of cross-border 
M&As are generally firms with large MVs, I define a cross-border bidder as a firm 
with ‘bigger’ MV if it belongs to Groups 1-3, otherwise I define it as a firm with 
‘smaller’ MV. In my study the approach above works well as it divides the parent 
samples to roughly two equal-sized sub-samples.
Taking into account that Chapter 5 (Long-run excess returns) has shown that ‘hubris’ 
or managerial motives appear to be important factors in UK domestic (acquiring listed 
targets) markets, in particular I expect that the dummy variable ‘MV_Domestic’ has a 
negative sign because higher agency costs (and/or less focus on targets) may be 
associated with those ‘bigger’ firms. At this stage, it is not clear which sign may be 
associated with UK domestic acquirers of private targets or UK cross-border 
acquirers.
2 1 2
The tender offer hypothesis
Tender offers are often associated with the view that bidders can replace inefficient 
management and realize a capital gain by improving operating performance. Bidders 
uncover value-creating insights about the target firm and seek to avoid giving value 
up in a negotiation with a target firm. Jensen and Ruback(1983), Gregory (1997), and 
Loughran and Vijh (1997) all found higher abnormal returns of bidders after tender 
offers than after mergers. Tender offers are, therefore, expected to have a positive 
effect on acquiring firms’ post-acquisition share price performance. A dummy 
variable ‘Tender’ is set to 1 if the bid offer is a tender offer and I expect a positive 
sign for this variable.
The MTBV effect hypothesis
Acquirers with a high MTBV (glamour stocks) tend to be overpriced reflecting a 
recent high growth in earnings, and acquirers with a consistent record of bad news 
tend to be undervalued and have a low MTBV (value stocks) (Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1998). Thus, at the time of the bid announcement, acquirers with a high 
MTBV tend to have a high share return and vice versa. After a period of time the 
market corrects the previous over-reaction based of past performance and 
shareholders of acquirers with a high MTBV at the announcement time will 
experience low average returns afterwards, and shareholders of acquirers with a low 
MTBV at the announcement time will subsequently earn superior returns 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Therefore, there are two hypotheses for the 
MTBV effects: One is, in the short run, shareholders of high MTBV acquirers 
experience better share price performance than low MTBV acquirers at the 
announcement time; another is, in the long run, shareholders of high MTBV acquirers 
experience poorer share price performance than low MTBV acquirers.
To test the MTBV effect'hypothesis, a variable ‘MTBV’ which is the market-to-book 
ratio of the sample firm is used. It is calculated as: Market value of the firm / Book 
value of the firm. Market value is determined in the stock market through its market 
capitalization. Book value is calculated by looking at the firm's accounting value.
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The variable ‘MTBV’ is expected to have a positive sign in the short run analysis and 
a negative sign in the long run analysis.
6.1.2 Other Possible Determinants
Some other possible determinants of the profitability of M&As are also examined in 
this chapter. They are listed as follows and will be discussed immediately afterwards.
Hostility
Hostile offers can occur for motives that are similar to tender offers, namely bidding 
firms exploring synergy gains by installing more efficient management. In this case 
hostile offers are expected to result in higher post-acquisition abnormal returns to 
bidders than friendly offers. However, in a hostile offer the initial bid is often revised 
upwards -  therefore the gains to bidding firms will be smaller.
The dummy variable ‘Hostility’ is introduced to test the mixed effects of hostile offer 
on post-acquisition share performance. There are mainly three different degrees of 
hostility in Acquisitions Monthly: ‘hostile’ offer, ‘recommended’ offer and offer with 
no clear degree of hostility (the key words used are ‘hostile’, ‘recommended’ and 
merely ‘has acquired’ in turn). The dummy variable Hostility is equal to one if the bid 
is described as ‘hostile’. At this stage, the results are expected to be either positive (or 
negative) or insignificant.
Earlier studies, for example, both Franks and Harris (1989), and Cosh and Guest 
(2001), found no statistically significant difference of abnormal returns to bidders 
during the announcement period between hostile and friendly offers indicating a 
mixed effect of hostility. Gregory and Matatko (2004) also found no statistically 
significant difference between hostile and friendly offers when controlling for 
payment methods in their regression tests.
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Private Acquisitions
Acquisitions of privately held companies represent more than 80% of all acquisitions 
(Draper and Paudyal, 2006). Despite their significance, studies of such acquisitions 
and their impact on the wealth of shareholders are rare. M&As of private target firms 
are less likely to be associated with managers’ own interest, because managers who 
want to maximize the size of the firm or their control of the firm tend to seek out large 
and well-known target firms. Also, it may be easier for bidders to absorb a typically 
smaller private firm. In addition, information on listed target firms is more easily 
available therefore the market to acquire listed target firms is likely to be more 
competitive and liquid. All reasons noted above suggest that bidding firms of 
privately held companies may have higher shareholder wealth gains than those 
acquiring publicly listed companies.
To test the effect of private offers, a dummy variable ‘Private’ is set to 1 if the bidder 
acquires a private target. I expect a positive sign for this variable. The earlier evidence 
provided by Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller (2002) and Draper and Paudyal (2006) 
suggest that bidders of private targets earn positive excess returns while bidders of 
public targets do not.
Total Debt /  Common Equity ratio
The Total Debt / Common Equity ratio (TDCE) can have two possible effects: 1) this 
ratio is an indicator of how aggressive a firm has been in financing its growth with 
debt. In this case, a high TDCE could be a signal of ‘hubris’ because the manager has 
been aggressive; 2) a high TDCE ratio can result in volatile earnings due to the 
additional interest expense involved. In this case, a high TDCE could either result in 
investors doubting the firms’ future profitability or be seen as a signal of poor 
management skills. Both of these arguments suggest that investors may respond 
negatively to bidders with high TDCE ratios.
To test the effects of the TDCE ratio, a variable ‘TDCE’ is introduced and calculated 
as Total liability / Shareholder’s Equity. A negative sign is expected. Few studies on 
M&As have examined this ratio.
215
Dividend Yield
Mature, well-established companies tend to have higher DY, while young, growth- 
oriented companies tend to have a lower or no DY. Assuming that firms are loyal to 
shareholders, growth-oriented managers with (or seeking) good future investment 
opportunities are more likely to pay low dividends because it gives them more 
discretion with regard to the future use of their financial resources. As a result, 
bidders with low past dividend yields may meet a positive response from investors. In 
contrast, bidders with high dividend yields may have fewer future growth 
opportunities, and bids may be viewed as less desirable. Furthermore, it may be 
worthy to note that the discussion above is contradictory to Jensen (1986)’s free cash 
flow hypothesis. Jensen (1986)’s view assumes there is a conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders, whereas the discussion above, similar to Myers and 
Majluf (1984)’s model as noted in Section 2.5.1 of Chapter 2 (Literature Review), 
assumes that managers are loyal to shareholders.
To test the effects of dividend yield, a variable ‘DY’ which is the dividend yield is 
introduced and a negative sign is expected for this variable. Dividend yield is 
calculated as: Dividends per share / Price per share.
Time Period
Tse and Soufani (2001) report that abnormal returns are significantly different 
between high merger activity periods and low merger activity periods. Their results 
show that bidders in high M&A activity periods on average gain less positive 
abnormal returns than those in low M&A activity periods. One possible reason for 
this is that in high M&A activity periods, the competition in M&A markets is also 
higher, hence bidders are forced to pay higher premiums.
A dummy variable ‘Time’ is introduced to test the effect of time periods. ‘Time’ is 
equal to one if the offer is made between 1995 to the end of 1999, which is a high 
M&A activity period during the period 1992-2003 as noted in Section 1.2 of Chapter 
1 {Introduction). A negative sign is expected for this variable.
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Industry sectors
In the sample of this study, three industry sectors (based on the ‘I/B/E/S’ industry 
classification system of DataStream) were most active in UK M&A markets: Finance 
(Code 1 in DataStream): Consumer Services (Code 4) and Capital Goods (Code 10). 
As noted in Section 5.4 of Chapter 5 (Long-run Excess Returns), different industry 
sectors are often associated with different characteristics such as risk ratings and 
growth opportunities. To control for industry differences, three industry dummies are 
introduced: Tnd_l* equal to one if bidders come from the sector ‘Finance’; Tnd_4’ 
equal to one if bidders come from the sector ‘Consumer Services’; and ‘Ind_10’ equal 
to one if bidders come from the sector ‘Capital Goods’. Positive or negative (or 
insignificant) signs are expected for these three industry dummy variables.
Some other variables were also examined, such as the return on equity, the growth 
rate of total income and price / earnings ratios. In all regression tests, they were found 
to be not statistically significant regardless of how the model specifications were 
changed, and they are omitted from the results reported in this chapter.
6.1.3 Conclusion
As a brief conclusion, Table 6.1 lists all variables that remain in the regression tests of 
this chapter.
Table 6.1 Hypotheses examined in this chapter
Variables Expected Sign Main Possible Reasons Note
Cross Negative
Possibly more relevant to 
‘hubris’ than domestic 
M&As; difficulties of 
assessing foreign firms
Possibly positive sign 
if synergy gains (e.g. 
through extending 
markets served) 
outweigh
‘managerial’/’hubris’
costs
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Payment Negative ‘Free cash flow’ hypothesis
Possibly positive sign 
based on Myers and 
Majluf (1984)
MV
dummies
Negative for UK 
domestic bidders 
(acquiring listed 
targets)
‘Bigger’ bidders more likely 
to be ‘hubris’ or 
‘managerially’ motivated 
than ‘smaller’ bidders
Possibly positive sign 
if synergy gains 
prevail (e.g. through 
more bargaining power 
associated with bigger 
bidders)
Tender Positive Bids more likely to be synergy-motivated
MTBV
Positive in the 
short run and 
possibly 
negative in the 
long run
Investors’ overreaction to 
bidders’ past achievement in 
the short run which could be 
reversed in the long run
Hostility
Possibly 
positive, may 
also be negative 
(or insignificant)
Bids more likely to be 
synergy-motivated, although 
bid premium may be higher 
in contested bids
Private Positive
Bids more likely to be 
synergy-motivated and it 
may be easier to absorb 
smaller private targets
TDCE Negative
Firms with higher TDCE 
may be affected by ‘hubris’ 
and/or have poorer 
management skills
DY Negative
Assuming managers are 
loyal to shareholders, a firm 
may retain cash because 
they have good investment 
opportunities
Time Negative
Higher competition in 
periods of high M&A 
activity may increase 
bidders’ premium
Industry
dummies
Positive or 
negative (or 
insignificant)
Dummy variables that 
control for industry 
differences
Section 6.2 Methodology
To test these hypotheses for bidders, I ran regression (ordinary least squares) tests 
with announcement period abnormal returns as well as long-run abnormal returns as
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dependent variables. A potential problem with using abnormal returns is the choice of 
share pricing model. There are three choices of share pricing model: 1) using 
abnormal returns (ARs) derived from the market model as in Chapter 4 (Short-run 
Excess Returns); 2) using ARs derived from the Fama-French Three-Factor model; 3) 
using ARs derived from a MV/MTBV benchmark, such as the ‘Control Firm’ (CF) 
model and the ‘Control Portfolio’ (CP) model in Chapter 5 {Long-run Excess 
Returns). This chapter uses the third option, namely ARs derived from a MV/MTBV- 
matched framework. This is because, with option 3, I can conveniently use the 
I/B/E/S industry classification system of DataStream to adjust the obtained ARs for 
industry effects. This adjustment offers an alternative benchmark in regression tests. 
The methodology of adjusting ARs for industry effects has been discussed in Section 
5.4 of Chapter 5. Furthermore, the AR calculation is based on the CF model rather 
than the CP model, because the former avoids the skewness and rebalancing biases 
(Lyon et al., 1997,1999) as discussed in Section 3.4.2 of Chapter 3 {Methodology).
Either cumulative abnormal return (CAR) or buy-hold-abnormal return (BHAR) can 
be used as the dependent variable to test the aggregate effects over multiple periods. 
Barber and Lyon (1997), argue that the mean BHAR is appropriate in measuring long- 
run abnormal return because it ‘precisely measures investor experience in the long 
horizon’. However, both Mitchell and Stafford (2000) and Fama (1998) argue there is 
no compelling reason to choose BHARs because BHARs can ‘give false impressions 
of the speed of price adjustment to an event’ (Fama, 1998, p. 294). Therefore both 
two types of abnormal returns have been tested. In general, using CARs as the 
dependent variable generated stronger results and came with much better fit { R 2) 
when the event window was long. Therefore the results using CARs as dependent 
variables are reported in this chapter. One more reason for Lyon et al. (1997, 1999) to 
advocate the use of BHARs is because the conventional CAR approach is based on a 
market index - which can be flawed due to the ‘new listing’ bias as discussed in 
Section 3.4.2 of Chapter 3. In this chapter, the ARs were derived from a method free 
of the use of the market index (the CF model), therefore using CARs as dependent 
variables over a long-ruii window is a valid option. Lyon et al. (1997, pp. 362-363, 
Table 5) provide evidence that CARs derived from a ‘size book-to-market matched 
control firm’ model are unbiased throughout the five years after the announcement.
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The sample compositions are introduced in the following sections where appropriate. 
Domestic acquirers of publicly listed targets are included. The regression results are 
labelled with *, **, *** if they are significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
Section 6.3 reports the short-run regression results, followed by Sections 6.4 and 6.5 
reporting the long-run regression results. The sample compositions and event 
windows to be studied are introduced in the corresponding sections.
Section 6.3 Regression Analysis in the Short Run
Table 6.2 below shows us the sample composition (by industry) for the announcement 
period regression analysis.
Table 6.2 Sample composition (by industry) for the short run regression tests
Sector Sector mnemonic Sector description Number of
l/B/E/S appearing in Bidders
Code datatype (Total=367)
1 FINANCE Finance 51
2 HEALTH Health 9
3 CONSNO Consumer non-durables 28
4 CONSSVC Consumer services 110
5 CONSDUR Consumer durables 10
6 ENERGY Energy 6
7 TRANSP Transportation 5
8 TECHNOL Technology 18
9 BASIC Basic industries 31
10 CAPITAL Capital goods 83
11 UTILITY Public utilities 4
99 UNDESIGN Unclassified 12
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Table 6.2 shows that, as I have discussed, bidders mainly come from sectors Finance 
(Code 1), Consumer services (Code 4) and Capital goods (Code 10).
In Chapter 4 (Short-run Excess Returns) the abnormal returns are calculated based on 
the market model. Table 6.3 reports the (cumulative) abnormal returns calculated 
based on the MV/MTBV framework.
Table 6.3 Short run excess returns based on the MV/MTBV framework
Month 0 Month +1 Month 
(0M, +1M)
AR/CAR
(MV/MTBV benchmarked)
0.010
( t= l.W )
0.012 ** 
(t=2.114)
0.021 ** 
(t=2.308)
AR/CAR
(Industry/MV/MTBV benchmarked)
0.006 
(t=1.021)
0.008 
(t=1.320)
0.014
(t=1.461)
The (cumulative) abnormal returns in Table 6.3 are benchmarked by MV/MTBV and 
industry-adjusted MV/MTBV, respectively. Using the MV/MTBV benchmark or the 
industry-adjusted MV/MTBV benchmark involves valuing the firm’s share price at a 
market-wide level or an industry-wide level. The advantage of the MV/MTBV 
benchmark is the choice of control-firm is much wider because it selects control firm 
at the market-wide level. It will be easier for a sample firm to find a control firm that 
is similar in both MV and MTBV. The advantage of the Industry/MV/MTBV 
benchmark is that there are more similar elements between the control firm and the 
sample firm since they are from the same industry sector. Therefore it is worthwhile 
to consider results using both benchmarks.
In Table 6.3 we can see the MV/MTBV benchmark presents positive and statistically 
significant (cumulative) ARs in Month +1 and the event window (0M, +1M). The 
timing of statistically significant results is consistent with the findings in Chapter 4 
(Short-run Excess returns). The industry-adjusted MV/MTBV benchmark reduces 
ARs by 0.4% for Month 0 and Month +1. The industry-adjusted MV/MTBV 
benchmark presents positive (cumulative) ARs but they are statistically insignificant.
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Both sets of results in Table 6.3 show that, in Month 0, UK acquiring firms 
experience insignificant ARs which is consistent with the results in Chapter 4.
Tables 6.4 and 6.5 present the short-run regression results, based on the original 
CARs and the industry-adjusted CARs as dependent variables, respectively. The 
short-run event windows are defined as Month 0, Month +1 and a combined window 
Month (0, +1). The regression model for Tables 6.4 and 6.5 is:
C A R j (ti, t2) = a* + piCrossj + p2Paymentj + p3Tenderj + p4Hostilityi + psPrivatej + 
p6DYj+ p7MTBVj + pgTDCEj + P9MV_Domesticj + pioMV_Cross-borderj + 
pnMV_Privatej + PnTimej + Pi3Ind_lj + Pi4nd_4i + p15Ind_10j + 8j
In the short run tests, Private, MTBV and TDCE are found to have no explanatory 
power as indicated by both Table 6.4 and Table 6.5, but I kept them in the short run 
regression models to make comparisons with the long run regression results. 
Removing or keeping variables Private, MTBV and TDCE from the regression 
models does not have any fundamental impact on the generated results.
Table 6.4 reports the results based on the MV/MTBV benchmark. The results are 
disappointing. There is a lack of statistically significant relationship in the three 
regression tests. In the period Month +1, both the ‘Cross’ and ‘Tender’ dummies are 
positive and statistically significant. These show the superior share price performance 
of cross-border bids and tender offers shortly after the announcement time. The 
adjusted-R is 0.0142. The announcement month window, Month 0, and the combined 
event window, Month (0M, +1M), show no statistically significant results.
The positive sign of the ‘Cross’ dummy is inconsistent with the cross-border (for 
bidders) hypothesis developed earlier. It is also inconsistent with some earlier studies 
such as Danbolt (1995) who finds that UK domestic bidders outperform cross-border 
ones in 1986-1991. My result appears to suggest that synergy-related motives such as 
escaping small home market and responding to overseas clients are the driving factors 
of cross-border M&As for the UK bidders in 1992-2003. On the other hand, the 
positive sign of the ‘Tender’ dummy is consistent with the tender offer hypothesis 
developed earlier. The result supports the view that tender offers are more likely to be
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Table 6.4
Table 6.4 is the report of short-run regression tests. The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns calculated on the basis of the 
original MV/MTBV matched control firm model.
Independent Variable Month 0 Month +1 Month (0M, +1M)
Constant 0.0411 0.0058 0.0506
1 . 2 0 7 4 0 . 1 9 0 0 1 . 0 2 2 5
CROSS -0.0310 0.0590 0.0129
- 0 . 7 8 6 0 1 . 6 6 8 8* 0 . 2 2 5 4
Payment 0.0014 0.0054 0.0094
0 . 1 0 6 6 0 . 4 4 5 0 0 . 4 8 0 7
Tender -0.0197 0.0570 0.0370
- 0 . 7 6 4 1 2 . 4 5 7 9
**
0 . 9 8 8 4
Hostility -0.0042 -0.0132 -0.0168
- 0 . 1 5 4 2 - 0 . 5 4 1 9 - 0 . 4 2 9 0
PRIVATE 0.0032 -0.0046 0.0054
0 . 0 9 6 0 - 0 . 1 5 1 3 0 . 1 0 9 8
Independent Variable - 
continued Month 0 Month +1 Month (0M, +1M)
DY -0.0025 -0.0028 -0.0050
- 0 . 8 6 8 0 - 1 . 0 9 0 2 - 1 . 2 1 3 6
MTBV -0.0005 0.0006 0.0001
- 0 . 3 2 5 5 0 . 3 6 7 3 0 . 0 4 5 4
TDCE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
- 0 . 0 9 7 0 0 . 7 1 6 8 0 . 3 1 7 1
MV_Domestic -0.0342 -0.0284 -0.0625
- 1 . 0 6 7 9 - 0 . 9 8 4 2 - 1 . 3 4 1 2
MV_Cross-border 0.0309 -0.0375 0.0077
0 . 9 2 2 8 - 1 . 2 5 7 5 0 . 1 5 7 5
MV_Private 0.0026 0.0010 -0.0016
0 . 1 6 1 7 0 . 0 6 5 8 - 0 . 0 6 9 3
TIME -0.0204 0.0161 -0.0092
- 1 . 2 6 2 0 1 . 1 0 7 1 - 0 . 3 8 8 2
IND._1 0.0035 0.0041 0.0045
0 . 1 6 5 0 0 . 2 1 7 2 0 . 1 4 6 7
Independen t V ariable
continued
Month 0 Month +1 Month (OM, +1M)
IND. 4
IND. 10
Adjusted R 
N=367
-0.0156
- 0 . 9 7 2 7
0.0002
0 . 0 0 9 5
-0.0108
- 0.0101
- 0 . 6 9 5 9
-0.0170
- 1 . 0 7 3 2
0.0142
-0.0302
- 1 . 2 9 1 4
-0.0234
- 0 . 9 0 8 9
-0.0114
Numbers in italic are t-statistics. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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synergy-motivated. It is in line with some earlier studies such as Gregory (1997) who 
studies UK bidders in 1984-1992 and reports superior share price performance for 
tender-offer bidders.
To test how the variables in the table are correlated and whether the correlations have 
any impact on the regression results, a correlation matrix derived from the 
independent variables is presented in Table A6.1. In Table A6.1 we can observe some 
relatively high correlation coefficients although many are quite low. On the basis of 
this, I tested a large number of model specifications, but no further significant effects 
were observed in these regressions. Also, Table A6.2 shows simple regression results 
between the dependent variable and each variable in turn. This also shows no 
significant relation in any of the variables used.1
Table 6.5 reports the results based on the industry-adjusted MV/MTBV benchmark. In 
this case, the regression results are more significant.
Table 6.5 shows that, in the announcement month and in (OM, +1M), the dummy 
variable ‘Payment’ is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. It does not 
provide evidence for the cash offer hypothesis discussed in Section 6.1.1. In contrast, 
it is more in line with Myers and Majluf (1984)’s asymmetric information model 
which suggests that managers are loyal to shareholders and cash offers convey good 
news to investors. The finding of a positive relationship between ‘Payment’ and the 
short run abnormal returns is consistent with some earlier studies, e.g. Peterson and 
Peterson (1991) and Franks, Harris and Mayer (1988) as I have discussed in Section 
2.5.1 of Chapter 2 (Literature Review).
In Table 6.5 I again can find the significant role of ‘Tender’. The positive sign of 
‘Tender’ is realized at Month +1 (statistically significant at the 1% level) and in the 
event window (OM, +1M) (statistically significant at the 5% level). This suggests that 
tender offers are perceived to be more profitable by the market.
1 For the rest o f  Chapter 6, the regression results presented in the tables are generally tested 
for robustness by dropping or adding variables to the regression models. I f  multicollinearity is 
found to be a major issue, it w ill be clearly specified.
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Table 6.5
Table 6.5 is the report of short-run regression tests. The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns calculated on the basis of the 
Industry-adjusted MV/MTBV matched control firm model.
Independent Variable Month 0 Month +1 Month (0M, +1M)
Constant 0.0312 -0.0017 0.0228
0.9550 -0.0529 0 . 4 4 3 8
CROSS -0.0430 0.0460 0.0145
- 1 . 1 5 9 0 1 . 2 4 2 0 0 . 2 4 6 7
Payment 0.0280 0.0185 0.0439
2 . 2 0 0 3 1 . 4 6 2 8 2 . 1 7 9 4
** **
Tender 0.0002 0.0831 0.0840
0 . 0 0 9 8 3 . 4 3 3 8 2 . 1 9 2 3
*** **
Hostility 0.0233 -0.0065 0.0162
0 . 9 0 2 7 - 0 . 2 5 3 4 0 . 4 0 0 6
PRIVATE -0.0143 -0.0038 -0.0273
- 0 . 4 4 7 7 - 0 . 1 2 0 5 - 0 . 5 4 1 1
Independent Variable - 
continued Month 0 Month +1 Month (OM, +1M)
DY -0.0030 -0.0046 -0.0078
- 1 . 1 0 9 7 - 1 . 7 4 1 0 - 1 . 8 3 6 2* *
MTBV -0.0008 0.0013 0.0005
- 0 . 4 9 8 6 0 . 8 5 8 6 0 . 2 2 3 1
TDCE 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
- 0 . 3 7 3 3 0 . 9 2 3 0 0 . 3 6 1 9
MV_Domestic -0.0627 -0.0242 -0.0877
- 2 . 0 5 4 2 - 0 . 7 9 8 2 - 1 . 8 2 7 6
** *
MV_Cross-border (0.0187) -(0.0252) -(0.0173)
(0.5910) -(0.7932) -(0.3433)
MV_Private -0.0114 -0.0022 -0.0078
- 0 . 7 3 9 6 - 0 . 1 4 7 5 - 0 . 3 2 1 4
TIME 0.0073 0.0241 0.0405
0 . 4 7 0 1 1 . 5 5 9 8 1 . 6 3 7 0
IND._1 0.0199 -0.0140 0.0104
0 . 9 9 7 6 - 0 . 7 1 1 2 0 . 3 3 1 5
Independen t Variable
continued Month 0 Month +1 Month (OM, +1M)
IND. 4
IND. 10
Adjusted R 
N=367
-0.0334
- 2 . 1 7 4 2
* *
-0.0018
- 0 . 1 0 4 3
0.0221
-0.0161
- 1 . 0 5 7 6
-0.0143
- 0 . 8 5 3 3
0.0353
-0.0435
- 1 . 8 0 1 7
*
-0.0066
- 0 . 2 4 5 6
0.0292
Numbers in italic are t-statistics. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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The role of dividend yield has a negative sign in the period Month +1 (statistically 
significant at the 10% level)2 and in the event window (OM, +1M) (statistically 
significant at the 10% level). The negative sign is consistent with the hypothesis that, 
for low dividend bidders, managers remain loyal to shareholders and that they retain 
cash for good future investment opportunities. In contrast, bidders with high past 
dividend yield may be seen as having fewer future growth opportunities, and bid 
announcements may be viewed as less desirable news. It might be worth noting that 
both the ‘Payment’ and ‘DY’ dummies do not provide evidence for Jensen (1986)’s 
free cash flow hypothesis. The results suggest that the ‘free cash flow conflicts 
between managers and shareholders’ are not a major motive for M&As in UK 
markets.
In the last chapter it has been shown that, in the long run, UK domestic acquisitions 
(not including private offers) reacted negatively to the scale of the acquirers’ MVs. 
Table 6.5 suggests this conclusion may also be true in the short run. The dummy 
variable MV_Domestic is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in the 
announcement month, and it is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level 
in the period (OM, +1M). The results are consistent with the bidder size hypothesis 
which predicts a negative sign for the ‘MV_Domestic’ dummy because higher agency 
costs (and/or less focus on targets) may be associated with ‘bigger’ acquiring firms. It 
is also in line with Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) who studied US M&As 
and report lower average abnormal returns for larger bidders. The other two MV 
dummies, MV_Cross-border and MV_Private are not statistically significant.
Additionally, the dummy variable Ind_4 shows a negative sign and is statistically 
significant in the announcement month at the 5% level and in the period (0M, +1M) at 
the 10% level. The results suggest that the shareholders of bidding firms in the most 
active acquisition market, Consumer Services, did less well in the announcement 
period. No significant effect is found for the other industries considered in Table 6.5.
Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 show different results. As I have discussed, using the 
MV/MTBV benchmark or the industry-adjusted MV/MTBV benchmark involves
2 This result is slightly weakened in some different regressions tried.
1
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valuing the firm’s share price at a market-wide level or an industry-wide level. Both 
have advantages therefore it might be hard to say which benchmark is superior given 
these different factors. Combining Table 6.5 and Table 6.6, we can see that the 
variables ‘Cross’, ‘Payment’, ‘Tender’, ‘DY’, ‘MVJDomestic’, and ‘Ind_4’ are 
statistically significant (depending on the benchmark used). By analysing the results, I  
can make the following points as a conclusion for this section:
1. The cross-border (for bidders) hypothesis is not supported in the data. My 
results do not support the view that cross-border M&As are less profitable 
than domestic M&As due to greater information asymmetry in cross-border 
M&As (Seth, Song and Pettit, 2000). In contrast, the positive sign of the 
‘Cross’ dummy seems to suggest that cross-border M&As are more influenced 
by some synergy-related reasons such as escaping small home markets and 
responding to overseas clients.
2. The cash offer hypothesis, or similarly Jensen (1986)’s free cash flow 
hypothesis, is not supported in these data. The regression results are more in 
line with Myers or Majluf (1984)’s asymmetric information model which 
suggests that managers make cash offers because they believe their shares are 
undervalued.
3. Tender offers are found to have higher profitability than negotiated offers. 
This is consistent with the view that synergy-motivated acquirers uncover 
potential gains of M&As and seek to avoid giving value up in a negotiated 
offer with a target firm.
4. Based on the industry-adjusted MV/MTBV benchmark, it is found that, in the 
short-run domestic acquirers (acquiring publicly listed target firms), bidders 
with ‘bigger’ MVs perform less well than ‘smaller’ bidders. The results 
suggest that managerial motives and higher agency costs are important in this 
context. In contrast, cross-border and private acquisitions do not react to MVs 
in the short run.
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Section 6.4 Regression Analysis in the Long Run
The table below shows the sample composition (by industry) for the long-run 
regression analysis (up to 5 years after the announcement). Again, we can see the 
sample is dominated by firms from the sectors Finance, Consumer Services and 
Capital Goods.
Table 6.6 Sample composition (by industry) for the long run regression tests
Sector Sector mnemonic Sector description Number of
l/B/E/S appearing in Bidders
Code datatype (Total-75)
1 FINANCE Finance 16
2 HEALTH Health 3
3 CONSNO Consumer non-durables 3
4 CONSSVC Consumer services 15
5 CONSDUR Consumer durables 3
6 ENERGY Energy 1
7 TRANSP Transportation 1
8 TECHNOL Technology 1
9 BASIC Basic industries 6
10 CAPITAL Capital goods 22
11 UTILITY Public utilities 1
99 UNDESIGN Unclassified 3
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 report the regression analysis for a number of event windows as 
shown in the tables. In both tables, Month +1 is omitted to avoid any short-run effect. 
The dependent variables in Table 6.7 are based on the original MV/MTBV matched 
control firm model. In Table 6.8 the dependent variables are based on the industry- 
adjusted MV/MTBV matched control firm model. The dependent variables are 
calculated as cumulative abnormal returns over each period. For example, the 
dependent variable for the event window (+2M, +12M) is calculated as:
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CARj(+2M,+12M) ARu , where t = Months 2, 3, ... , 12 ; ARu is the average
f=2
abnormal return of firm i at time t.
In the tests, the variables ‘Hostility’ and ‘Tender’ are not in the long-run regression 
models because there are not sufficient firms of these types in the long run sample. 
Among three industry dummies, Ind_10 was found to be not statistically significant. 
Among three MV dummies, MV_Cross-border was found to be not statistically 
significant. Both variables have no impact on the results regardless of model 
specification changes. Therefore, I only keep Ind_l and Ind_4 as well as 
MV_Domestic and MV_Private in the equation to save degrees of freedom. The 
regression model for Tables 6.7 and 6.8 is:
CARj (ti, Xi) = cij + PiCrosSi + p2Paymentj + p3Privatej + p4DY*+ PsMTBVj + p6TDCEi 
+ P7MV_DomestiCj + pgMV_Privatei + PgTimej + pioInd_li + pnlnd_4j +
Table 6.7 reports the results based on the original MV/MTBV benchmark.
The results indicate that the role of the ‘Cross’ dummy appear to be an important 
positive factor over the event window up to the 2nd year after the announcement. Once 
again it provides no evidence for the cross-border (for bidders) hypothesis developed 
earlier. Similarly as the last section, the result suggests that cross-border M&As are 
more influenced by synergy-related motives such as responding to global clients than 
by ‘hubris’ (and/or managerial reasons) such that greater information asymmetry may 
be associated with cross-border M&As.
In the test, the ‘Private’ dummy showed no statistically significant results in the 
selected event windows. This result is inconsistent with the view, as noted in Section 
6.1.2, that acquisitions of private targets may have better share price performance 
because they are less likely to be motivated by managerial reasons than acquisitions
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Table 6.7
Table 6.7 is the report of long-run regression tests. The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns calculated on the basis of the 
original MV/MTBV matched control firm model.
Independent Variable (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+36M, +60M)
Constant -0.2749 -0.4147 -0.3377 -0.6040 -0.6423 -0.0781 -0.3437-1.0797 -1.0247 -0.7053 -1.1150 -1.1514 -0.2023 -1.2357
CROSS 0.6333 0.9961 0.6131 0.4132 0.2573 -0.0430 -0.18292.4079 2.3832 1.2349 0.7337 0.4411 -0.1075 -0.6288
** **
PAYMENT -0.0933 -0.2378 -0.2091 0.1279 0.1867 -0.1238 0.1951-0.5971 -0.9580 -0.7124 0.3765 0.5241 -0.5236 1.0984
PRIVATE 0.0233 0.0839 -0.2488 -0.2005 -0.3333 -0.2795 -0.19810.0935 0.2118 -0.5322 -0.3782 -0.6091 -0.7419 -0.7260
DY -0.0218 -0.0302 -0.0095 -0.0175 -0.0052 0.0150 0.0081-0.6466 -0.5629 -0.1496 -0.2385 -0.0684 0.2929 0.2145
MTBV -0.0211 -0.0237 -0.0684 -0.1532 -0.1397 -0.0340 -0.0617-0.7534 -0.5343 -1.0835 -2.1268 -1.8825 -0.6686 -1.6665
** *
TDCE -0.0009 -0.0034 -0.0040 -0.0031 -0.0025 -0.0031 0.0015-1.0020 -2.3599 -2.2773 -1.5910 -1.2141 -2.2434 1.4832
** ** **
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Independent Variable - 
continued (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+36M, +60M)
MV_Domestic 0.0029 -0.1010 -0.4420 -0.2410 -0.3266 -0.4495 0.14530.0132 -0.2884 -1.0700 -0.5178 -0.6815 -1.3506 0.6080
MV_Private 0.2846 0.1105 0.4294 0.6357 0.9183 0.1235 0.63371.6052 0.3920 1.2743 1.6213 2.2486
**
0.4549 3.1122
***
TIME 0.3462 0.5073 0.6750 0.7875 0.9051 0.3248 0.23181.8917
*
1.7445
*
1.9678
*
2.0356
**
2.2724
**
1.1752 1.1675
IND. 1 0.0928 0.4186 0.4469 0.6351 0.5575 0.3481 0.14000.6042 1.7153* 1.5510 1.9466* 1.6573* 1.4989 0.8350
IND. 4 0.0612 -0.0414 0.2630 0.8692 0.8092 0.2145 0.49240.3523 -0.1502 0.8042 2.2587
**
2.0319
**
0.8143 2.4798
**
Adjusted R2 
N=75
0.0595 0.0840 0.0739 0.1442 0.1668 0.0080 0.2030
Numbers in italic are t-statistics. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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of public targets. Under some circumstances, the ‘Private’ dummy could become 
statistically significant in some different regressions tried, but not consistently so .3
The importance of MTBV on long-run share returns is shown in Table 6.7. The sign 
of the variable ‘MTBV’ is negative as expected, and statistically significant over the 
(+2M, +48M) and (+2M, 60M) event windows. Since the time that Rau and 
Vermaelen (1998), based on the US bidders in 1980-1991, found that ‘value acquiring 
firms’ (low MTBV) outperform the ‘glamour acquiring firms’ (high MTBV) in the 
long-run, MTBV has been a popular variable in studies of long-run acquiring firms’ 
share returns. However, some of these studies only considered the post-acquisition 
share performance up to 3 years after the announcement and in some of these studies 
the relationship claimed by Rau and Vermaelen (1998) was not observed. My results 
provide evidence that high MTBV acquirers under-perform low MTBV acquirers in 
the long run, but the effect takes a relatively long time to take effect. In my regression 
tests, the impact of the variable ‘MTBV’ cannot be observed until at least 4 years’ 
abnormal performance has accumulated.
The ‘Total Debt to Common Equity’ ratio has rarely been examined in the earlier 
M&A event studies. In my results, the coefficients of this ratio are consistently 
negative and statistically significant over the periods (+2M, +24M), (+2M, +36M) 
and (+12M, +36M). As I have discussed, this ratio has two implications. One is it can 
be looked at as an indicator of how aggressive a firm has been in financing its growth 
with debt, another is a high TDCE can result in volatile earnings as a result of the 
additional interest expense. Both effects may have negative impacts on investors’ 
expectation on M&A profitability. For example, a high TDCE could be a signal of 
‘hubris’ because the manager has been too aggressive and/or a high TDCE could 
result in investors doubting managers’ abilities as well as the firm’s future 
profitability. In short, the negative sign of the variable ‘TDCE’ in the regression 
model suggests bidding firms that may have been affected by ‘hubris’ and/or poor 
management skills (a s : reflected by TDCE) are more likely to have poorer 
performance in the long run.
3 This may be a case where multicollinearity may have been a factor in the regressions given  
the correlations between ‘Private’ and other variables in Table A6.1.
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The dummy variable ‘MV_Private’ is positive and statistically significant. In Table 
6.7 it is statistically significant at the 5% level for the event window (+2M, +60M) 
and at the 1% level for the event window to (+36M, +60M). Few earlier studies have 
reported significant impact of MVs on the long run share price performance. My 
results show that for the acquisitions of private targets larger acquirers outperform 
smaller acquirers in the long run. As I have discussed earlier in Section 6.1.1, the 
positive sign of ‘MV_Private’ seems to suggest that the positive synergy factors, such 
as ‘bigger’ bidders may have more bargaining power in M&As and more management 
experience, are more important to acquirers of private targets than the possible agency 
costs associated with ‘bigger’ bidders. On the other hand, ‘MV_Domestic’ and 
‘MV_Cross-border’ are not statistically significant in the regressions based on the 
original MV/MTBV benchmark.
The dummy variable ‘Time’ shows positive coefficients which are consistently 
statistically significant in many event windows. The positive sign indicates that the 
acquirers making acquisitions during the high acquisition activity period (as noted in 
Section 1.2 of Chapter 1, Introduction) outperform in the long run those making 
acquisitions during the low acquisition activity period. It is inconsistent with some 
previous studies (e.g. Tse and Soufani, 2001) that claim the wealth gains are lower in 
high acquisition activity periods because acquirers may face higher competition in 
acquisition markets.
‘Ind_l’ and ‘Ind_4’ are dummy variables identifying acquirers in the Finance and 
Consumer Services sectors, respectively. Table 6.7 shows that both the ‘Ind_l ’ and 
‘Ind_4’ dummies are significant when the effects are cumulated over the (+2M, 48M) 
and the (+2M, +60M) event windows. The coefficients are consistently positive for 
both dummy variables. My results suggest that acquisitions in the financial and 
consumer service markets have superior long run share price performance (although 
in the short run there is some evidence of poorer performance for bidders in the 
consumer service market as discussed earlier).
Table 6.8 reports the regression analysis where the dependent variable is based on 
the industry-adjusted MV/MTBV benchmark. Comparing Table 6.8 with Table 6.7, 
some results in Table 6.8 appears to be different from Table 6.7:
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Table 6.8
Table 6.8 is the report of long-run regression tests. The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns calculated on the basis of the 
Industry-adjusted MV/MTBV matched control firm model.
Independent Variable (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+36M, +60M)
Constant 0.07280.3822 0.41081.1636 0.65041.7639*
0.10970.2533 0.16670.3427 0.53861.7091*
-0.5349-1.8559
*
CROSS 0.23821.2089 0.30260.8298 -0.0180-0.0478 -0.3998-0.8927 -0.4542-0.9021 -0.2869-0.8897 -0.2545-0.8531
PAYMENT 0.07070.5976 -0.0372-0.1698 0.04740.2100 0.47541.7083*
0.53481.7016
*
-0.0362-0.1876 0.30351.6298*
PRIVATE 0.01320.0702 0.05300.1526 0.01440.0400 -0.1375-0.3206 -0.4993-1.0223 -0.0236-0.0768 -0.6507-2.2483
**
DY -0.0538-2.1272
**
-0.1055-2.2483
**
-0.1232-2.5211
**
-0.0637-1.0788 -0.0649-0.9694 -0.0635-1.5194 0.05841.4723
MTBV -0.0189-0.9007 -0.0688-1.7713*
-0.1001-2.0767
**
-0.1234-2.1392
**
-0.1144-1.7652*
-0.0607-1.4722 0.00050.0121
TDCE -0.0007-1.0403 -0.0013-1.0285 -0.0021-1.5753 -0.0015-0.9003 -0.0025-1.3845 -0.0016-1.3841 -0.0003-0.2361
238
Independent Variable - 
continued (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+36M, +60M)
MV Domestic -0.1533 -0.4665 -0.8363 -0.7799 -0.9318 -0.6978 -0.0818-0.9316 -1.5163 -2.5821
**
-2.0565
**
-2.1912
**
-2.5208
**
-0.3245
MV Private 0.0936 -0.0297 -0.0083 -0.0993 0.0765 -0.1317 0.20960.6970 -0.1194 -0.0323 -0.3134 0.2117 -0.5961 0.9791
TIME 0.1967 0.2210 0.2461 0.6998 0.7633 0.0633 0.55961.4388 0.8688 0.9077 2.1609
**
2.1004
**
0.2733 2.5992
**
IND. 1 -0.0461 -0.0029 0.1576 0.2301 0.3417 0.1982 0.1989-0.4006 -0.0138 0.7130 0.8807 1.1620 1.0492 1.1413
IND. 4 -0.1000 -0.1725 0.1194 0.3576 0.4161 0.2407 0.2438-0.7686 -0.7148 0.4776 1.1635 1.2052 1.1267 1.1914
Adjusted R2 
N=75
0.1069 0.0635 0.1696 0.1904 0.1579 0.0912 0.0489
Numbers in italic are t-statistics. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
239
First, there is weak evidence that the ‘Payment’ dummy is positive and statistically 
significant in the long-run within the 5 year post-acquisition period, which is not 
found in Table 6.7. Rarely has a study provided evidence that the means of payment is 
also a determinant factor for the long-run post-acquisition share price performance. 
For example, Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2004) based on US data report the cash 
dummy (equal to one if the offer is purely cash-financed) is not statistically 
significant in the long run.4 My results show weak evidence that cash-financed 
acquisitions are better performers (statistically significant at the 10% level) in the long 
run over the period (+36M, +60M). Together with my short-run result that the 
‘Payment’ dummy is positive and statistically significant, this long-run result is 
consistent with the view of Myers and Majluf (1984) in that bidder managers may 
favour cash offers if bidding firms’ share price is undervalued.
Second, there is a negative sign for the ‘Private’ dummy over the period (+36M, 
+60M) which is statistically significant at the 5% level.5 This result is inconsistent 
with the view that acquisitions of private targets are less affected by to managerial 
factors and may have better share price performance than acquisitions of public 
targets.
Third, another finding in Table 6.8 is the variable ‘DY’ becomes statistically 
significant for up to 3 years after the announcement. Based on the 
Industry/MV/MTBV benchmarked abnormal returns, the DY variable has a consistent 
negative sign as I expected. My results suggest that a high DY has significant adverse 
effects on the long-run share price performance for up to 3 years. This result is 
consistent with the view that for low dividend bidders, managers remain loyal to 
shareholders and seek out good future investment opportunities. In contrast, bidders 
with high past dividend payout may have less growth opportunities, and the bid 
announcement may be viewed as less desirable.
4 They only show that cash-financed focus-increasing mergers outperform equity-financed 
focus-decreasing mergers in the long run. For the overall sample, the cash dummy is 
insignificant.
5 However, under some circumstances, the ‘Private’ dummy could be not statistically 
significant in some different regressions tried.
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Fourth, the coefficients of the ‘MV_Domestic’ dummy in Table 6.8 are consistently 
negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for the (+2M, +36M), (+2M, 
+48M), and (+2M, +60M) event windows. We see that, based on the industry- 
adjusted MV/MTBV benchmark, the ‘MV_Domestic’ dummy is negative and 
statistically significant in both the short (Table 6.5) and the long run (Table 6.8). As 
noted earlier in Section 6.3, these results suggest that managerial motives and higher 
agency costs are important factors for ‘bigger’ acquirers of public targets. It is 
consistent with the view that managers who want to maximise their own utility tend to 
seek well-known publicly-listed target firms.
Finally, in comparison with Table 6.7, results in Table 6.8 show that the impact of the 
variable ‘MTBV’ becomes stronger, and the impacts of the variables ‘Cross’, 
‘TDCE’, ‘MV_Private’ and Industry (both ‘Ind_l’ and ‘Ind_4’) are weakened. On the 
other hand, the ‘Time’ dummy remains positive and statistically significant,
In a conclusion by examining both Tables 6.7 and 6.8, 6 I find that the variables 
‘Cross’, ‘Payment’, ‘MTBV’, ‘TDCE’, ‘DY’, ‘MV_Domestic’, ‘MV_Private’, 
‘Time’, ‘Ind_l’ , and ‘Ind_4’ appear to be statistically significant factors in 
determining the long run share price performance, although depending on the 
benchmark selection. There are a number of points that may be worth distinguishing 
as follows:
1) Based on the original MV/MTBV benchmark, the positive sign of ‘Cross’ in 
the long run as well as in the short run (Month +1) regression analysis 
suggests that cross-border bids are more influenced by synergy-related reasons 
such as responding to overseas clients and escaping small home market than 
by ‘hubris’ (or managerial reasons).
6 A s noted in Footnote 1, the results reported in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 were tested for robustness 
by dropping and adding variables to the regression model. Apart from the ‘Private’ dummy 
variable, the results were broadly robust to alternative model specifications and no evidence 
that multicollinearity was a problem was observed.
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2) Based on the industry-adjusted MV/MTBV benchmark, ‘Payment’ has a 
positive sign as suggested by Myers or Majluf (1984) and ‘DY’ has a negative 
sign in both the long and the short run regression analysis. Once again this 
suggests that Jensen (1986)’s ‘free cash flow hypothesis’ is not a major motive 
for M&As in the UK market in this period.
3) Based on the original MV/MTBV benchmark, the result that ‘TDCE’ is a 
significant and negative factor in the long run seems to suggest the existence 
of the ‘hubris’ factor in M&As. Bidders that were overly aggressive or poorly 
managed (as reflected by high TDCE ratios) tend to have poor long run share 
price performance.
4) Depending on the benchmark used, ‘MV_Domestic’ has a negative sign in the 
long run as well as in the short run regression analysis, whereas ‘MV_Private’ 
has a positive sign in the long run regression analysis. In addition, MV appears 
to have no influence on share price performance of cross-border M&As. These 
results seem to suggest that the strength of managerial motives are different 
among domestic, cross-border and private M&As, with the private type least 
likely to have been affected by managerial factors associated with ‘bigger’ 
bidders and acquisitions of public targets most likely to have been affected.
Section 6.5 Sub-sample Analysis
Different types of acquisition could be motivated by different considerations therefore 
the determinants of the source of profitability could be different, too. For this reason, 
this section runs long-run regression tests on different sub-samples of the sample as a 
whole. The original sample is divided to three sub-samples:
(Group 1) bidders making domestic acquisitions (of publicly listed target firms) 
(Group 2) bidders making cross-border acquisitions 
(Group 3) bidders acquiring private target firms.
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A vast majority of private offers in Acquisitions Monthly are domestic acquisitions. 
Therefore, all bidders in Group 3 are also domestic bidders.
Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 report the regression results for the restricted sub-sample of 
Group 1. The sample size is shown in the tables. The regression model is:
CARj (ti, t2) = a* + p!Paymentj + p2DYj+ psMTBVi + P-fTDCEj + p5MV_Domesticj + 
p6Timej + P7lnd_lj + Pglnd_4j +
Table 6.9 is based on the MV/MTBV benchmark, and Table 6.10 is based on the 
industry-adjusted MV/MTBV benchmark. Both Table 6.9 and Table 6.10 indicate that 
three variables (‘TDCE’ with a negative sign, ‘MV_Domestic’ with a negative sign 
and ‘Time’ with a positive sign) may be important factors to the long run profitability 
of UK domestic acquirers of public targets. As noted earlier, a high ‘TDCE’ could be 
a signal of ‘hubris’ and a high MV could be associated with high agency costs. The 
results seem to suggest the co-existence of ‘hubris’ and ‘managerial reasons’ is 
important in UK domestic M&As of public targets. On the other hand, the positive 
sign of ‘Time’ suggests than UK domestic M&As of public targets experienced higher 
returns in high M&A activity periods. Other variables in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 are not 
statistically significant.
The sub-sample analysis on the restricted sample of UK cross-border acquirers in 
general shows insignificant results and therefore is not reported. Only the variable 
‘DY’ generates negative and weakly statistically significant results for up to 2 years 
after the announcement (based on the industry-adjusted MV/MTBV benchmark). 
Megginson, Morgan and Nail (2004) find that culture differences (as measured by 
‘Herfindahl Index’) has a statistically significant impact on the long run share price 
performance of cross-border M&As, and Gregory and McCorriston (2005) find that 
the exchange rate is a significant factor in determining event period abnormal returns 
for cross-border bidders.1 This suggests future research on long-run performance of 
cross-border acquirers may need to focus on other factors such as macroeconomic 
factors or cultural differences in examining cross-border M&As.
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Table 6.9
Table 6.9 is the report of long-run regression tests for the restricted sub-sample. The acquirers in the sub-sample were domestic acquirers and 
acquired publicly listed target firms. The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns calculated on the basis of the MV/MTBV matched 
control firm model.
Independent Variable (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+36M, +60M)
Constant -0.2489 -0.4389 -0.4370 -0.6208 -0.8981 -0.1881 -0.4611-0.6297 -0.8813 -0.7262 -0.8231 -0.9692 -0.3559 -0.8089
PAYMENT -0.2468 -0.1722 0.2126 0.2284 0.8408 0.4595 0.6282-0.5072 -0.2809 0.2870 0.2460 0.7369 0.7060 0.8950
DY -0.0040 0.0092 0.0554 0.0153 0.0774 0.0594 0.0219-0.0576 0.1061 0.5291 0.1164 0.4796 0.6456 0.2211
MTBV -0.0544 0.0393 0.1968 0.1367 0.2283 0.2512 0.0315-0.4087 0.2344 0.9710 0.5382 0.7314 1.4112 0.1640
TDCE -0.0011 -0.0041 -0.0050 -0.0038 -0.0040 -0.0039 0.0010-0.9848 -2.7840 -2.8373 -1.6950 -1.4721 -2.4939 0.6020
** ** **
MV_Domestic 0.0337 -0.0636 -0.4663 -0.3602 -0.3685 -0.4999 0.09780.1607 -0.2411 -1.4621 -0.9011 -0.7503 -1.7848
*
0.3236
TIME 0.1966 0.3833 0.5025 0.8952 0.8171 0.3059 0.31470.8485 1.3128 1.4244 2.0246* 1.5042 0.9871 0.9416
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Independent Variable - 
continued (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+36M, +60M)
IND. 1 0.0964 0.1725 -0.0502 -0.0506 0.1110 -0.1466 0.16110.3561 0.5060 -0.1219 -0.0981 0.1749 -0.4051 0.4130
IND. 4 0.3277 -0.4289 -0.0212 0.4586 0.5446 -0.3490 0.56580.8854 -0.9199 -0.0377 0.6494 0.6276 -0.7051 1.0601
Adjusted R2 
N=24
-0.2489 0.2306 0.2896 0.2507 0.0789 0.2606 -0.1294
Numbers in italic are t-statistics. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
245
Table 6.10
Table 6.10 is the report o f  long-run regression tests for the restricted sub-sample. The acquirers in the sub-sample were domestic acquirers and
acquired publicly listed target firms. The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns calculated on the basis o f the industry-adjusted
MV/MTBV matched control firm model.
Independent Variable (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48 M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+36M, +60M)
Constant -0.2558 -0.1454 0.5155 -0.0058 -0.4004 0.7242 -0.9159
-1.0173 -0.4156 1.0301 -0.0088 -0.4750 1.4363 -1.5175
PAYMENT -0.1224 0.1084 0.5966 0.9345 1.0217 0.7014 0.4252
-0.3954 0.2596 1.0146 1.2119 1.0318 1.1840 0.5996
DY 0.0178 0.0060 -0.0902 -0.0530 -0.0148 -0.0962 0.0755
0.4065 0.0970 -1.0290 -0.4611 -0.1000 -1.0890 0.7136
MTBV -0.1023 -0.1101 -0.1808 -0.1860 -0.0914 -0.0571 0.0895
-1.2085 -0.9220 -1.0759 -0.8437 -0.3228 -0.3372 0.4413
TDCE -0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0027 -0.0017 -0.0024 -0.0022 0.0003
-0.5084 -1.6377 -1.9068* -0.9256 -1.0019 -1.5531 0.1818
MV_Domestic -0.0926 -0.3269 -0.8383 -0.7957 -0.9077 -0.7162 -0.0694
-0.6952 -1.7780 -3.1131 -2.2531 -2.0015 -2.6400 -0.2138
* *** ** * **
TIME 0.2993 0.4226 0.4638 1.1427 1.2064 0.1955 0.7426
2.0307 2.0360 1.5316 2.8770 2.3653 0.6407 2.0333
* * ** ** *
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Independent Variable - 
continued (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+36M, +60M)
IND. 1 0.0623 0.1816 0.2596 0.3249 0.6874 0.1336 0.4279
0.3622 0.7227 0.7129 0.6802 1.1209 0.3642 0.9743
IND. 4 0.3437 -0.3582 -0.1768 -0.0900 0.0323 -0.5903 0.2091
1.4598 -1.0710 -0.3684 -0.1431 0.0399 -1.2209 0.3613
Adjusted R2 
N=24
-0.0559 0.2718 0.3786 0.4521 0.2712 0.2856 -0.0146
Numbers in italic are t-statistics. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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Table 6.11 and Table 6.12 reports the regression results for the restricted sub-sample 
of Group 3. The sample size is shown in the tables. The regression model is:
CARj (ti, t2) = (Xj + p!Paymenti + p2DYi+ p3MTBVj + P4TDCE1 + p5MV_Privatei + 
P6lnd_li +  p7lnd_4j +  8i
Table 6.11 is based on the MV/MTBV benchmark and Table 6.12 is based on the 
industry-adjusted MV/MTBV benchmark. The event window in the last column is 
changed to (+24M, +60M) because the results are stronger in this event window.
By examining Tables 6.11 and 6.12, it seems that the post-acquisition performance of 
acquirers of private target firms is very sensitive to the benchmarks. In Table 6.11 
(based on the original MV/MTBV benchmark) some statistically significant results 
are observed as follows: 1) the variable ‘MTBV’ is negative and statistically 
significant at the 5% or 1% level for many periods examined. This suggests that the 
‘market overreaction’ effects of MTBV, as noted in Section 6.1, is most strongly 
reflected in acquisitions of private targets for the periods examined; 2 ) surprisingly 
the variable ‘TDCE’ has a positive sign over the periods (+24M, +60M) and is 
statistical significant at the 1% level. This contrasts with the view that a high TDCE is 
a signal of ‘hubris’ such that bidder shareholder wealth following the announcement 
of a M&A may be reduced. One possible reason could be that, for UK M&As of 
private targets, the hypothesized ‘hubris’ side of the TDCE ratio is neutralised, and a 
more positive side of the TDCE ratio prevails; 3) consistent with my earlier results, 
the variables ‘MV_Private’ and ‘Ind_4’ are positive and statistically significant. There 
is some weak evidence that ‘Ind_l’ may be positive (at the 1 0 % level) over the period 
(+2M, +24M) but later becomes negative (at the 10% level) over the period (+24M, 
+60M).
On the other hand, as shown in Table 6.12 (based on the industry-adjusted 
MV/MTBV benchmark), only the variable ‘DY’ shows weak evidence of negative 
and statistically significant results over the (+2M, +12M) period. The negative sign of 
‘DY’ is consistent with view that for low dividend bidders, managers remain loyal to 
shareholders and seek out good future investment opportunities. In contrast, bidders
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Table 6.11
Table 6.11 is the report o f  long-run regression tests for the restricted sub-sample. The acquirers in the sub-sample were domestic acquirers and
acquired private target firms. The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns calculated on the basis o f  the MV/MTBV matched control
firm model.
Independent Variable (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+24M, +60M)
Constant .. 0.1198 0.0669 0.3152 -0.1108 -0.0103 0.1664 -0.1771
0.3605 0.1018 0.4502 -0.1486 -0.0147 0.2667 -0.4989
PAYMENT -0.1201 -0.3764 -0.4671 -0.1866 -0.0738 -0.3607 -0.0075
-0.6367 -1.0087 -1.1763 -0.4546 -0.1869 -1.0193 -0.0372
DY -0.0088 -0.0132 -0.0629 -0.0842 -0.0980 -0.0443 -0.0483
-0.1798 -0.1362 -0.5999 -0.7408 -0.9183 -0.4735 -0.8939
MTBV -0.0412 -0.0684 -0.1996 -0.3291 -0.3452 -0.1268 -0.1610
-1.1963 -1.0042 -2.1186 -3.3175 -3.7143 -1.5104 -3.4207** *** *** ***
TDCE -0.0031 -0.0049 0.0005 0.0050 0.0094 0.0027 0.0100
-1.3879 -1.1084 0.1062 0.9590 1.9101 0.5919 4.0444* ***
MV_Private 0.2985 0.0913 0.3930 0.4975 0.7677 0.0723 0.9161
1.6273 0.2516 1.0135 1.2287 2.0114 0.2091 4.7386* ***
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Independent Variable - 
continued (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+24M, +60M)
IND. 1 0.3899 1.0159 0.7328 1.1865 0.6695 0.3171 -0.5232
1.3636 1.7956
*
1.2156 1.9621
*
1.1823 0.5903 -1.8245
*
IND. 4 0.1815 0.4552 0.8948 2.2162 2.0297 0.6743 0.8898
0.5726 0.7257 1.3351 3.0966
***
3.0315
***
1.1291 2.6238
**
Adjusted R2 
N=34
-0.0032 -0.0731 -0.0038 0.2515 0.3278 -0.1662 0.6333
Numbers in italic are t-statistics. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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Table 6.12
Table 6.12 is the report o f long-run regression tests for the restricted sub-sample. The acquirers in the sub-sample were domestic acquirers and
acquired private target firms. The dependent variables are cumulative abnormal returns calculated on the basis o f the industry-adjusted
MV/MTBV matched control firm model.
Independent Variable (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+24M, +60M)
Constant 0.3195 0.8062 1.3351 0.5603 0.2912 0.9733 -0.9169
1.0764 1.2494 2.1887
**
0.7326 0.3240 2.0307
*
-1.4186
PAYMENT 0.0220 -0.2878 -0.2227 0.1539 0.3237 -0.2625 0.3835
0.1357 -0.8182 -0.6716 0.3782 0.6961 -1.0076 1.1469
DY -0.0741 -0.1113 -0.1359 -0.0461 -0.0286 -0.0510 0.1077
-1.7303* -1.1953 -1.5209 -0.4043 -0.2213 -0.7269 1.1604
MTBV -0.0154 -0.0816 -0.0948 -0.1185 -0.1224 -0.0506 0.0290
-0.5342 -1.3019 -1.2282 -1.2472 -1.1389 -0.8331 0.3759
TDCE -0.0027 -0.0042 -0.0053 -0.0032 -0.0044 -0.0036 -0.0032
-1.3851 -0.9856 -1.2354 -0.6177 -0.7396 -1.0596 -0.7502
MV_Private 0.1511 0.0667 0.0582 -0.0001 0.1907 -0.1082 0.4591
0.9648 0.1960 0.1815 -0.0001 0.4186 -0.4293 1.4016
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Independent Variable - 
continued (+2M, +12M) (+2M, +24M) (+2M, +36M) (+2M, +48M) (+2M, +60M) (+12M, +36M) (+24M, +60M)
IND. 1 0.1331 0.1224 0.0070 0.2751 0.3077 -0.1361 0.3396
0.5229 0.2212 0.0134 0.4552 0.4340 -0.3333 0.6662
IND. 4 -0.0721 0.0162 -0.0239 0.6625 0.6970 0.0251 0.4276
-0.2608 0.0269 -0.0422 0.9629 0.8695 0.0565 0.7419
Adjusted R2 
N=34
0.1106 -0.0322 0.0531 -0.058 -0.0581 -0.0067 -0.1114
Numbers in italic are t-statistics. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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with high, past dividend payout may have less growth opportunities, and the bid 
announcement may be viewed as less desirable.
Section 6.6 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the impact of some variables on both the short and long 
run share price performance for UK M&As. A number of variables were identified to 
be important factors of determining the profitability of M&As. Depending on the 
benchmark used: in the short run, it has been shown that factors such as cross-border, 
means of payment, tender offer, dividend yield, market values (for domestic acquirers 
of listed targets), and industry (for the consumer service sector) are important 
determinants; and in the long run, it has been shown that factors such as cross-border, 
means of payment, tender offer, market to book value, dividend yield, market value 
(not for cross-border bidders), and industry (for the Finance and Consumer Service 
sectors) are important determinants of share price performance of bidders. Some main 
findings are summarized as follows.
The results show that, in the long run, cross-border M&As may have better share 
price performance. This suggests that cross-border bids are more influenced by 
synergy-related reasons, such as responding to overseas clients and escaping small 
home markets, than by ‘hubris’ and the possible greater information asymmetry in 
cross-border than in domestic M&As.
The results also suggest that Jensen (1986)’s ‘free cash flow hypothesis’ is not a 
major factor in the UK M&A market. This is shown in the positive sign of ‘Payment’ 
and the negative sign of ‘DY’ in many of the regression tests contrary to the 
prediction of the ‘free cash flow’ hypothesis. The positive sign of ‘Payment' is in line 
with the view of Myers and Majluf (1984) as noted earlier.
The results seem to suggest that ‘hubris’, as reflected by the TDCE ratio, may be a 
factor in UK domestic M&As of public targets. This is shown by the negative sign of 
‘TDCE’ in the long run regression tests for the sub-sample of acquisitions of public 
targets. However, the variable ‘TDCE’ has a positive sign in the long run regression
253
tests for the sub-sample of domestic acquisitions of private targets. One possible 
reason could be there is less ‘hubris’ in acquisitions of private targets, and a more 
positive side of the TDCE ratio prevails in UK acquirers of private targets.
Finally, as noted in Section 6.1, the impact of MV could be either positively or 
negatively (or insignificantly) related to bidders’ share price performance. A ‘bigger’ 
bidder may be associated with greater agency costs, however, it may also be 
associated with greater bargaining power (or management experience, etc). 
Depending on the benchmark used, ‘MV_Domestic’ has a negative sign in the long 
run as well as in the short run regression analysis, whereas ‘MV_Private’ has a 
positive sign in the long run regression analysis. In addition, MV appears to have no 
influence on share price performance of cross-border M&As. These results seem to 
suggest that the strength of managerial motives are different among domestic, cross- 
border and private M&As, with the private type least likely to have been affected by 
managerial factors and acquisitions of public targets most likely to have been 
affected.
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Appendix: Chapter 6
Table A6.1 Correlation matrix for Table 6.41
CRO­
SS
PAY­
MENT
TEN­
DER
HOS­
TILITY
PRI­
VATE DY MTBV
CROSS 1.00 0.37 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.29 0.11
PAY­
MENT 0.37 1.00 0.20 0.14 0.59 0.63 0.33
TEN­
DER 0.06 0.20 1.00 0.40 -0.02 0.25 0.10
HOS­
TILITY -0.01 0.14 0.40 1.00 -0.02 0.20 0.12
PRI­
VATE -0.02 0.59 -0.02 -0.02 1.00 0.67 0.36
DY 0.29 0.63 0.25 0.20 0.67 1.00 0.27
MTBV 0.11 0.33 0.10 0.12 0.36 0.27 1.00
TDCE 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.19 -0.42
MV_D. -0.01 0.23 0.58 0.58 -0.02 0.30 0.13
MV_C. 0.69 0.27 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.20 0.04
MV_P. -0.02 0.41 -0.01 -0.01 0.69 0.43 0.34
TIME 0.12 0.64 0.17 0.20 0.79 0.72 0.33
IND_1 0.07 0.24 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.09
IND_4 0.17 0.39 0.17 0.15 0.45 0.41 0.27
IND 10 0.18 0.42 0.05 0.05 0.43 0.42 0.16
1 ‘MV_D.’ =’MV_Domestic’; ‘MV_C.’ = ‘MV_Cross-border’; ‘MV_P.’ = ‘MV_Private\
TDCE MV_D. MV_C. MV_P. TIME IND_1 IND_4 IND_10
0.04 -0.01 0.69 -0.02 0.12 0.07 0.17 0.18
0.10 0.23 0.27 0.41 0.64 0.24 0.39 0.42
0.07 0.58 0.06 -0.01 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.05
0.12 0.58 -0.01 -0.01 0.20 0.21 0.15 0.05
0.08 -0.02 -0.02 0.69 0.79 0.22 0.45 0.43
0.19 0.30 0.20 0.43 0.72 0.28 0.41 0.42
-0.42 0.13 0.04 0.34 0.33 0.09 0.27 0.16
1.00 0.16 0.04 0.03 0.13 0.25 -0.02 0.04
0.16 1.00 -0.01 -0.02 0.27 0.26 0.22 0.07
0.04 -0.01 1.00 -0.01 0.11 0.08 0.16 0.12
0.03 -0.02 -0.01 1.00 0.50 0.21 0.34 0.23
0.13 0.27 0.11 0.50 1.00 0.31 0.45 0.37
0.25 0.26 0.08 0.21 0.31 1.00 -0.02 -0.01
-0.02 0.22 0.16 0.34 0.45 -0.02 1.00 -0.02
0.04 0.07 0.12 0.23 0.37 -0.01 -0.02 1.00
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Table A6.2 Simple regression analysis in relation to Table 6.42
Month 0 The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return based on the original MV/MTBV matched control firm model
CON- 0.0051 0.0056 0.0100* 0.0086 0.0014 0.0129 0.0054 0.0061 0.0152* 0.0043 0.0003 0.0118 0.0047 0.0093
STANT 0.7613 0.6029 1.7213 1.4754 0.1484 1.1185 0.7078 0.9076 1.8407 0.6591 0.0432 1.0143 0.7047 1.2573
CROSS 0.0007 0.0404
PAY- -0.0006
MENT - 0.0509
TEN- -0.0219
DER - 1.1666
HOS- -0.0072
TILITY - 0.3766
PRI- '  0.0104
VATE 0.9041
- 0.0021 
- 0.7904DY
MTBV -0.0001
I V M D  - 0.0326
TDCE 0.00000.3745
MV D -0.0132
-  - 1.1876
MV C 0.0137
1 -  0.5660
MV P 0.0159
m v -  1.1810
TIME -0.0092
- 0.6686
IND 1 0.0035
-  0.1948
IND 4 -0.0139
-  - 0.0176
IND 10
2 Figures in italics are t-statistics. ***, **, and * denotes significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
0.0025
0.3494
0.0122
0.8187
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Chapter 7 Conclusions
Section 7.1 Introduction
The purpose of this study has been to undertake an empirical investigation of the 
profitability of firms after M&As for some major acquisition markets in the EU. The 
study examined the recent period 1992 to 2003 for the UK, France and Germany. 
These three markets are the most active M&A markets in the EU and have the best 
data availability. This period consists of a M&A wave as I have discussed in Chapter 
1 {Introduction) and was characterised by a large increase in both the number and 
value of European M&A activity.
The study performed empirical tests on both the short- and long- run (up to 5 years) 
share price performance of firms after mergers and acquisitions, and also both 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions for the selected countries. Additionally, this 
study paid attention to the long-run share price performance of acquirers of private 
target firms for UK M&As. In the long run tests, the study employed recent 
developments in event study methodology to ensure empirical results of the 
profitability of M&As are robust and comparable as possible.
Furthermore, this study explored a number of determinants of the variation in post­
acquisition share-price performance for UK acquirers over both the short- and long- 
run. Also, these determinants may help to further reveal the motives for M&As.
Section 7.2 Key Findings
This thesis mainly focuses on two issues: 1) exploring the profitability of firms after 
M&As for different types of bidders and targets; and 2) exploring the important 
factors of determining the share price performance after M&As. I start with the key 
findings on the first issue.
i
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The short-run tests of the profitability of M&As show little sensitivity to asset pricing 
models considered. The results are similar between the market-index based models 
and the MV/MTBV-matched models. In the short run, the empirical results show 
strong evidence that shareholders of target firms enjoy a profitable experience over a 
short time period surrounding the announcement date, irrespective of whether they are 
domestic or cross-border acquisitions. Take the (-5D, +5D) event window as an 
example: the UK target firms on average receive a statistically significant abnormal 
return of over 23% in this period, the French target firms on average receive a 
statistically significant abnormal return of over 6 %, and the German target firms on 
average receive a statistically significant abnormal return of over 14%. On the other 
hand, the profitability of bidding firms over a short event window is less clear. The 
shareholders of the French and German bidding firms experience statistically 
insignificant wealth effects within the event month. However, there is weak evidence 
that UK bidding firms have superior profitability in the short run. Over the (-5D, 
+5D) event period, UK domestic acquirers on average experience an abnormal return 
of over 3% which is statistically significant at the 5% level, and UK cross-border 
acquirers on average experience an abnormal return of over 2 % and statistically 
significant at the 1 0% level.
Therefore, for the short run share price performance, we can see that target firms’ 
shareholders have positive wealth effects and bidding firms’ shareholders do not lose 
in line with some earlier studies (e.g. Franks and Harris, 1989). Although most 
bidding firms make statements about the potential synergies from M&As, the 
forecasted benefits are frequently not fully achieved by those bidders in the short run. 
This may be the results of over-optimistic forecasts of the bidding management or the 
fact that M&As were initiated for reasons such as ‘agency’ problems or ‘hubris’. Both 
‘agency’ problems and ‘hubris’ may lower the potential ‘synergy’ gains to bidding 
firms and deliver premiums to target firms.
Consistent with the ‘market effect’ hypothesis developed in Chapter 2 (Literature 
Review), the short run results also show that the location of target firms appears to 
have an important impact on the short-term wealth effects: UK targets generate 
significantly higher abnormal returns than their Continental European counterparts. 
Take the (-5D, +5D) event window as an example: the UK target firms on average
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receive an abnormal return of over 23% whereas the Continental European (France 
and Germany) target firms on average receive 10% - 11%. The difference is a 
substantial 12% plus which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, a 
feature of this study is that it provides evidence that a market effect may exist. This 
could be a result of a higher degree of competitiveness of M&As, a more liquid and 
well-developed equity market and a higher degree of shareholder protection in the UK 
market than in the French and German markets.
This study has also examined the long run share price performance for the three 
countries. The long run event study is important because the short run abnormal 
returns may only provide an incomplete image of the bidding firms’ shareholders’ 
wealth effects. The possibility exists that the market does not always accurately 
predict the future performance of M&As.
Some studies (e.g. Lyon et al., 1999) suggest that the long-run tests of the profitability 
of M&As are sensitive to model selection and sample selection. Also they suggest 
that the methodologies commonly used in earlier event studies are flawed in the long 
run tests. To address these issues, this study employed several methodologies that are 
robust to the recent criticisms. To reduce the statistical problem of cross-sectional 
dependence in sample firm share returns, the original samples were divided into non­
overlapping and overlapping sub-samples. 1 I start the discussion from the results 
based on the non-overlapping samples. This study employed the (industry-adjusted) 
control firm and control portfolio models together with bootstrapped skewness 
adjusted t-statistics to study non-overlapping sub-samples. These models avoid new 
listing, re-balancing and skewness biases suggested by Lyon et al. (1997,1999).
There is evidence that UK domestic acquirers of publicly-listed target firms on 
average have a less profitable experience in the long-run post-acquisition period. This 
is shown by the negative and statistically significant mean BHARs up to 2 and a half 
years after the announcement date. If I take the results based on the ‘3Y Non­
overlapping Sample’ as an example, the negative mean BHARs trough at -19.6% 
(statistically significant at the 1% level) after the end of the 2 nd year relative to the
1 ‘Overlapping’ mean acquirers make multiple acquisitions within the relevant periods, 
whereas this is not the case in non-overlapping samples.
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announcement date. After approximately 2 and a half years, the mean BHARs 
gradually become statistically insignificant. The results suggest that negative motives, 
like ‘hubris’ or managerial motives, are important factors in the UK M&A markets 
(mainly for domestic acquirers of listed targets) from a long run share price 
performance point of view.
The results for UK domestic acquirers of private target firms are more mixed, and 
dependent on sample selection. Based on the ‘3Y Non-overlapping Sample’, there is 
evidence that UK domestic acquirers of private targets experience negative and 
statistically significant BHARs in the long run. However, this is not supported by the 
‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’. Based on the ‘5Y Non-overlapping Sample’, the mean 
BHARs in the long run for acquirers of private targets are positive but not statistically 
significant (except in one case). This suggests that in long run event studies, one 
should be careful in interpreting results.
Generally speaking, there is no real evidence showing that the long run share price 
performance for UK cross-border acquirers is statistically significant. This implies 
that the shareholders of UK cross-border acquirers do not experience further positive 
or negative abnormal returns in the long run.
Gathering all UK acquirers together, there is evidence that, in the long run, overall 
acquisitions by UK acquirers yield negative profits. This is supported by any 
combination of the sampling methods and benchmarks used.
The French sample provides no real evidence of under- or over- performance in the 
long run (except in one case). On balance, the results suggest there is less ‘hubris’ or 
managerial motives in the French than in the UK M&A market. For the German 
M&A market, results are dependent on the methodology. There is some evidence of 
underperformance in the German sample for domestic acquirers. If I take the ‘3Y 
Non-overlapping Sample’ of German domestic acquirers as an example, based on the 
control firm model, the mean BHARs trough at -28.3% (statistically significant at the 
1% level) after two years relative to the announcement date, whereas the mean 
BHARs trough at -9.2% based on the control portfolio model which is not statistically 
significant.
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When I gather all acquirers from all three countries together, there is strong evidence 
that overall M&A activity is unprofitable in the long run, which is supported by any 
combination of the sampling methods and benchmarks used. Overall, the results 
suggest that that firms (and investors) should be wary of entering into M&As 
especially from a long run share price performance point of view.
One feature of this study is that it makes a distinction between non-overlapping and 
overlapping samples in the long run. With the presence of overlapping returns, the 
BHARs of the original CF/CP model is no longer an appropriate indicator of the long 
run share price performance. For one reason, the BHARs of an earlier M&A can 
impact on the BHARs of the subsequent M&As and make the results contaminated; 
for another reason, test statistics could be mis-specified due to lack of independence 
in overlapping returns. To tackle these problems, I employed the calendar time 
approach along with either the Fama-French three-factor or control portfolio model 
(as suggested by e.g. Fama, 1998, and Mitchell and Stafford, 2000).
The results show that although UK non-overlapping acquirers (of domestic public 
targets) experience negative and statistically significant mean abnormal returns over 
the period examined, UK overlapping acquirers (of domestic public targets) only 
experience insignificant average excess returns over the same period. UK overlapping 
acquirers (of private target firms) experience positive and statistically significant 
average excess returns, which are also significantly higher than the average excess 
return of UK non-overlapping acquirers (of private target firms) over the same period 
examined. Gathering all UK acquirers together, the entire UK overlapping sample 
also shows better performance than the entire UK non-overlapping sample. Therefore, 
this study reveals that the investigation of overlapping samples is important because 
the overlapping sample firms on average may perform differently from the non­
overlapping sample firms. Different performance could occur if ‘overlapping’ is a 
sign of experience in handling M&As and if experience is positively correlated with 
the post-M&A share price performance. Similarly, ‘overlapping’ could be linked to 
the bidding firm’s ambition, the speed of expansion, etc., which could have an impact 
on the long run share price performance. Overall the results above suggest superior 
performance of overlapping bidders for the UK and imply that experience of
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acquisitions plays an important role in explaining variations o f  post-acquisition share
price performance.
For the French market, the results show that the ‘overlapping’ effect is not an 
important factor. However, surprisingly, in the German sample, overlapping domestic 
acquirers appear to do less well than non-overlapping ones. One possible reason is 
that ‘hubris’ or ‘agency’ has become more significant for German overlapping 
domestic acquirers and they might have been overly aggressive in corporate 
expansion.
Another feature of this study is that it distinguishes between domestic and cross- 
border M&As. Earlier studies (e.g. Harris and Ravenscaft. 1991, and Campa and 
Hernando, 2002) suggest that for the event period there is a cross-border effect: in a 
market, in the short run, cross-border targets gain significantly more than domestic 
targets while cross-border bidders gain significantly less than domestic bidders. My 
study shows that, within Month 0 for the UK market, targets in cross-border M&As 
do experience higher share price performance, however, shareholder wealth effects 
for cross-border bidders are not significantly lower than domestic bidders. This thesis 
further investigated the cross-border effect in the long run event study environment 
for the UK market. The results show that based on the (+2M, +24M) period, cross- 
border bidders experience significantly higher share price performance than domestic 
bidders.
The available results of my study seem to suggest that synergy gains for cross-border 
bidders take a long time to develop. As I have discussed, there are two groups of 
arguments why shareholder wealth effects may be different between domestic and 
cross-border M&As. One group suggests negative motives may be important factors. 
For example, the profitability of cross-border M&As for bidders may be lowered by 
‘hubris’ factors such that managers of bidding firms underestimate the impact of 
culture differences on the success of M&As or overestimate their ability to value 
foreign firms (e.g. due to different accounting standards). Another group points in the 
opposite direction. It argues that cross-border acquisitions may be more motivated by 
positive factors, e.g. escaping a small home market, extending markets served, 
achieving economies of scale, replacing inefficient management of a foreign firm, and
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responding to overseas clients’ needs. My results appear to suggest that in the short 
run (e.g. Month 0), cross-border bidders are influenced by ‘hubris’ in conjunction 
with those unique ‘synergies’ of cross-border M&As in similar strength. As a result, 
we see no under- or over- share price performance for cross-border bidders compared 
with domestic bidders. In the long run when those positive synergy factors in cross- 
border M&As start to develop and bidders have more access to targets’ information, 
we can observe the better bidder share price performance of cross-border bidders than 
domestic ones.
This study also examined some other possible determinants of the post-acquisition 
share price performance. The tests were performed on the UK sample because its 
sample size is bigger as well as the UK being a major M&A market in the EU. A 
number of factors have been discovered that have explanatory power for short- and/or 
long- run post-acquisition share price performance.
This study shows that Jensen (1986)’s free cash flow hypothesis is not a major factor 
in the UK M&A market. Jensen (1986)’s free cash flow hypothesis predicts that 
managers may waste free cash flow on less desired M&A projects rather than 
dividend payouts because of a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. 
In my study, in the short run, cash offers have better share price performance than 
equity offers which is in contrast with Jensen (1986). My result is more in line with 
Myers and Majluf (1984) who assume that managers are loyal to shareholders and 
possess information about the true value of the firm. As a result, cash offers serve as a 
good signal to investors indicating that the share price of bidding firms may be 
undervalued. There is also some weak evidence that cash offers have superior 
performance in the long run (depending on methodology used), which was not found 
in earlier studies.
This study provides evidence that the MV of acquirers has important explanatory 
power to the long-run share price performance. The empirical results of this study 
reveal that, for domestic acquirers of publicly-listed targets, in both the short and long 
run, ‘bigger’ acquirers underperform ‘smaller’ ones. Managers may be more powerful 
in a bigger firm, which makes monitoring them more difficult and costly. In addition, 
a bigger bidder may have less focus on the acquired firms. These could be reasons for
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the negative relationship between MV and share price performance for domestic 
acquirers of listed targets. It also suggests that managerial motives are significant 
factors in this type of M&A. In contrast, for domestic acquirers of private target firms, 
the results show that in the long run ‘bigger’ acquirers outperform ‘smaller’ ones. 
This could be the result of more bargaining power, more financing resources, and 
more adaptability/experience in absorbing target firms that may be associated with 
‘bigger’ acquirers. It may reveal that there are less managerial motives in domestic 
acquirers of private targets.
The results in this study suggest that in the short run tender offers have superior share 
price performance for acquirers. This result is consistent with earlier studies such as 
Gregory (1997) and Loughran and Vijh (1997). The value-increasing feature of tender 
offers is consistent with the view that acquiring firms can replace the inefficient 
management of target firms and realize a capital gain by improving operating 
performance. The bidder in a tender offer uncovers value-creating insights about the 
target firm and seeks to avoid giving value up in a negotiation with the target firm.
The ‘glamour’ versus ‘value’ firm effect, as found by Rau and Vermaelen (1997) and 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), are supported in the long run in this study. 
Consistent with their findings, this study found a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between long-run post-acquisition share price performance and the 
MTBVs of acquirers before the announcement. This study further shows that the 
glamour/value effect of MTBVs mainly exists in acquirers of private targets. The 
glamour/value effect of MTBV suggests that acquirers with a high MTBV (glamour 
stocks) tend to be overpriced (see also Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998, p. 307- 
314) reflecting a recent high growth in earnings, and vice versa. After a period of time 
the market corrects the previous over-reaction based of past performance. 
Shareholders of acquirers with a high MTBV at the announcement time will 
experience low average returns afterwards, and shareholders of acquirers with a low 
MTBV (value stocks) at the announcement time will subsequently earn superior 
returns. Therefore, a negative relationship between MTBV and the long run share 
price performance is observed. The ‘over-reaction’ hypothesis above also predicts a 
positive relationship between MTBVs and the short run share price performance. 
However, this is not observed in this study.
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In this study, there are other factors that are also found to be important in determining 
post-M&A share price performance. In certain circumstances factors, such as the 
Total Debt/Common Equity ratio, dividend yield before the announcement, industry 
sector, and acquisition period, were also found to be able to explain some of the 
variations in acquirers’ share price performance after M&As. These issues have been 
discussed in Chapter 6  (Regression Analysis).
Section 7.3 Contributions
This study contributes to the literature of event studies of M&As in three ways as 
follows.
First, it examined the long run share price performance after M&As and employed 
several methodologies that are robust to the recent criticisms of commonly used 
methodologies in earlier event studies. The long run event study is important because 
the possibility exists that the short run share price performance does not always 
accurately predict the future performance of M&As. This is reflected by the results of 
this study. For example, in the short run, UK domestic acquirers of public targets do 
not under- or over- perform (except a few cases), whereas there is significant evidence 
that they do under-perform in longer run, e.g. up to 5 years.
The different share price performance between the short and long run event studies 
has some wider significance. For one thing, it shows that M&As are long term 
investments. Some synergy gains may take a long time to develop and are not fully 
realized in the share price around the announcement period. Also, investors may 
revise their views/expectations after the M&As when the evidence/performance of the 
M&As becomes clearer. Similarly, agency costs may be spread over a long time 
period and not fully realized in the short run share price. For another, it questions the 
wealth-creation feature of M&As in the short run. The results of this study show that, 
in certain circumstances (especially for acquisitions of public targets in the UK 
market), acquirers do suffer wealth losses in the long run.
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The long run results for UK acquirers also raise policy concerns for M&As. In this 
study, on balance there is more evidence to show that UK acquirers of public targets 
suffer significant wealth losses if the longer post-M&A period is considered. Possible 
reasons may be acquisitions of public target firms are more likely to be associated 
with managers’ own interests or ‘hubris’ may be factor. This raises serious question 
over this type of M&A, in particular, the evidence suggests that from a public policy 
point of view investors should need to be more cautious in approving this type of 
M&A.
Second, this study has shown somewhat different results for the French and German 
M&A markets. Earlier event studies, especially long run event studies, have been 
largely limited to the UK and US M&A markets, therefore there is a need for the 
M&A research for the continental EU acquisition markets. This study showed that 
the profitability of M&A activity (for target firms) is systematically higher in the UK 
market than in the French and German markets.
Finally, this study investigated three types of acquirers, that is, acquirers of domestic, 
cross-border and private targets. Few studies have examined all these types of 
acquisitions together for both the short and long run. This study further shows that the 
profitability (and the determinants of the profitability) of these three types of acquirers 
can be different, especially in the long run.
The different results for domestic, cross-border and private M&As also have wider 
significance as they may reveal that different characteristics and different strengths of 
motives are associated with these three types of M&As. On balance, the results for the 
UK suggest that acquirers of private targets (and cross-border targets) are less likely 
to have negative share price effects in the long run than acquirers of domestic public 
companies. The results suggest that problems of ‘agency’ and ‘hubris’ do not 
outweigh synergy effects in private and (cross-border) M&As, but may be more of a 
problem in (especially larger) domestic public M&As.
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